BEYOND EMERGENCY RELIEF

Longer-term trends and priorities for UN agencies in Darfur

United Nations
Sudan
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Planning for longer-term sustainability in Darfur

This document promotes mid- and longer-term planning among UN agencies in order to help Darfur move towards greater sustainability. Far from comprehensive, the document identifies major trends and priorities where more robust engagement can have a substantial impact. Specifically, the document focuses on technical areas where UN agencies possess significant expertise, but that have received only some attention so far. Trends and priorities were determined over nine months of research and consultations with UN agencies, governments, donors and civil society. The resolution of key political challenges – including a lasting peace agreement – is also critical to Darfur’s future. This document focuses on vital technical priorities, however, and does not address political issues directly. All activities outlined in the document are intended to complement ongoing humanitarian assistance efforts. Implementation should begin in areas where conditions allow, expanding as conditions improve elsewhere.

Trends
Three major trends are analysed in this document: environmental change, demographic shifts, and institutions and governance. Each of these trends has significantly contributed to conflict and vulnerability in Darfur, and the recent crisis has intensified many of them.

Environmental change
Environmental degradation has intensified in recent years, undermining Darfur’s future prospects. This degradation is chiefly driven by two forces: climate change and human impact on the environment.

Climate change is a natural process over which local people have little control. In Darfur, this is chiefly visible in more erratic rainfall, which has led to increased drought severity and frequency. In North Darfur, 20 of the 25 driest years on record have occurred since 1972. Climate change has undermined agriculture and encouraged conflict, as well as led to maladaptive coping strategies, such as deforestation.

Human impact on the environment exacerbates the effects of climate change. This impact is mainly visible in three areas: deforestation, aggressive agriculture, and water management. An earlier trend towards deforestation has been accelerated by the conflict, as people clear trees, mainly for fuel and construction. Some forests around major cities have disappeared entirely. Aggressive agriculture – over-cultivation and over-grazing – was a serious issue before the conflict that pressured livelihoods and fuelled disputes. Farmers often cultivated land without rest and expanded planting areas to the detriment of grazing land and forests. Pastoralists grazed herds on smaller tracts that could not support them. Water has also been poorly managed. Water resources can be difficult to access and are strained by increased population densities. Water tables have fallen rapidly in some areas – including by 10 metres around El Fasher since 2007 – indicating a need for better management.

Demographic shifts
Darfur has undergone major demographic shifts over the last generation. These shifts have complicated the region’s ability to absorb the effects of environmental change and poor governance. Demographic shifts are chiefly visible in three areas: population growth, youth bulge and urbanization.

Since 1973, Darfur’s population has grown almost six-fold, to roughly 7.5 million people. At historic growth rates, the area could be home to 12 million people by 2025. Large population increases translate into corresponding demands for services and opportunities that the region is ill-equipped to meet. Darfur is home to a high concentration of youth – 52 percent of Darfuris are no older than 16 years. This youth bulge creates enormous pressure to provide education and other opportunities for young people. Over the last generation, urbanization has also increased and was forcibly accelerated by the conflict. Fifty percent of Darfuris now live in and around major cities, or along the axes that link them. Urbanization offers several potential benefits, including increased proximity to services, but cities must be adequately equipped to provide for residents in order to reap these benefits.

Institutions and governance
Weak governance undermines Darfur’s ability to confront major changes and effectively manage associated tensions. Overall, institutions in Darfur – both in government and civil society – have performed below required capacity, primarily as a result of two issues: marginalization and an internal institutional breakdown.

Darfur has historically been marginalized. Low fiscal transfers from the centre and poor access to services best illustrate the impact of marginalization since Sudan’s independence. In 2008, Darfur’s state governments received only 21 percent of the budget for which they had planned, although this represents an increase over earlier years. Lack of funding and capacity gaps constrain local governments’ ability to meet people’s needs, contributing to poor development indicators in many sectors.

Internally, Darfur has seen a protracted breakdown in its institutions. This breakdown is most visible when examining local governments and land tenure regulations. Modernization drives in the 1970s mostly replaced traditional structures with new institutions. These replacements largely failed to deliver...
benefits to the local population, however. As a result, trust in institutions diminished, and a dual system emerged in which neither modern nor traditional institutions fully command popular trust or participation.

Priorities
In order to help address the trends destabilizing Darfur, this document identifies four major priorities for mid- and longer-term planning among UN agencies: environment, livelihoods, education and human capital, as well as governance and capacity building. Ultimately, all progress is the responsibility of local communities, their leaders and the Government of Sudan. UN agencies can support the fulfilment of these responsibilities by leveraging resources and expertise.

Environment
Strengthening environmental management is critical to resolving the current crisis and promoting durable solutions for the region. Major priorities include:

1. Support better management of forestry resources by engaging officials and communities;
2. Promote inclusive management of water resources and improve water harvesting and access;
3. Promote the use of alternative energy and technology – particularly for construction;
4. Support greater community engagement through outreach and the development of environmental action plans;
5. Strengthen official capacity to lead environmental monitoring, research and policy development.

Livelihoods
Livelihoods are undergoing a substantial shift in Darfur. Rural livelihoods, routinely targeted during the conflict, mostly comprise farming, livestock and forestry. Urban livelihoods are mostly based on agricultural services or processing. In rural and urban areas, many people have turned to unsustainable livelihoods – like the sale of firewood – in the absence of other opportunities. Short-term initiatives should promote temporary employment while continuing to develop longer-term strategies. Major priorities include:

1. Support large-scale, temporary employment programmes, such as food-for-work;
2. Supply farmers and pastoralists with critical inputs that will boost production;
3. Strengthen markets across Darfur to serve as social and economic anchors;
4. Encourage greater security for livelihoods by working with UNAMID to increase patrols;
5. Improve access to finance – particularly for small farmers and entrepreneurs;
6. Improve agricultural practices – including demarcation of migration routes – through training and other activities;
7. Invest in agriculture – including agro-forestry and semi-mechanized farming – as a way to encourage sustainable rural livelihoods;
8. Introduce better agricultural risk management – including crop insurance;
9. Strengthen links to markets by working to develop a more pro-poor value chain;
10. Promote urban planning and private sector development.

Education and human capital
Given Darfur’s challenges, education will be key to moving the region out of crisis. Besides teaching, schools also play a critical role in child protection and can provide a minimum package of services in other sectors. Efforts should focus on primary and secondary schools, as well as vocational and alternative training. Major priorities include:

1. Support efforts to close the primary school enrolment gap between Darfur and other northern states;
2. Promote access to vocational training and alternative learning opportunities, particularly literacy and numeracy;
3. Support greater access to secondary education;
4. Work with partners to improve the quality of education, focusing on the student-teacher ratio, teacher training and infrastructure;
5. Collaborate to ensure that schools provide a minimum package of child-friendly services;
6. Bolster the capacity of education officials.

Governance and capacity building
Strengthening governance, particularly at the local level, is essential to future sustainability. Better governance must include more reliable basic services, a strong to the rule of law, and robust community involvement. UN agencies should engage officials and civil society together, all within a framework that emphasizes peacebuilding. Major priorities include:

1. Strengthen the role of civil society in governance – especially in advocating priorities;
2. Improve civil society’s ability to resolve disputes and promote justice;
3. Strengthen the capacity of technical ministries at the state and locality levels in order to improve service delivery;
4. Build stronger capacity for public management and coordination in state governments;
5. Strengthen the official justice sector and the rule of law, including human rights.
INTRODUCTION

Beyond emergency relief: Longer-term trends and priorities for UN agencies in Darfur

Darfur remains beset by serious, immediate challenges – the legacy of a conflict that has evolved significantly since 2003, but continues to threaten the well-being of millions of Darfuris. These challenges demand rapid, ongoing response – in food, health, water and shelter, for example – to keep people alive and meet their most basic needs. But in many ways, today’s emergencies are symptoms of long-standing trends – protracted crises in the environment, demographics and governance – that contributed to the recent conflict and have intensified as a result of it. As the international community considers what Darfur needs to move beyond emergencies and relief, engaging these trends will be critical. Going forward, assistance efforts will increasingly be confronted with a fundamental question: how can 8 million people live sustainably in Darfur?

Recent deteriorations in security and unresolved political issues – not least of which is the lack of a peace agreement – may make this question seem premature. But whether a lasting settlement comes tomorrow or not at all, Darfur cannot afford to defer questions on how to repair its ecosystem, manage a rapidly changing population or mend its institutions. As these trends accelerate, driven by natural processes and human impact, the potential result is harrowing: mounting competition over dwindling resources that will suffocate opportunity, fuel conflict and leave Darfur mired in tragedy.

Addressing these issues is enormously complex – a fact that underscores the need to start planning early. But this complexity also indicates that in moving ahead, the international community must have a clear sense of where it can be most helpful – and where it cannot. For the United Nations, this means prioritizing areas where UN agencies have a distinct advantage in expertise, presence and partnerships, while recognizing that progress ultimately depends on local communities, their leaders and the Government of Sudan.

Towards that end, the UN has identified four priorities that have received only some attention to date, and that could benefit from greater engagement in the longer term. These priorities – the environment, livelihoods, education and governance – represent the outcome of nine months of research and consultations that included UN agencies, government officials, donors and civil society. Taken together, they offer an initial strategy to ground future planning efforts and support Darfur in moving towards greater sustainability. To be successful, these efforts must consider the needs of all 8 million residents of Darfur, including – but not limited to – the area’s two million IDPs and a total of four million recipients of humanitarian aid.

Environment

Climate change in Darfur has disrupted people’s lives by curtailing the availability of resources, thereby spurring greater competition and conflict. Confronted with the consequences of a brutal war, many people have embraced coping strategies – clearing forests to power the kilns for fire bricks, for example – that have accelerated the impact of climate change and indirectly perpetuated a root cause of the conflict. Reversing this damage will be essential to Darfur’s sustainability in the longer-term. UN agencies can offer significant support for this process by promoting better environmental management and empowering communities to confront climate-related vulnerability.

Livelihoods

Adapting livelihoods in Darfur will be critical to supporting longer-term stability, given the need to develop dependable means of self-sufficiency for the region’s rapidly growing population. Rural livelihoods are likely to continue to generate substantial wealth and deserve significant attention, particularly in terms of environmental renewal and balancing the needs of farmers and pastoralists. But as Darfur’s cities continue to grow, efforts to rehabilitate and expand urban livelihoods will also be crucial. UN agencies can best assist local stakeholders in this process by drawing on successful experience in economic planning, employment generation and agricultural development, among other key areas.

Education and human capital

Access to education in Darfur has expanded somewhat, but the public sector remains ill-equipped to accommodate all school-aged children. An effective, accessible education system – including primary, secondary and vocational schooling – is crucial to building the human capital that Darfuris will require to realize their ambitions and confront longer-term challenges. Education can also play an important role in promoting reconciliation, as well as facilitating the availability of basic services to students. Working with local governments, UN agencies can translate significant strengths in education and training into support for Darfuri learners and the institutions that are responsible for them.

Governance and capacity development

Good governance, particularly at the local level, is key to managing the major challenges facing Darfur. Building institutions that reflect and respond to communities’ needs and aspirations will be critical to transforming civil society into an effective advocate of local priorities, as well as building local governments that will act as stewards of peace and prosperity. Achieving this outcome will require rigorous capacity building efforts that involve both civil society and local officials, includ-
ing attention to local governments’ relations with Khartoum. Demonstrated experience with successful capacity development programmes in Sudan – including in Darfur – indicates that UN agencies can add significant value to this process.

**Structure and approach**

Planning with a longer horizon in Darfur is intended to complement the current commitment to humanitarian assistance, a vital enterprise in the lives of some 4 million people. On a parallel track, international and national actors must take steps to ensure that humanitarian accomplishments can be leveraged into longer-term progress. In so doing, a sophisticated sense of timing and location – when and where certain programmes can move ahead, and others cannot – will be imperative, particularly in light of fluctuating security, limited access, and unresolved political questions. These factors are critical to determining when implementation is appropriate, but they should not divert attention from Darfur’s longer-term priorities altogether. Humanitarian programmes have already made great strides in meeting people’s needs, and in many cases already support projects that look to the future. Broadening these efforts into sustainable progress for Darfur constitutes a responsible extension of this approach.

This document identifies and analyses several destabilizing trends in Darfur, focusing on developments in the environment, demographics and governance that have significantly contributed to vulnerability. Far from a comprehensive account, the document highlights four technical priorities – environment, livelihoods, education and governance – where greater UN agency engagement can have a substantial impact. These priorities emphasize UN agencies’ recognized expertise, as well as reflect likely funding availability. As a result, some important technical issues, such as large-scale infrastructure improvements, are not directly addressed. The four priorities are mainly presented at a general level, offering initial recommendations that can help ground future planning efforts. Individual agencies often already possess or are developing detailed action plans within these priorities.

Beyond technical priorities, critical political issues – including land tenure, the fate of IDPs and the peace process – are fundamental to Darfur’s longer-term sustainability. These concerns will require resolution through an equitable political process, however, which lies mostly outside the scope of this document. Instead, the technical priorities discussed here are intended to complement the international community’s efforts to support a just and lasting political settlement. As a result, when peace does come, UN agencies will stand ready to assist Darfur in moving quickly and decisively towards stability and prosperity for all its citizens.
TRENDS

Environmental change
Climate change and human impact on the environment

Demographic shifts
Population growth, youth bulge and urbanization

Institutions and governance
Marginalization and internal breakdown
The environment in Darfur has declined rapidly in recent years, the cumulative effect of climate change and human impact. Environmental concerns have often been at the root of conflict in the area, as people – especially farmers and pastoralists – clash over access to natural resources. But the scale of recent degradation has eclipsed previous shortages, severely destabilizing a fragile ecosystem that for generations had balanced the needs of diverse livelihoods. The implications include deteriorations in the quality of life, such as access to water or forestry resources, as well as potentially irreversible damage to livelihoods and the spectre of nearly constant conflict. Reversing this decline is critical to moving Darfur past the current crisis and ensuring its longer-term viability.

The effects of climate change have been exacerbated by man-made degradation. But these processes have also been intensified by the absence of capable leadership, as well as the pressures of population growth and urbanization. In devising strategies to address these developments, UN agencies should consider all the dynamics behind Darfur’s environmental decline. This section outlines two principal factors driving recent degradation: climate change and human impact.

Climate change
Located on the edge of the desert, Darfur’s ecosystem has always been extremely delicate. Over time, this ecosystem has sustained a predominantly rural society by offering mostly adequate levels of rain, sun and soil fertility to support a balance between pastoralists and farmers. Agriculture in Darfur depends almost exclusively on the environment, meaning that rain levels essentially determine the success or failure of planters and herders in any given season. In the cities, rainfall is equally important, as it replenishes the water tables from which people access critical water supplies.

Harvest failure (2000)

- 40%

25 - 70% harvest failure across Darfur today

Harvest failure (2050)

- 70%

40 - 85% harvest failure in Darfur projected by 2050

Rainfall has always been somewhat erratic in Darfur, and a history of regular drought has been a major contributor to conflict over time. In recent years, however, rain seems to fall with considerably less predictable frequency across the region, the apparent result of climate change processes over which Darfuris have little control. In North Darfur, for example, 20 of the 25 driest years on record have occurred since 1972. As this trend has emerged, Darfur has also faced a period of rapid population growth that increased society’s overall demand for water and other resources.

Climate change and rainfall

More erratic rainfall in recent years has already had far reaching consequences. Drought has occurred with greater regularity and severity, for example, contributing to the frequent failure of growing seasons across Darfur. Today, at least 30 percent of harvests are estimated to fail in Darfur – a figure that rises to at least 70 percent in the worst-hit areas, mostly...
in North Darfur. Failed growing seasons dramatically increase the likelihood of hunger and malnutrition, setting off a search for alternatives that can foster conflict and encourage maladaptive coping strategies. Drought-associated drops in the water supply can also threaten sanitation, potentially triggering serious health risks. Overall, these effects have led to greater vulnerabilities in food, water, health and nutrition, as well as protection risks stemming from increased conflict.

Projections indicate that this process will intensify. According to recent estimates, Darfuris will face a substantially greater risk of drought and associated threats over the next 30 years. At current rates, this means that North Darfur could be essentially barren by 2050, leading to a collapse of existing livelihoods that could result in conflict or large-scale migration. Even comparatively fertile South Darfur will see at least 40 percent of all growing seasons fail by 2050—a figure that rises to at least 70 percent in half of the state’s territory.

Altering the direction of climate change is essentially impossible for Darfur’s people. As a result, it is imperative that the area embrace adaptive strategies that will mitigate the impact of climate change and promote greater sustainability. Darfuris understand that their land is changing, and the vigour with which they have embraced coping strategies—not always positive—is indicative of their grasp of the situation. Working with local people to improve existing approaches to the environment can have a significant effect on tempering environmental change. The largest opportunities here will come from addressing the human impact on the area’s ecosystem.

**Human impact on the environment**

The deleterious effects of climate change are seriously compounded by the impact of humans on the environment. To some extent, this impact is the predictable result of rapid population growth, as greater numbers of people consume more resources. The ecosystem in Darfur, however, is particularly ill-equipped to absorb such growth in the absence of significant adaptations. Without positive changes, human impact will combine with climate change to facilitate the collapse of rural livelihoods and place untenable pressure on urban areas. Human impact on the environment is most visible in the following areas: deforestation, over-cultivation and over-grazing, and water consumption. These activities are all essential to life in Darfur, but will require significant changes in order to become sustainable.

In embracing such changes, Darfuris have been severely handicapped by recent events, particularly a conflict that has left some 2 million people displaced from their homes and driven many to desperation. One result of this desperation has been the adoption of maladaptive coping strategies—clearing forests to access firewood, for example—that increase pressure on the environment, particularly around urban areas and IDP camps. By perpetuating one of the main drivers of conflict—environmental stress—this maladaptation undermines Darfur’s capacity to emerge from crisis.

**Deforestation**

Darfur has the last remaining substantial forest cover in northern Sudan. These forests face serious threats from agriculture, population growth and the effects of conflict. Before the war broke out, tree cover in Darfur was already declining, with forests contracting at an average annual rate of over 1 percent between 1973 and 2006. Overall, Sudan has lost more forest cover than any other African country, and Darfur is clearly a major contributor to this trend. In fact, some forests around cities like Nyala and El Geneina have disappeared entirely.

The biggest culprit driving deforestation is the enormous demand for construction and firewood. Growing urbanization has often translated into a construction boom around Darfur, sending brick production soaring across the area. In Nyala alone, for example, brick production surged to almost 130 million in 2007. Making bricks requires large quantities of wood to fuel kilns, which combined with domestic firewood needs, has resulted in highly unsustainable deforestation rates. In Kalma camp near Nyala, for example, IDPs could once find adequate firewood within 15 kilometres. Today, they must travel 75 kilometres for the same purpose, or rely on firewood merchants who travel to them.

Where people are still able to practise traditional rural livelihoods, pastoralists and farmers have also played an important role in fuelling deforestation. Farmers, for example, have

### Deforestation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No country in Africa has lost more forest than Sudan</th>
<th>Loss of forest area 1990-2005 (million hectares)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>42.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>26.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>25.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>25.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>24.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>24.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>23.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>22.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>22.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### Fire brick production

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fire brick production surged</th>
<th>Number of bricks produced and taxed by FNC per year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>El Geneina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-crisis</td>
<td>9,045,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>1,215,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>29,970,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>82,620,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>40,780,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UNEP (2008a).
often cleared forests to claim new land for cultivation, or have supplemented income by selling firewood or charcoal. Similar pressures on pastoralists have led to the same results, and many pastoralists take advantage of nomadic lifestyles to transport wood to urban areas where it is in short supply.

Urbanization, population growth and the effects of climate change would have likely increased pressure on Darfur’s forests in any case. But the conflict has intensified the toll on Darfur’s trees at the precise moment that thousands of families needed new sources of income. Left unchecked, deforestation will likely intensify, calling for better forestry management.

### Over-cultivation and over-grazing

As the population has expanded, the demands that greater numbers of people put on the land have increased, leading to “aggressive agriculture” that is characterized by over-cultivation of fields and over-grazing of animals. Both practices substantially degrade land quality over time, steadily depleting Darfur’s ability to support rural livelihoods and fuelling conflict among different groups. These factors were clearly present before the recent crisis and contributed to its outbreak.

Over-cultivation represents a lack of awareness of best practices – including crop rotation and other strategies – and a response to climate change on the part of distressed farmers. Increased droughts led many families to expand the size of their cultivated land in order to spread the risk of failure over a larger area. Often, this expansion encroached on forests, as mentioned above, as well as on rangelands traditionally used for grazing. The latter is a significant cause of conflict, as farmers and pastoralists compete for the same resources.

Agricultural policy has also encouraged over-cultivation. In many parts of Darfur, rights to cultivate the land are maintained by demonstrating regular use. As a result, farmers see clear incentives to plant as much land as possible without rest, depleting the soil’s fertility. Recent estimates project that an exhausted field would now require 12 to 15 years of lying fallow in order to restore fertility in some areas, up from just 3 to 5 years in the 1970s. Policy also results in a lighter tax burden for farmers than for pastoralists, thereby encouraging farmers to plant more. Constant cultivation undermines longer-term productivity and strongly illustrates how human environmental impact can worsen the effects of climate change.

Related to this issue, many pastoralists have grazed too many animals on insufficient land. Over-grazing eats away at land productivity and accelerates erosion. As farmers have expanded cultivated areas, pastoralists have crowded herds onto smaller parcels, increasing the pressure on these tracts. As noted above, this competition strengthens the chance of conflict. Compounding this pressure, the total livestock population in Darfur was increasing steadily – at 3 to 3.5 percent per year – before the conflict, climbing to around 30 million animals by 2007. It is therefore unsurprising that grazing lands have become degraded – a trend that, left unchecked, could potentially destroy pastoralism in some areas entirely.

Taken together, aggressive agricultural practices and deforestation have substantially altered traditional land use. This process was well underway in many areas before the conflict, and the tensions it enflamed played a significant role in pushing Darfur into the current crisis. In one part of South Darfur, for example, it is possible to compare land use patterns just before the recent conflict with patterns from 25 years earlier.

What emerges is a powerful illustration of human impact on the environment in an age of population growth and climate change. Cultivated areas have dramatically expanded to the detriment of forests and bush lands used for grazing. The resulting squeeze on pastoralists has made it extremely difficult for nomadic migratory routes to avoid coming into contact with farmers, thereby setting the stage for conflict.

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**Deforestation (2004)**

- 15 km
- Distance to travel from Kalma for firewood in 2004

**Deforestation (2009)**

- 75 km
- Distance to travel from Kalma for firewood in 2009

**Changing land use**

Source: Adapted from UNEP, Sudan Post-conflict Environmental Assessment (2007).

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7 The annual increase in livestock is in USAID, Steps Towards Stabilization in Governance and Livelihoods in Darfur, Sudan (2005), as well as other sources. Overall, the livestock population in Sudan has increased at least six fold since 1959. See UNEP (2005), p. 184.

8 Pellekaan et al., p. 214.
Water consumption and management

Water resources in Darfur derive from rainfall or other surface resources and include two underground reserves: aquifers mostly in sandstones and the “central basement complex”, which contains water trapped in rock formations. Resources from the latter are more difficult to access. Water consumption was estimated at 500 million cubic metres per year in 2007 – well within projected availability. Many of these resources are located away from major population centres, however, or pose other serious access challenges. In fact, the main constraint in accessing water often lies in poor technology and a lack of awareness of best practices, rather than the scarcity of water as such. In just one two-month period, for example, UNICEF estimates that several billion litres of water were lost across Darfur due the absence of adequate harvesting technology.10

Still, as urbanization has accelerated, growing population densities have put enormous strain on the water supply around cities and camps, often resulting in unsustainable consumption levels. The water table around El Fasher, for example, is estimated to have dropped by 10 metres since 2007,11 and up to 22 metres in Abu Shouk IDP camp alone. The threat of groundwater depletion therefore remains a major concern.12

Water is an essential need both for people’s direct survival and the associated benefits in sanitation, health and other critical areas. Humanitarian agencies and government partners have made considerable strides in ensuring access in recent years – including WASH sector efforts that facilitated access to an improved water supply for over 800,000 people in 2009.13 Despite these gains, Darfur remains significantly behind many northern states in the proportion of people who use an improved water supply – a figure that sinks as low as 39.6 percent in West Darfur. Durable access is a key component of the environmental challenges facing Darfur, and expanding access without sacrificing sustainability is critical.

Unfortunately, the water sector in Darfur has often suffered from weak official management, including a lack of comprehensive institutions capable of effectively managing the area’s resources. This management gap has coincided with burgeoning demand in the wake of rapid population growth and urbanization. The resulting tendency towards unsustainable use has been intensified by the recent conflict, as people have sought water wherever possible and without regard to the longer-term effects. Brick-making, for example, requires water to mould bricks, in addition to the firewood consumed to power kilns. Effective regulations could better guide water use – promoting alternatives to bricks such as stabilized-soil blocks (SSBs), which require no wood and up to 60 percent less water,14 or compressed plastic bricks, for example. Crucially, stronger management could also preside over a sustainable expansion of access to water that will balance legitimate needs and environmental imperatives.

**Conclusion**

The environment in Darfur is facing a double assault from climate change and human impact. Climate change is most visible in erratic rain levels and associated increases in drought. Partially as a result of these changes, many farmers cultivate their fields more intensively, and many have expanded to the detriment of surrounding forests and grazing land. Pastoralists, squeezed by the loss of rangelands, often over-graze their herds in smaller areas, further fuelling degradation. Deforestation also constitutes a substantial threat, as Darfuris have cleared forests as an alternative or supplementary livelihoods strategy. Pressure on the environment is further intensified by current water consumption – better management of which will be crucial to Darfur’s future, including for related issues such as improved access, sanitation and health. Major priorities in addressing the recent environmental decline will include direct environmental programmes, as well as significant attention to livelihoods and governance issues.

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3 Ibid., p. 186.
10 UNICEF, correspondence August 2010.
13 UNICEF, WASH Sector Output Table (December 2009). Total figure refers to the number of people provided access to an improved water supply through new and rehabilitated facilities.
Demographic Shifts

Darfur is in the midst of a seismic demographic shift, illustrated by a rapidly growing population that is increasingly young and urban. This shift has mostly occurred within a single generation, transforming Darfur from a small, rural society into a home for almost 8 million people, about half of whom live in and around urban areas or along the roads that link the main cities. Similar changes in other countries have often contributed to social upheaval as new realities confront traditional customs, or young people seek alternatives to a lack of economic opportunity. In Darfur, demographic change has also magnified the impact of other trends in the region, complicating society’s ability to absorb the consequences of environmental change and weak governance.

Without greater attention to population issues, the challenges facing Darfur are likely to become even more serious, as growing numbers of people compete for dwindling resources in the context of a failing environment and inefficient governance. In many ways, the recent conflict represents the outcome of such a scenario, and Darfur must act quickly to adapt to demographic change if it ever hopes to emerge from the current crisis. Without such adaptation, Darfur runs a substantial risk of facing chronic challenges that will jeopardize its sustainability. When planning for the longer term, all actors should fully consider the impact of demographic shifts on the area and seek to identify activities that will encourage positive adaptation to recent changes. These changes are principally visible in three areas: population growth, the “youth bulge” and urbanization.

Population Growth

The most visible feature of the demographic shift in Darfur is rapid population growth – from 1.3 million people in 1973 to an estimated 7.5 million today. This represents an almost six-fold increase in 35 years. By comparison, equivalent growth since the mid-1970s would have saddled the United States with a population of 1.3 billion in 2010, and the United Kingdom with 336 million. Any society would face significant difficulty in absorbing such rapid population growth, as more people demand a corresponding increase in resources. But Darfur, burdened with weak institutions and serious environmental degradation, was perhaps particularly ill-equipped to manage such growth. In fact, this growth has likely played an important role in fostering negative environmental practices, as people cultivate more land to feed larger families, for example. Despite the additional pressures it has created, population growth shows little sign of abating, mostly increasing by around 2.8 percent per year. Assuming these rates continue, up to 12 million people will be living in Darfur by 2025 - 50 percent more than today.

Beyond the impact on natural resources, a larger population requires an economy that can generate sufficient opportunities and provide basic services – whether in the countryside or in urban centres. Economic pressure puts additional stress on the environment and poses a significant challenge to government, as people consume more water, demand an education for their children or look for work. In the context of such growth, institutions may find it difficult to meet expanding needs quickly enough, particularly in Darfur, where state budgets have increased at a slower rate than in other parts of Sudan. As more people go without basic services or productive livelihoods, many will turn to maladaptive coping strategies. The resulting scarcity in natural resources and dearth of opportunity increase the likelihood of conflict, potentially setting the stage for perpetual crisis in the region.

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Population Growth

Population growth in Sudan compared

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Continent</th>
<th>Change in Population from 1980 to 2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>+100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>+80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Africa</td>
<td>+60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>+40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>+20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: US Census Bureau (2010), International Data Base; Census Bureau Sudan (2009).

Population and Projected Growth in Darfur


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Population (Million)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>12.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2025</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Census Bureau Sudan (2009), Census reports 2009 and 1993.
Youth bulge

Given that Darfur’s rapid population growth began in earnest in the 1970s, it follows that younger people constitute a significant majority of the area’s residents. As of 2008, over half of Darfuris were between the ages of 0 and 16 years old, even higher than the overall Sudanese proportion of 47 percent. As a result, Darfur is confronting a serious demographic bottleneck that requires it to provide services and jobs for people who are often too young to contribute financially to society. Given the heavy concentration of young people, large numbers of people will age into the labour force every year, vastly outstripping available economic opportunities. Agriculture, for example, is unlikely to provide reliable livelihoods for these people without significant adaptation. This, in turn, raises important questions about the capacity of cities to absorb new residents and the degree to which these residents are prepared to thrive in urban environments.

Youth bulges are common in developing areas, particularly in Africa and the Middle East. In Sudan’s immediate region, however, Darfur stands out for its elevated concentration of young people. Youth rates in Darfur generally dwarf those in Sudan’s more stable neighbours, instead often approaching the rates in more volatile surrounding countries. In Chad, for example, 46.4 percent of people are between 0 and 14 years old – comparable to the rate in Darfur, and significantly more than an estimated 32 percent in Egypt. This recalls an often discussed link between social instability and high concentrations of youth without productive employment – either in school or work. Certainly, as the “formal” conflict has receded closer proximity to services and more lucrative economic opportunities – or even a reliable basket of associated services like health or nutrition – greatly undermines young people’s ability to pursue sustainable livelihoods. A major result is that young people are often at a double disadvantage – cut off from their families’ traditional livelihoods due to conflict or environmental decline, but frequently unprepared – in terms of knowledge, training and other needs – to pursue alternative options.

In fact, young people have exceedingly few opportunities in Darfur. Ravaged by years of conflict and environmental decline, Darfur’s economy has been unable to create sufficient opportunities in the cities or the countryside. Threats to security and deteriorations in land quality have spurred many families to move to cities or IDP camps. As a result, young people have increasingly grown up in urbanized areas where they may be unprepared to succeed – the consequence of poor access to education and an almost total absence of vocational training. Over the last three years, for example, gross enrolment in secondary schools has declined by a respective annual average of one and two percent in South and North Darfur.

The failure to provide educational opportunities – or even a reliable basket of associated services like health or nutrition – greatly undermines young people’s ability to pursue sustainable livelihoods. A major result is that young people are often at a double disadvantage – cut off from their families’ traditional livelihoods due to conflict or environmental decline, but frequently unprepared – in terms of knowledge, training and other needs – to pursue alternative options.

Urbanization

Life in urban centres can offer several benefits, including closer proximity to services and more lucrative economic opportunity. These benefits will only fully materialize, however, if cities possess the necessary resources to support adequate service provision and infrastructure. In Darfur, as successful...
In migrating to urban areas, Darfuris were part of a global trend towards urbanization that included the rest of Sudan, as well as many other countries around the world. Sudan, for example, overtook the average rate of urbanization in Africa shortly after the year 2000, and at current rates, will become as urbanized as the world average around 2050.

In Darfur, the pre-existing trend towards urbanization was forcibly and dramatically accelerated by the recent conflict, as rural civilians fled to the relative refuge of urban areas and IDP camps. One estimate projects that urbanization in Darfur doubled – to 40 percent – between 2003 and 2006 alone. This trend has continued in the intervening four years, and today roughly half of Darfuris live in and near major urban areas, or along the axes that link them. In addressing this change, it is important to bear in mind that critical issues related to urbanization – particularly land tenure and the rights of IDPs to return, resettle or integrate as they choose – remain unresolved. But a substantial reversal in current rates of urbanization appears unlikely, given evidence from other countries showing that urbanization will almost universally increase as rural civilians return, resettle or integrate as they choose – remain unresolved. But a substantial reversal in current rates of urbanization appears unlikely, given evidence from other countries showing that urbanization will almost universally increase in the developing world. As people spend year after year in urban areas, many new residents – including IDPs – may come to associate these areas with easier access to health, water, nutrition and other essential services.

In fact, many IDP camps have already come to resemble urban neighbourhoods or emerging cities, characterized by a greater number of permanent structures and growing economic links to nearby population centres. Local and municipal authorities increasingly recognize this fact and are incorporating it into their planning, as illustrated by urban plans for Nyala, which forecast the city’s progressive expansion to accommodate surrounding IDP areas and other new residents over the next ten years. In South Darfur, local authorities have promised free titles to plots of land around Nyala for IDPs who choose to build permanent structures – a requirement that UNHABITAT helps families fulfill by supporting the production of affordable, environmentally-friendly construction materials.

Anecdotally, many IDPs want their children to grow up to become doctors, engineers or other professionals – an objective that will be easier to achieve from an urban base. Given these aspirations, as well as the relative length of displacement and greater opportunities for jobs and services, it seems likely that a substantial proportion of IDPs will choose to live permanently in or near urban centres.

In light of the projection that Darfur’s cities will continue to grow, it is important to emphasize two points. First, all displaced people had been moving to cities even before the conflict.

5 De-urbanization can occur, but it is most often associated with duress, i.e. natural disaster or conflict. A recent UNFPA study points out that governments in Africa and Asia must “embrace and prepare for rapid urbanization” and noted that the “trend towards urbanization is inexorable.” (UNFPA 2010).
6 The land title programme is mostly an initiative of the federal Humanitarian Affairs Commission (HAC) and the State Ministry of Physical Planning and Public Utilities (SMPPU). These plans remain in place, but implementation has not always been free of problems.
7 This view is shared by the federal Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC), which noted in August 2010 that a “considerable number” of IDPs in and around urban areas are likely to integrate into their current communities. Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs, Humanitarian Aid Commission, Support for Recovery and Development of Darfur: Brief Note (August 2010).
people have a fundamental right to decide whether they will return home, settle elsewhere or integrate into their current communities. UN agencies must support IDPs’ informed, voluntary decisions on this issue. Second, while urbanization can offer considerable benefits, there is also a significant risk in encouraging more people to move to the cities before these cities are fully prepared to accommodate them. Clearly, urbanization can facilitate service delivery, potentially offering clinics, nutrition centres, water systems and other services to greater numbers of people and at significantly lower per capita costs. But the necessary infrastructure for these services is frequently lacking, and the rapid growth of ill-equipped cities can easily exacerbate vulnerability, fostering poor sanitation that triggers outbreaks of preventable diseases, for example. Urban planning must therefore include provisions for a minimum basket of services for all residents, and UN agencies must be careful not to inadvertently strengthen any urban pull effect without supporting greater urban capacity. This issue becomes even more important in light of the tremendous strain that many urban centres already place on surrounding natural resources – particularly water and forests.

If the proper conditions are in place, however, a measured, sustainable shift towards greater urban living in Darfur potentially offers two main benefits beyond facilitating service delivery. First, with a sufficient expansion in economic opportunities, new urban livelihoods could offer an attractive solution for people who have left rural areas due to conflict or environmental degradation and wish to remain in the city. Many new urban dwellers, for example, have been attracted to cities by the possibility of work in Darfur’s booming construction industry. Second, cities promise greater exposure to different communities if managed properly, living in close proximity to different groups can be a catalyst for peacebuilding and a potential antidote to the inter-communal mistrust that has deepened in Darfur over the past decade. While there is legitimate cause for concern about the consequences of poorly managed urbanization, this trend nonetheless has the potential to support durable solutions under effective leadership.

**Conclusion**

Darfur’s demographic changes have significantly altered the face of its society in a single generation. Rapid population growth has led to a nearly six-fold increase in the number of people living in Darfur - over half of whom are under sixteen. The recent conflict dramatically accelerated a pre-existing migration towards the cities, and presently around half of Darfuris live in urban centres or on the axes that link them. These shifts pose significant challenges to Darfur, and in many ways reinforce simultaneous declines in governance and the environment. UN agencies should assist Darfur in adapting to these new demographic realities, while continuing to support people’s inherent rights to determine their futures. Major priorities in the longer-term that can address the impact of demographic change in Darfur will include expanded access to livelihoods, better education, a healthier environment and more effective governance.

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8 SMPPU and other local ministries are aware of this issue and are currently planning future efforts to support the “minimum basket” idea.

9 This example is intended only to demonstrate how urban livelihoods opportunities can act as a magnet for new urban residents. The current construction boom in Darfur may not be a sustainable option in the future, particularly in sectors that are driven by the heavy international presence.
The effects of environmental decline and seismic demographic change in Darfur could have been tempered by the intervention of effective, accountable governance, including official and community institutions. Unfortunately, local governments were largely unable to deliver such intervention, contributing to a loss of popular faith in institutions and the increasing fragmentation of Darfuri society. These shortcomings in many ways reflect both internal incapacity and a lack of dedicated central and external support. Communities also remain limited in their ability to advocate and realize their priorities, many of which – including development, protection and gender issues – have traditionally encountered limited traction with Darfuri officials.

The erosion of governance in Darfur is principally the result of two related processes: the area’s marginalization and an internal breakdown in Darfuri structures. As with other trends, this decline has been exacerbated by the recent conflict, which illustrated institutions’ inability to protect civilians and fostered deep mistrust among different communities. Strengthening governance in Darfur will require significant capacity development focusing on official and community institutions.

**Marginalization**

A relatively prosperous area at its founding as a sultanate in the 17th century, Darfur began to experience increasing marginalization from the time it was conquered by external forces two hundred years later. This trend continued following Sudan’s independence in 1956. Today, marginalization constitutes a serious destabilizing force in Darfur and is most clearly identified by the region’s comparatively weak access to basic services, insufficient federal financial support and corresponding shortcomings in national governance.

Perceptions of this marginalization have often sparked anger and resentment among the Darfuri population, most recently playing a crucial role in the outbreak of violence in 2003.

### Social indicators in northern states

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service disparities</th>
<th>Service disparities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>32% births attended by qualified staff (W. Darfur)</td>
<td>85% births attended by qualified staff (Khartoum)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

That year, the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the Sudanese Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) rebel groups attacked government positions in Darfur over accusations that central authorities discriminated against non-Arabs and had purposely left Darfur impoverished in order to benefit Khartoum and central Sudan. The forceful response to these attacks set off the current crisis, which to date has left an estimated 300,000 people dead and at least 2 million uprooted from their homes.

Lopsided access to services is perhaps the most vivid illustration of Darfur’s marginalization. Basic needs like water, health and education are frequently at or near the bottom of national surveys when compared to other northern states. With poor education, bad health and little water, for example, it is perhaps unsurprising that Darfuris remain vulnerable to successive crises. In South and West Darfur, for example, fewer than a quarter of children had received a full course of immunizations in 2006 – just over one-third of the equivalent figure in Khartoum and Gezira states. Primary school gross enrolment is similarly low, bottoming out at 67 percent in North Darfur in 2009, compared to 94 percent in Khartoum. The impact of such gaps is compounded by a pervasive sense of neglect and isolation, perhaps best expressed by the area’s limited infrastructure. Darfur counts an estimated 588 kilometres of paved or gravel roads, just 5 percent of Sudan’s total.

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1. Government of Sudan, Sudan Household Health Survey (SHHS) (December 2007).
2. ESR (July 2010).
3. The Darfur total (588 km) comes from Margie Buchanan-Smith and Abduljabbar Abdulla Fadul, Adaptation and Devastation: The Impact of the Conflict on Trade and Markets in Darfur (June 2008). The Sudan total (11,000 km) is based on figures in the 2010 Work Plan (2009).
State and local governments are legally responsible for delivering most social and economic services, but financing depends on fiscal transfers from central authorities. These transfers have risen substantially since the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that ended the north-south civil war in 2005. But recent increases often do not represent true funding rises, as in many cases fiscal transfers have replaced services that the national government provided directly before decentralization. In any case, transfers to Darfur remain mostly inadequate given the scale of needs in the area, and public investment remains curtailed, accounting for an estimated 16 percent of state expenditure in 2008. North Darfur, for example, faced a 65 percent income gap in 2008, receiving only one-third of the federal funding for which it had planned. While there is legitimate reason for concern about the general quality of state budgets, such shortfalls constrain local governments’ ability to provide for Darfuris, fuelling popular mistrust in government as a whole.

The CPA mandated the creation of the Fiscal and Financial Allocations Monitoring Commission (FFAMC) in order to monitor fiscal transfers from the centre and ensure a smooth, predictable state budget process. The formulas adopted by the FFAMC have not always been applied, however, and allocations both among the states and between the federal and state levels often occur outside FFAMC recommendations. The end result is a system that is neither totally transparent nor predictable, undermining all states’ capacity to plan and execute priorities – including in Darfur. In addition, long-term national revenue projections for Sudan are concerning, given


Oil production

Oil production may fall as soon as 2012
Production projection assuming no new discoveries in million barrels per year


Oil revenues

Oil revenues may shrink
Revenue projection based on different oil price scenarios in $ billion per year

Source: World Bank, Sudan: The Road to Sustainable and Broad-Based Growth (Dec 2009).
that oil production could begin to fall as soon as 2012. At current rates, oil reserves could potentially become exhausted in the next 30 years, unless new reserves are discovered.5 With oil representing such a substantial share of the national budget, it is conceivable that as oil revenues shrink, fiscal transfers to the states could fall as well.

Beyond services and budgets, Darfur’s marginalization is a reflection of the state of governance in Sudan as a whole. Ranked in the bottom 10 percent for all six worldwide governance indicators in 2008, Sudan regressed on several key measures from earlier years, including regulatory quality, government effectiveness, rule of law and control of corruption. Darfur, like other regions, must operate within this system, leaving the area highly vulnerable to ongoing marginalization.

Internal institutional breakdown

At the same time that Darfur has faced marginalization, a breakdown in internal institutions has also contributed to the area’s decline. Over time, traditional structures – including institutions and practices – were weakened or removed in favour of modern replacements, but these new structures often failed to prove their utility to local people. In fact, where an imperfect – but often effective – indigenous system had been in place before, Darfuris now increasingly perceived a set of rules and institutions that failed to allocate resources equitably or manage disputes effectively. The outcome – often described as a “governance vacuum”6 – accelerated public distrust of institutions, already prominent in Darfur due to decades of marginalization. At the internal level, the origins of this distrust are particularly visible in two critical areas: the make-up of local governments and land regulations.

In 1971, traditional governing institutions in Darfur – known as the Native Administration (NA) – were abolished. The NA had included sheikhs, omdas and other traditional authorities who had been largely responsible for justice and administration. The abolition came as part of a modernization drive that in delivering adequate support to the region. Central authorities began appointing Darfuris to lead local governments in the 1980s, a theoretically positive step that encountered some difficulties in practice. Under local leadership, many people in Darfur began to perceive a bias in governing institutions in favour of the groups that managed them, further alienating many Darfuris from government. The NA was revived in the 1980s with little real authority, contributing to a somewhat confused governance profile that persists today in which neither set of institutions fully possesses popular faith or meaningful capacity.7

In addition to changes in the architecture of government, new regulations replaced earlier practices, including in land tenure – a common flashpoint in Darfur. The prior land tenure system, known as hakura, largely balanced the rights of pastoralists, farmers and others through a system that allocated land to different tribes and managed access to resources. This approach faced periods of stress, particularly during poor growing seasons, but in general divided land in a way that sustained livelihoods and kept the peace. The hakura system, however, was diminished over time by external regulations during and after the colonial era. The 1971 Unregistered Land Act dealt the system another blow, awarding all formally unregistered land – including some hakura tracts – to the government. The system was therefore left partially in place – still in force for those who had formally registered their holdings – but subsumed to national law. Crucially, the new system did not create an effective approach to land allocation or management, and the resulting hybrid system helped set the stage for unsustainable practices such as the rapid new governments was low – particularly given their difficulty in delivering adequate support to the region. Central authorities began appointing Darfuris to lead local governments in the 1980s, a theoretically positive step that encountered some difficulties in practice. Under local leadership, many people in Darfur began to perceive a bias in governing institutions in favour of the groups that managed them, further alienating many Darfuris from government. The NA was revived in the 1980s with little real authority, contributing to a somewhat confused governance profile that persists today in which neither set of institutions fully possesses popular faith or meaningful capacity.7

Governance indicators for Sudan


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5 Production forecasts are based on the limited information available on oil sector exploration and investment in current projects and are only indicative. (World Bank, 2010).
7 The impact of the decline of the NA and the lack of full capacity of modern institutions is widely discussed. See, for example, DJAM (2007) for a useful summary. More detailed treatments can be found in Musa Abdul-Jalil, Adam Azzain Mohammed and Ahmed A. Yousef, “Native Administration and Local Governance in Darfur: Past and Future,” in Alex de Waal ed. War in Darfur and the Search for Peace (2007), or in R.S. O’Fahey, Conflict in Darfur: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives (2004), among other works.
expansion of farming land – itself a contributor to conflict between pastoralists and nomads. This development took place just as Darfur was on the eve of major environmental and demographic changes that the new land laws – in addition to the local governments enforcing them – would prove ill-equipped to manage.8

The recent conflict has accelerated the institutional breakdown in Darfur, as it has substantially undermined trust among different groups and demonstrated institutions’ inability to fully respond to people’s needs in the midst of an emergency. At the community level, stronger institutions could have acted as a useful buffer against inter-communal tensions or violence, and today such institutions could potentially act as forceful advocates for local priorities, as well as spearhead reconciliation efforts. Lingering inter-communal mistrust, an overall lack of trust in institutions, and the trauma of the conflict mean that community organizations today do not always represent the sort of vibrant force that is needed to engage the governing process successfully or encourage positive relations with other groups. Building the strength of these communities is therefore central to Darfur’s longer-term sustainability.

**Conclusion**

Institutions and governance in Darfur are often limited in their ability to confront the area’s most pressing challenges, the result of years of marginalization and a related institutional breakdown within Darfur itself. Institutional weaknesses have deprived Darfur of the sort of leadership and public engagement that could have potentially managed the dramatic changes of the last generation or helped to avert the recent conflict. Longer-term sustainability in Darfur will flourish only if it is overseen by a responsive, accountable system of local government that reflects the priorities of engaged communities from across Darfur – including marginalized groups and women. Major priority actions that can address these weaknesses include greater capacity development efforts for civil society and official institutions.

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8 The impact of changing approaches to land use is also widely discussed. The DJAM (2007) again offers a strong summary. More detail can be found in Musa Adam Abdul-Jalil, “The Dynamics of Customary Land Tenure and Natural Resource Management in Darfur” (2007), among other works.
PRIORITIES

Environment
A healthy environment for a sustainable future

Livelihoods
Reliable livelihoods for stability and prosperity

Education and human capital
Human capital for local empowerment

Governance and capacity development
Better governance for effective leadership
Severe environmental degradation poses a direct threat to Darfur’s immediate stability and undermines future prospects for peace and prosperity. This degradation is the result of climate change over which Darfuris have little control, as well as the impact of human activities. Climate change principally concerns more erratic rainfall and an associated increase in drought, in many cases spurring people to adapt in ways that intensify pressure on the area’s ecosystem. Human impact is most visible in large-scale deforestation, aggressive agricultural practices and water mismanagement. Many of these activities have intensified as a result of the recent conflict. Overall, environmental issues have frequently been at the root of conflict in Darfur, as growing numbers of people compete for dwindling resources. Strengthening environmental management is therefore critical not only to resolving the current crisis, but to promoting durable solutions for Darfur in the longer term.

Rapid environmental decline offers a powerful argument for the need to start planning for Darfur’s longer-term priorities. Left unchecked, this degradation could slide into irreversibility, severely complicating efforts to promote future progress. Without a healthy environment, Darfur will be unable to provide sufficient livelihoods for its growing population or meet basic needs in water and other critical areas. These consequences are both immediate and far-reaching, and UN agencies should considerably expand their efforts to engage local leaders and communities on this issue as soon as possible.

**Major priorities**

The environment in Darfur has changed dramatically over the last generation, calling for a new approach to the management of natural resources that will encourage positive adaptations to emerging realities. This approach should include the incorporation of technical, social and economic considerations into major environmental priorities. All efforts should be complemented by intensive outreach to raise awareness of environmental issues, as well as capacity development programmes that will enable governments and communities to take the lead on environmental priorities.

Security and access concerns are likely to constrain initial activities, particularly in volatile rural areas. As a result, agencies should concentrate early efforts in relatively secure zones, especially around rapidly growing urban centres whose residents place considerable strain on surrounding resources. As conditions improve in other areas, these efforts should expand accordingly.

1. **Support better management of forestry resources.**

Deforestation poses an enormous threat to Darfur, and maladaptive livelihoods strategies have dramatically accelerated the toll of conflict on Darfur’s trees. To counteract this effect, UN agencies should support participatory reforestation and afforestation efforts, working with the Forests National Corporation (FNC), Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, local

**Forest management**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Many North African countries halted or reversed forest loss</th>
<th>Destruction of forest reserves in Darfur</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percentage change in forest area between 1990 and 2005</td>
<td>Estimated percentage loss of selected FNC reserves during the conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>FNC forest reserve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>Kunduwa, Nyalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>Gereida</td>
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<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>Murtagellow</td>
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<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>Golol</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Kayangat, El Geneina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>El Geneina, green belt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>Momei</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Source: UNEP (2008a).
Deforestation

>1% annual loss in Darfur forest cover (1973-2006)

Water and construction

50% water saved by SSBs vs common fire bricks

institutions and communities to promote better management. Replanting and restocking of forest reserves is an important part of this process, but efforts should focus primarily on strategies to encourage sustainable use of forest resources in the longer-term.

These strategies include the development of commercial woodlands and nurseries, as well as greater support for forest-based livelihoods such as gum arabic, honey, hibiscus and other products (See “Livelihoods” section for more detail on forestry-based livelihoods). Plans for the FNC to develop comprehensive state-level forestry strategies for all states are encouraging, and UN agencies should work to support this initiative in Darfur and promote its results. Finally, committed efforts aimed at arresting deforestation in Darfur offer significant promise, as demonstrated by the experience of several other countries that successfully slowed or reversed this process in recent years.

2. Improve water harvesting, access and management.

UN agencies in Darfur should work with local counterparts to improve management of water resources and expand access to water in a way that will promote sustainability. To achieve this objective, agencies should support integrated water resource management (IWRM) among local authorities and communities across Darfur. IWRM organizes technical specialists, officials, traditional leaders and civil society into water councils that manage water use cooperatively. By incorporating the concerns of multiple stakeholders, this approach can improve critical issues such as catchment management and urban pollution, as well as contribute to a more sustainable use of existing resources. Within the IWRM approach, UN agencies should continue to promote greater access to water and sanitation, particularly in urban areas facing potential shortages. This will involve continued collaboration with the federal Water, Environment and Sanitation (WES) project, state-level water corporations and community partners in order to expand the water supply without sacrificing sustainability. Possible strategies for greater access include community-led water harvesting projects that focus on more effective harnessing of water resources, including rainwater collection, as well as the construction and maintenance of traditional rainwater reservoirs (hafirs), small dams and other water storage facilities. Support for the development of effective waste water strategies could also improve sanitation in Darfur, particularly in and around vulnerable urban areas.

3. Promote the use of alternative energy and technology – particularly for construction.

Most Darfuris rely on firewood or charcoal to meet their energy needs, leading to untenable rates of deforestation. UN agencies should promote alternative technologies that can attenuate the impact of these needs on natural resources. For construction, stabilized soil blocks (SSBs) have tremendous potential as an alternative to traditional bricks, which consume large quantities of firewood and water in the fabrication process. UN agencies should support the use of SSB technology across Darfur, disseminating the necessary tools and inputs as widely as possible and should support traditional brick-makers in transitioning to new technology, including with necessary training. UNHABITAT and other agencies have already begun work in this area, and efforts should continue.¹ UN agencies – and UNAMID in particular – could have an catalytic effect on the SSB market by procuring SSBs for their own future construction needs. These efforts should be preceded by a feasibility study, as well investigations of other possible alternatives, such as compressed plastic bricks.

Besides construction, domestic cooking represents a substantial source of fuel needs, and UN agencies should support the use of alternative fuels such as liquefied petroleum gas (LPG). Despite relatively high gas prices in Darfur and the one-time need to purchase a canister in which to store the gas, the LPG market appears to be growing independently due to dwindling forests. By devising strategies to facilitate a transition to LPG from firewood, such as micro-credit to buy the initial LPG canister, UN agencies could promote substantial growth in this market. Besides these solutions, agencies should continue to support efforts to investigate additional fuel and energy alternatives, including solar power and other innovative approaches.

4. Support greater community engagement in environmental issues.

UN agencies should dramatically increase community outreach on environmental issues in order to empower Darfuris to lead sustainable environmental management efforts. Outreach campaigns should explain the causes of recent environmental degradation as well as provide information on how specific adaptations could potentially reverse this decline. In addition, UN agencies should support locally-driven consultations that will culminate in comprehensive

Cost comparison for a 4x4 meter house

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Required inputs</th>
<th>Fire bricks</th>
<th>SSB</th>
<th>Concrete</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of bricks</td>
<td>13,824</td>
<td>1,644</td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Price per brick</td>
<td>$0.08</td>
<td>$0.36</td>
<td>$0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size</td>
<td>18x9x5cm</td>
<td>29x14x12cm</td>
<td>39x19x10cm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total price of bricks</td>
<td>$1,105</td>
<td>$599</td>
<td>$720</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cement, sand and mortar</td>
<td>$750</td>
<td>$142</td>
<td>$214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water</td>
<td>12,000 litres</td>
<td>6,000 litres</td>
<td>6,000 litres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trees</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction labour cost</td>
<td>$400</td>
<td>$300</td>
<td>$200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total cost</td>
<td>$2,295</td>
<td>$1,941</td>
<td>$1,134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost comparison</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ See, for example, UNHABITAT (2009).

Community Environmental Action Plans (CEAPs). These plans will outline the specific environmental challenges facing individual communities, as well as articulate priority actions to be implemented and managed by community members. As a result, Darfuris will better understand the risks and options inherent in environmental change and will become directly engaged in fostering sustainability within their communities.

5. Strengthen official capacity to develop research-based environmental policy.

UN agencies should support the capacity of official institutions to conduct rigorous analysis and develop research-based environmental policies. Drastic changes to the environment in Darfur over the last generation mean that new, adaptable approaches to environmental management are required. As communities and governments in Darfur work to develop these approaches, UN agencies should support the strengthening of official capacity to lead ongoing research in key areas, including meteorology, land use, water resources, drought preparedness and others. Simultaneously, agencies should work to develop official capacity to formulate effective policies based on research results. At the federal level, potential partners include the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry; the Ministry of Animal Resources; the Water, Environment and Sanitation project; and the Forests National Corporation, among others. Local partners could include the South Darfur Ministry of the Environment, state ministries of agriculture and the Darfur Land Commission, as well as other state and local bodies. This objective is crucial to maintaining the momentum behind several recent positive developments, including the creation of a state-level environment ministry in South Darfur and the decision of the Darfur Land Commission to sponsor a comprehensive land use survey. Maintaining this momentum will ensure that effective national and local management of the environment will translate into greater sustainability in the longer term.
Livelihoods – the activities by which people make their living – are undergoing a substantial shift in Darfur, the consequence of profound changes in demographics and the environment, as well as conflict-related devastation. Until people can reliably provide for their families, Darfur is unlikely to fully emerge from crisis. Strengthening livelihoods poses an acute challenge, given Darfur’s rapid population growth, urbanization and environmental degradation. These forces, often accelerated by conflict, have spurred thousands of rural families to withdraw from traditional livelihoods – frequently under duress and without increases in new opportunities or training. Recent data illustrate the scope of these changes, as large numbers of Darfuris identify activities like wage labour or business as their source of income as opposed to crops or livestock. UN agencies should support the revival and expansion of livelihoods in rural and urban areas as a way to promote greater sustainability.

Livelihoods programmes should take a phased approach that promotes short-term initiatives to get Darfuris working as soon as possible, while continuing to develop and implement longer-term, sustainable strategies. All efforts must remain aware of critical related issues – especially the future return, resettlement or integration of some 2 million IDPs. Overall, activities must strive to improve opportunities for all Darfuris without distinction to residential status or any other characteristic. This section provides an overview of rural and urban livelihoods, followed by general priorities moving forward.

**Rural livelihoods**

Strengthening rural livelihoods is vital to any effort to promote durable solutions in Darfur. Achieving this objective remains severely complicated by environmental degradation, insecurity and land rights issues that prevent many rural families – especially IDPs – from practising their livelihoods. Despite these challenges, agriculture most likely continues to gener-

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income sources by community type</th>
<th>North Darfur</th>
<th>South Darfur</th>
<th>West Darfur</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Main sources of income for residents and IDPs in %</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crops</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Livestock</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donations</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wage labour</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food aid sale</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firewood</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>IDP Resident</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crops</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Livestock</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donations</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wage labour</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food aid sale</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firewood</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Priority 1**
Support large, temporary employment programmes – including food-for-work.

**Priority 2**
Supply farmers and pastoralists with inputs that will boost production.

**Priority 3**
Strengthen markets in urban and rural areas.

**Priority 4**
Encourage greater security as a way to enable livelihoods.

**Priority 5**
Improve access to finance – particularly for small farmers and entrepreneurs.

**Priority 6**
Improve agricultural practices – including demarcation of migration routes.

**Priority 7**
Invest in agriculture – including agro-forestry and semi-mechanized farming.

**Priority 8**
Introduce better agricultural risk management.

**Priority 9**
Improve urban and rural links to market – including an increase in direct benefits to producers.

**Priority 10**
Promote urban planning and private sector development.

Source: WFP, Food Security and Monitoring System (FSMS) (May 2010).
Rural livelihoods in Darfur mostly comprise farming, livestock and forestry. Farmers almost exclusively practise traditional rain-fed agriculture, mostly producing millet, sorghum, groundnuts, sesame, hibiscus and gum arabic before the conflict. Substantial risk of crop failure, owing to crop variability and increased drought, encouraged many farmers to spread their risk over more land, often expanding farms at the expense of rangelands or forest cover. Pastoralists raise livestock, often as nomadic herders, and depend principally on the sale and export of sheep, cattle, goats and camels. As of 2006, Darfur contributed 20 percent of the country’s overall livestock earnings—a sector that itself generated 20 percent of Sudanese GDP before oil exports began.

Like farming, pastoral livelihoods faced mounting pressure before the conflict due to environmental degradation and growing resource disputes. Both pastoralists and farmers have often turned to forestry activities to supplement their income. This trend has accelerated during the conflict. In 2008, for example, estimates projected that 52,000 trees were consumed to support brick-making alone.

Livestock exports from Sudan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Goats</th>
<th>Sheep</th>
<th>Camels</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Rural livelihoods were routinely targeted during the conflict, depriving an estimated 60 percent of farm households of their possessions and accelerating migration to urban areas and IDP camps. Attacks frequently destroyed entire farms, trees and other productive assets, as well as stole livestock and committed other crimes. The resulting devastation is reflected in a drop of over 50 percent in Darfur’s cereal production in 2004-05, as well as estimates that some groups lost between 50 and 90 percent of their livestock to theft. Traditionally, rural households had also relied on trade, remittances and labour migration within the region and abroad in order to boost incomes. Security-related barriers to the movement of goods and people—including occasional border closures—have severely undermined these strategies as well.

Cereal production has returned to the pre-crisis average, however, which raises two possibilities, both of which indirectly illustrate the importance of security and land rights to rural livelihoods. First, given that many displaced rural residents maintain that they cannot cultivate their fields, stabilized production could suggest land occupation by non-owners. A recent report highlighted widespread land occupation as a major concern in West Darfur, for example. Preliminary results from a more limited study, however, show that urban IDPs rarely identified occupation as the main constraint to cultivation, and data from May 2010 show that in West and South Darfur, respectively, 87 and 76 percent of IDPs have the same or better access to their land as the previous season. This leads to a second possibility—that IDPs may be able to commute to their fields more frequently than in the past. An exact answer is difficult to determine under current conditions. What is clear, however, is that land tenure and security issues, the resolution of which are largely beyond the scope of this document, will have serious implications for rural livelihoods programming in Darfur.

Given these implications, support for rural livelihoods will require careful attention to land rights and other sensitive issues in order to avoid “locking in” certain consequences of the conflict. As a result, UN agencies must adopt a careful mix of short- and longer-term strategies that will strengthen rural livelihoods without sacrificing the legitimate rights of any group—including some 2 million IDPs who have yet to choose to return to their areas of origin, resettle elsewhere or integrate into their current communities. Ultimately, a major

Livestock exports

Cereal production

component of any strategy for rural livelihoods should include support for all vulnerable people – IDPs and residents – to pursue livelihoods within a framework that advocates the protection of fundamental rights.

**Urban livelihoods**

Darfur’s cities have grown tremendously in recent years – a process that was forcibly accelerated by the conflict as people streamed into urban areas in search of safety. In some cities, recent arrivals vastly outnumber pre-conflict residents – almost 70 percent of the 63,000 people in Kebkabiya, in North Darfur, were IDPs in 2008, for example. This influx has put enormous strain on urban livelihoods for two main reasons. First, cities have been unable to generate new opportunities at a rate that matches rapid population growth. Second, most new urban-dwellers come from rural backgrounds, meaning that they often lack the skills necessary to be successful in urban environments. As a result, many urban residents have turned to maladaptive livelihoods strategies – brick making or charcoal selling, for example – that satisfy their immediate needs but undermine Darfur’s longer-term prospects.

Urbanization is a worldwide phenomenon, and it is unlikely to retreat significantly in Darfur, where estimates project that a substantial number of IDPs are likely to remain in or near urban areas. In fact, IDPs’ stated livelihoods goals have often shifted to reflect a desire to thrive in their new environments, including through employment, skills development and property acquisition. Helping new urban-dwellers to meet these goals – while simultaneously expanding opportunities for pre-conflict residents – constitutes a critical part of securing Darfur’s future. As longer-term initiatives in training, private sector development and other areas move forward, short-term programmes like food-for-work can help provide temporary employment to thousands of urban Darfuris.

Fortunately, some areas – especially in South Darfur – already possess a comparatively sophisticated infrastructure for urban livelihoods, demonstrating significant potential for the future. In 2003, for example, an estimated one-quarter of all small and medium enterprises in Sudan were located in Darfur – mostly clustered in South Darfur. These enterprises largely provided services or processing for the agricultural sector, but by 2006, only an estimated 10 to 20 percent were still functioning. Reviving enterprises would greatly improve the longer-term sustainability of urban livelihoods in Darfur, offering potential employment to a growing number of urban residents. As a first step, a new and more accurate accounting of enterprises and other private sector entities currently active in Darfur could provide a useful baseline from which to design longer-term programmes.

Despite insecurity and displacement, some developments in Darfur since the conflict could be leveraged into positive benefits for urban livelihoods. Urbanization, while significantly increasing pressure on cities, has also encouraged dynamic markets, for example, particularly in and around El Fasher and Nyala. These markets often lack modern facilities or are otherwise in poor condition. With improvements, they could potentially transform into hubs of economic activity that would anchor surrounding areas, as well as promote reconciliation as people interact with other communities during trade.

**Major priorities**

Initially, UN agency efforts to support livelihoods should concentrate on areas where they can have the greatest short-term impact, while continuing to develop longer-term strategies. Overall, these efforts should emphasize livelihoods stabilization for the most vulnerable – especially women, youth, IDPs and nomads – and promote market-based, inclusive economic growth that will facilitate future food security, reconciliation and employment generation. Given their mutual

---

**Gum arabic exports**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gum arabic exports from Sudan</th>
<th>Exports in ‘000 metric tons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Manufacturing establishments**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Distribution of manufacturing enterprises by state</th>
<th>Number of establishments in 2003</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Khartoum</td>
<td>4550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Darfur</td>
<td>4100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Gazeera</td>
<td>3250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White Nile</td>
<td>1500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gedarif</td>
<td>1450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sinnar</td>
<td>1250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. Darfur</td>
<td>1200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. Kordofan</td>
<td>1200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>River Nile</td>
<td>920</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern</td>
<td>882</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kassala</td>
<td>860</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Kordofan</td>
<td>690</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blue Nile</td>
<td>470</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Red Sea</td>
<td>420</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Food aid with a broader impact**

Food security remains a critical issue in Darfur, where an estimated 4.6 million people require food aid. As part of their efforts, WFP has supported limited food-for-work and food-for-recovery programmes that link food aid to labour-intensive infrastructure projects. These programmes offer temporary employment to vulnerable people and can significantly improve the quality of life in surrounding communities. In 2009, WFP supported 8,000 Darfuris through food-for-work and food-for-recovery, leading to the construction or rehabilitation of schools, health centres, roads, water points and other critical infrastructure in and around El Geneina. While limited, initial results demonstrate that food aid can successfully stave off hunger and promote longer-term progress simultaneously. This conclusion is further supported by the more extensive food-for-education initiative, which brought school feeding to an estimated 308,500 students in all three Darfur states in 2009. Food-for-recovery efforts are projected to increase in North Darfur in 2010, and with greater support, similar initiatives could move forward in many other areas, strengthening thousands of Darfuris’ sense of independence and improving their communities. At the same time, these programmes create space for officials, communities and partners to develop sustainable, long-term employment solutions.

Security and access concerns are likely to restrict where and when programmes can move forward. An initial focus on relatively safer and more populous urban areas will allow agencies to reach the greatest number of people at the lowest risk. Rural support programmes should be rolled out wherever practicable, expanding as conditions allow.

**1. Support large-scale, temporary employment programmes – including food-for-work.**

UN agencies should support immediate, labour-intensive employment programmes in order to generate productive activities for as many Darfuris as possible – including IDPs and vulnerable resident populations. Initially, these programmes should focus on cities and surrounding areas, given their comparative safety and high concentrations of people. Food-for-work and food-for-recovery programmes, led by WFP, could engage thousands of Darfuris in public works, leading to road rehabilitation, better drainage systems or other critical infrastructure projects. These projects could also benefit from UNAMID engineering expertise and security guarantees. Labour-intensive initiatives will foster independence among participants and improve the community’s quality of life. In addition, large-scale employment will buy time to move forward on longer-term livelihoods priorities. Similar initiatives have already occurred on a limited scale in Darfur, providing a basis for future programmes. In 2009, for example, some 8,000 people benefited from WFP food-for-work and food-for-recovery programmes, and UNHABITAT has introduced some pilot SSB-based employment programmes in several areas. These and other future efforts deserve greater support.

**2. Supply farmers and pastoralists with inputs that will boost production.**

Despite enormous disruption to rural livelihoods during the conflict, many farmers and pastoralists have managed to retain or rebuild their assets. Despite enormous disruption to rural livelihoods during the conflict, many farmers and pastoralists have managed to retain or rebuild their assets. Many continue to face the adverse effects of conflict and climate change, however, including environmental degradation, weak markets or the need to commute from distant locations. UN agencies should work with local authorities to provide farmers with seeds, tools and support for urban and rural livelihoods must go hand in hand. All efforts must ensure that programmes promote not just economic growth and opportunity, but equitable access to these activities for Darfur’s myriad constituencies, including a judicious balance between the needs of pastoralists and farmers. In so doing, it is important for UN agencies to remain cognizant of underlying issues – land tenure and security, for example – whose resolution will be critical to fostering vibrant livelihoods in the longer-term.

Security and access concerns are likely to restrict where and when programmes can move forward. An initial focus on relatively safer and more populous urban areas will allow agencies to reach the greatest number of people at the lowest risk. Rural support programmes should be rolled out wherever practicable, expanding as conditions allow.

**More patrols for better security**

Despite a difficult operating environment, UNAMID has worked to increase patrols in an effort to bolster security, enable livelihoods and facilitate assistance efforts across Darfur. Long-range patrols are particularly useful in this regard, as they cover more territory and can encourage safer conditions along major axes. Between February and June 2010, peacekeepers carried out 455 long-range patrols, including one mission in June that travelled more than 1,000 kilometres across North and West Darfur. These missions, in addition to regular patrolling, help open land routes, assess security conditions and build links with communities. UNAMID strives to adapt patrol routes to accommodate requests from communities and aid agencies, including the addition of three voluntary return sites in North Darfur in June 2010, upon certification by IOM. Continuing cooperation between UN agencies and UNAMID will ensure that both continue to leverage their relative strengths to support the emergence of secure, sustainable progress in Darfur.

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19 Ensuring this balance may require, at least initially, more concerted attention to pastoralist needs, which research suggests were often marginalized in the course of some earlier humanitarian efforts. See Helen Young, Abdalmornium Osman and Rebecca Dale (July 2007).
and other agricultural inputs that can quickly help improve their yields and boost their prospects at market. Meanwhile, pastoralists should receive veterinary services (including vaccinations and treatment) for their livestock, as well as supplies of animal feed and, where necessary, restocking of diminished herds – particularly for those who lost animals to theft. By offering complementary support for pastoralists and farmers, these programmes can help lessen tensions between the two groups, thereby addressing a key driver of conflict. Similar programmes are already underway in Darfur, where in 2009 FAO provided staple seeds to 160,000 households and essential tools to 44,000 households – in addition to livestock vaccinations that served 150,000 families. Deepening this support in the coming months and years will significantly strengthen rural livelihoods in Darfur.

3. Strengthen markets in urban and rural areas.

Urbanization and an increased international presence have encouraged the emergence of dynamic economies in and around some cities in Darfur, although economic life in rural areas often remains disrupted. One way to support livelihoods in cities and rural areas is to strengthen markets – the physical spaces where people trade – and the links between them. Historically, Darfur was a processing and distribution centre for much of the region. Strengthening markets can help restore this role, as well as promote reconciliation by encouraging different groups to interact for mutual gain. These efforts could focus initially on improving markets’ permanent structures and other basic equipment, as well as providing organizational assistance (design, market rotation, and other activities) that will solidify markets as economic and social anchors in their communities. Basic rehabilitation of a small rural market – including reconstruction of market stalls and the construction of a permanent building for storage or other uses – would cost between $6,000 and $10,000 to cover a village of 1,000 people and the surrounding area. The long-term benefits in terms of livelihoods and peacebuilding make market support a potentially strong value, and UN agencies should take advantage of this opportunity. Efforts in this area are already underway, with a DCPSF-funded NGO working to revive markets in three West Darfur localities as a way to boost livelihoods and promote reconciliation. Expanding this approach could have a significant impact on restoring commercial networks and fostering greater social stability.

4. Encourage greater security as a way to enable livelihoods.

Although UN agencies can have little independent impact on security, stepped up patrols along key farming and livestock routes by the UNAMID peacekeeping mission could help thousands of Darfuris to resume productive livelihoods. Key provisions of UNAMID’s mandate – to contribute to the protection of civilians and the emergence of a secure environment for reconstruction – clearly indicate a role for peacekeepers in this regard. At around 17,300 troops and 26,000 staff in total, UNAMID is currently approaching full deployment, and its capacity to conduct such patrols and fulfil its mandate has consequently expanded. UN agencies should work with UNAMID to encourage greater attention to major routes that link cities to each other and to farms, as well as along livestock migration routes. Additional security could encourage people to pursue independent livelihoods, as well as help contain conflicts between nomads and sedentary groups.

5. Improve access to finance – particularly for small farmers and entrepreneurs.

Finance availability in Darfur is low in comparison with other parts of northern Sudan, thereby constraining people’s economic ambitions. West Darfur, for example, had only five functioning bank branches in 2006. Lending at the micro-level is even scarcer, however, and it is this level that can have the most pronounced impact on the lives of Darfuris. In North and South Darfur, for example, bank-based microfinance services in 2009 were estimated to have met just one percent of total market demand. UN agencies should work with local authorities and civil society to prioritize the establishment of an effective microfinance network in Darfur. This network should be equally accessible to rural and urban livelihoods and groups and should especially target conflict-affected popula-

Microfinance in Darfur

Recent estimates project that up to 2.3 million adults in Darfur wish to take advantage of microfinance services. Similar programmes have been successful in other conflict areas, and the enormous demand in Darfur suggests that microfinance could substantially improve economic opportunities for local people. Despite this demand, formal microfinance remains extremely limited, with just two banks offering any services at all. Even these services – at 12 to 18 percent mark-ups – remain largely out of reach for many, and bank-originated microfinance met only one percent of total estimated demand in 2009. Two NGOs are working to expand access, but these efforts have been largely restricted to certain areas of North Darfur. Strengthening microfinance across the region – a key component of empowering people’s ambitions – is a sensible strategy for promoting inclusive economic growth that will boost livelihoods and, by extension, the area’s overall stability.

Source: Microfinance Assessment to Darfur 2010 (UNDP, IOM, Tufts, Japan)

References:

23 Abdelmajid Khojali and Lene M.P. Hansen, Microfinance Assessment Consultancy to Darfur: Final Report (June 2010).
Sustainable forestry livelihoods offer tremendous potential, particularly in the expansion of the gum arabic sector. Produced from acacia trees, gum arabic is used to make adhesives and binding agents, as well as additives in some sweets and other products. Sudan earned roughly $58 million in export income from gum arabic in 2008, and Darfur typically contributes 15 percent of total Sudanese production. Many acacia trees in the region were uprooted in recent decades to clear the way for farm land, and replanting these trees could yield significant benefits for local people, as well as help reverse erosion associated with environmental decline. With the government’s abolition of a market-distorting monopoly, expanding the gum arabic sector seems particularly timely. Other forest-based livelihoods could provide similar benefits, engaging people in the production of goods – like honey, hibiscus, frankincense and timber – that link forest preservation to profitability.

FAO and Partners, Summary of Activities Implemented in Various ERCU Operation Areas

6. Improve agricultural practices – including the demarcation of migration routes.

Rural livelihoods in Darfur must adapt if they are to thrive in an age of climate change and increasing demographic pressure. Adaptation will mean careful attention to balancing the needs of sedentary and nomadic groups. For farmers, training on better cultivation practices – including crop rotation, seed diversification and other priorities – will improve the sector’s performance, as well as reduce incentives to cultivate areas that may encroach on nomadic migration routes. FAO and partners have already broken ground in this area, organizing training for almost 32,000 people in Darfur in 2009.24 These efforts and other similar efforts should be strengthened in the months and years ahead. For pastoralists, UN agencies should also work with local actors and UNAMID to clearly demarcate migration routes so as to minimize future land use disputes. These routes should be equipped with boreholes and other basic services that facilitate herding, thereby easing some of the pressures that can spark conflict. Pastoralists should also receive training that emphasizes relevant skills acquisition and best practices for land use in the face of increasing environmental degradation.

7. Invest in agriculture – including agro-forestry and semi-mechanized farming.

Beyond encouraging better practices through training and other strategies (See recommendation 6, above), UN agencies should promote greater investment in rain-fed agriculture in the longer-term. Recent studies have revealed the potential benefits of greater cultivation of gum arabic and an expansion of semi-mechanized farming in South Darfur, for example.25 UN agencies should support the work of partner institutions in this field, as well as work with relevant state institutions to implement best practices that have emerged from research. At the policy level, UN efforts should also promote the alignment of agricultural incentives – particularly regarding land use, relative taxation of different activities and other issues – in order to create a more effective balance between the needs of pastoralists and farmers.

8. Introduce better agricultural risk management.

Substantial structural risks face agricultural workers in Darfur, including crop failure and livestock diseases. Innovative practices in agricultural risk management – particularly crop insurance adapted to small, poor farmers – could potentially mitigate the impacts of natural disasters on small agricultural holders in Darfur. Many neighbouring countries, including Kenya and Ethiopia, have introduced crop insurance schemes in some areas that involve automatic payouts in the event of verified natural incidents that result in crop failure. Even in the most fertile areas, Darfur can experience crop failure rates between 25 and 40 percent.26 This risk encourages unsustainable risk avoidance strategies, like over-cultivation or sale of firewood. Improving families’ risk burden could significantly improve the outcomes of rural livelihoods as a whole. As a first step, UN agencies should work with local and international partners to investigate the impact and feasibility of crop insurance plans as widely as possible in Darfur.

9. Improve urban and rural links to market – including an increase in direct benefits to producers.

The conflict in Darfur has seriously impacted trade and markets. This disruption has primarily disadvantaged rural and urban producers by weighing down the value-chain with increased costs of bringing goods to market – adding to an often burdensome tax system. UN agencies should support the development of a pro-poor value-chain in Darfur that will maximize the benefits that accrue to producers. As a first step, agencies should support a comprehensive value-chain analysis that will examine a basket of goods, such as incense, gum arabic, leather, milk and others. This analysis should outline how various factors – security, taxes and other issues – impact the value-chain, as well as identify the areas where international partners can have the greatest impact.

10. Promote urban planning and private sector development.

In order to create sustainable urban livelihoods in the longer-term, Darfur must develop a robust private sector with supporting urban infrastructure. Working from existing private sector strategies, UN agencies should liaise with local authorities and international partners to help devise a comprehensive private sector development programme for Darfur. This initiative should promote equitable private sector growth that will

26 Data adapted from the International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI) and The Energy Research Institute (TERI), Mapping Climate Vulnerability and Poverty in Africa (2006).
generate opportunities for all Darfuris, including the conflict-affected, women and other marginalized groups. As part of this approach, UN agencies should support efforts to conduct detailed livelihoods surveys that can assess market and labour capacities. Urban planning will also require significant support if Darfur’s cities expect to provide decent homes to new residents. In partnership with other actors, UN agencies with expertise in urban development – particularly city planning, waste management, water, and environmentally-friendly construction – could have a tremendous impact on the future quality of urban life in Darfur. UNAMID could likewise contribute engineering and security support in this regard.
EDUCATION AND HUMAN CAPITAL

Bolstering human capital is critical for a sustainable future

Education represents a profound investment in the future of any society, enabling students to realize their ambitions and confront adversity. In conflict-affected communities, education offers additional promise as a vehicle to instil peacebuilding and reconciliation in younger generations. Given the extensive challenges facing Darfur, education is a key strategy for bolstering the human capital required to move the region out of crisis and towards longer-term sustainability. UN agencies should work with local authorities and communities to strengthen access to comprehensive education as a way to empower Darfuris with the skills they need to lead productive, peaceful lives. Providing education and other services is a key government responsibility, meaning that success in education efforts will ultimately depend on greater government support. Together with this support, UN agencies can marshal significant expertise in order to assist officials in fulfilling these responsibilities.

In addition to supporting learning, schools play a critical role in safeguarding child protection by offering safe, friendly spaces that promote young people’s holistic development. With proper resources and management, schools can also provide a minimum package of critical services – in water, sanitation, health and nutrition, for example – that significantly enhance learners’ overall well-being. Furthermore, effective schooling offers the chance to raise awareness of environmental degradation and how to address it – including through SSB school construction or solar energy initiatives – as well as to inculcate a sense of positive citizenship that will enable students to go on to lead local institutions. Finally, education represents a major priority for state governments, who allocated around $21 million to the sector in 2008 – almost twice the $11 million received for education projects in Darfur through the 2009 Humanitarian Work Plan.1 Supporting education in the longer-term therefore provides a unique opportunity for progress in key related sectors, as well as adds value to a clearly identified local priority.

Under current conditions, Sudan will not achieve the Millennium Development Goal of universal primary education before 2028. In Darfur, the situation is even more concerning, as the region demonstrates serious deficits in education access and quality, despite some gains in primary enrolment. In two Darfur states, the primary gross enrolment ratio (GER) remains significantly below the northern Sudan average of 72 percent: 67 percent in North Darfur today and, according to an earlier survey, 59.4 percent in South Darfur.2 West

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1 State Ministries of Finance (2008) and 2010 Work Plan (2009). The Work Plan figure is based on a funding analysis that compared total funding by project, sector and region according to the latest data published through the Financial Tracking Service (FTS).

2 The North Darfur figure comes from ESR (2010). The South Darfur figure comes from Federal Ministry of General Education, Baseline Survey on Basic Education in the Northern States (Baseline Survey) (2008). ESR (2010) did not provide information for gross enrolment in South Darfur. Given the difficulties in comparing across two data sets, these figures are meant to give a general indication only.

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### Enrolment

#### Primary education

**Gross enrolment in percent in 2008/09**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Khartoum</th>
<th>Gezira</th>
<th>River Nile</th>
<th>W. Darfur</th>
<th>Northern</th>
<th>White Nile</th>
<th>S. Kordofan</th>
<th>N. Kordofan</th>
<th>Gezira</th>
<th>Blue Nile</th>
<th>Red Sea</th>
<th>Kassala</th>
<th>S. Darfur</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

#### Secondary education

**Gross enrolment in percent in 2008/09**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Khartoum</th>
<th>Gezira</th>
<th>River Nile</th>
<th>W. Darfur</th>
<th>Northern</th>
<th>White Nile</th>
<th>S. Kordofan</th>
<th>N. Kordofan</th>
<th>Gezira</th>
<th>Blue Nile</th>
<th>Red Sea</th>
<th>Kassala</th>
<th>S. Darfur</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Source</td>
<td>ESR (2010).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Darfur currently has an estimated 88 percent GER, however, which may be more the result of counting irregularities than genuine enrolment increases. These figures can be taken as barometers of the current education situation in Darfur and clearly indicate that the availability of primary education is insufficient. As a result, an unacceptable number of children are left out of primary school altogether.

Although access falls short of the northern Sudanese average, primary gross enrolment in Darfur has improved, rising at an annual rate of one to four percent over the last three years. These improvements are largely the result of concerted government and humanitarian efforts. Unfortunately, improved access does not necessarily translate into a good education, and there is significant cause for concern about the quality of schooling in Darfur. Official support for education remains scarce, and all three Darfur states were among the four northern states that spent the least per student at both the primary and secondary levels. West Darfur, for example, came in last for northern Sudan at just 124 SDG (roughly $49) per primary school student per year. The consequences of this relative deprivation are visible in student-teacher ratios in the area, among the worst in northern Sudan, as well as the proportion of students seated at desks during the school day, which is lower than anywhere else in the north.

Shortfalls in education funding and associated gaps in access and quality are closely related to the level of federal support for education. Altogether, 83 percent of education financing in northern Sudan comes from the states, but states – particularly in low-revenue areas like Darfur – are almost entirely dependent on fiscal transfers from Khartoum for their budgets. Greater federal support has a significant impact on the quality and availability of education, as demonstrated by the fact that northern states that receive greater transfers typically exhibit higher per-student spending.

Finally, when discussing education in Darfur, it is important not to focus exclusively on primary schooling. To be most effective, education must respond to the needs of an evolving society – one where people’s livelihoods opportunities are undergoing considerable change. Secondary schooling and vocational training are important strategies for managing such change, although neither receive substantial support. Secondary schools have limited resources, and all three Darfur states figure among the bottom in northern Sudan for secondary per-student spending and student-teacher ratios. Vocational training and similar activities currently receive just one percent of education spending in northern Sudan. UN agencies could add significant value by supporting greater opportunities for secondary schooling and vocational training, particularly in light of data illustrating the impact of skills deficits on the economy. In Nyala, for example, 56 percent of enterprises cited the lack of skilled manpower as a major or severe business constraint. In addition, education efforts should also promote easier access to alternative learning – especially in basic literacy and numeracy – for people of any age who are unable to attend school.

Major priorities

Education efforts should focus on working with officials and communities to support comprehensive education that is more available and of high quality. A key component of success will be increased support for education from government authorities, in addition to cooperation across UN agencies, international partners and local counterparts. The overarching goal must be to link education as closely as possible to the exigencies of daily life in Darfur, including primary and secondary schooling, as well as sustained commitments to vocational and alternative training. As part of these efforts, it is important to ensure that schools can offer a minimum package of critical services that will support learners, as well as make education more attractive to surrounding communities.

In moving forward, security concerns are likely to restrict where and when programmes can progress. UN agencies should target initial efforts in areas where education projects are already underway, expanding to new locations as conditions permit.

Transfers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>States receiving higher transfers spend more per student</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Federal transfers and per student spending (all levels) in SDG in 2009</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ESR (2010).

Spending

| Government spending per student in primary education |
| Spending on teachers, non-teaching staff, goods and services in SDG in 2009 |

Source: ESR (2010).
1. Support efforts to close the primary school enrolment gap between Darfur and other northern states.

In Darfur, primary school enrolment mostly lags behind the northern Sudan average. Closing this gap is critical to giving Darfuris the skills they need to take charge of their lives and by extension, improve the area’s longer-term prospects. Future efforts in this regard should build on the success of ongoing humanitarian education programmes and seize opportunities to translate these gains into sustainable improvements. A major component in this initiative must include increased government support for education. In addition, UN agencies should deepen cooperation with state ministries of education to devise strategies that will boost primary enrolment. As part of these efforts, agencies could work to provide more longer-term assistance to individual schools – including trainings and materials – in order to enhance their professionalism and overall impact. UNICEF already provides such assistance to between 40 and 50 schools in Darfur every year – a useful foundation on which to build future programmes.

2. Promote greater access to vocational training and alternative learning opportunities.

Millions of Darfuris are currently living in new, mostly urban environments that differ significantly from their areas of origin. Given pre-crisis urbanization trends, many displaced people are likely to remain in urban areas, and it is therefore critical to empower them with the skills they need to thrive. A shift in livelihoods in Darfur also means that many non-displaced Darfuris will need to adapt their skills in order to be successful. UN agencies should promote widely accessible vocational training in Darfur, with an initial focus on skills that are directly relevant to urban livelihoods. As a first step, agencies should support extensive market research to ensure that vocational training programmes closely correspond to available economic opportunities and popular demand. In addition, UN agencies should work with officials to increase the availability of alternative learning opportunities, particularly for people who lack basic skills in literacy and numeracy but are unable to attend school.

3. Support greater access to secondary education.

Families in Darfur often aspire for their children to become doctors, engineers or other highly skilled professionals, and many children wish to attend secondary school. But gross secondary enrolment remains stalled between 17 and 25 percent in Darfur, and secondary enrolment has actually dropped slightly in North and South Darfur. Costs – official and hidden – and distance are among the main barriers, creating a pent-up demand for secondary schooling that largely goes unmet. This problem is particularly acute in IDP camps, where many students who have completed the primary cycle find it difficult to continue due to restrictions on secondary school services inside officially temporary IDP camps. UN agencies should work with local governments and communities to find solutions for all families who wish to enrol their children in secondary school. Potential solutions include transportation planning to facilitate access to existing schools, as well as policy reviews that would examine secondary schools policy (see recommendation 5) and develop strategies to lower families’ financial burden, such as uniform subsidies. In the longer-term, UN agencies should support an expansion of secondary school services around Darfur that corresponds to actual demand in the areas where people live.

4. Work with partners to improve the quality of education.

In order for society to realize the benefits of education, schools must offer a high-quality learning experience to all students. On this issue, it is the primary responsibility of the government of Sudan to make the necessary resources available. UN agencies should cooperate with local officials and communities to improve the overall quality of education in Darfur, focusing initially on three issues: the student-teacher ratio, teacher training and infrastructure. At the primary level, Darfur has among the worst student-teacher ratios in northern Sudan – including 64 students for every teacher in West Darfur.

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**Quality**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Student teacher ratio in primary education</th>
<th>Students per teacher</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North Darfur</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Darfur</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White Nile</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blue Nile</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Red Sea</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gezira</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kassala</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sinnar</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gezira extension</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kordofan</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Darfur</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Darfur extension</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ESR (2010).

**Equipment**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pupils seated at a desk in primary schools</th>
<th>Percentage of pupils seated at a desk</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North Kordofan</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Kordofan</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gezira</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kassala</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sinnar</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gezira extension</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kordofan</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Darfur</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Darfur extension</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>River Nile</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Red Nile</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khorriun</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gezira</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kassala</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sinnar</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gezira extension</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kordofan</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Darfur</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Darfur extension</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Darfur. To reduce this ratio, teacher hiring must increase, possibly through fast-track credentialing programmes. Teachers already on the job may also require additional training in order to ensure high quality instruction. Working with state ministries to create and expand teacher training programmes in classroom management and other issues is one possible strategy. Finally, schools must offer a physical environment that facilitates learning, preferably one that includes desks, chairs and other materials inside a permanent structure. Currently, state governments in northern Sudan spend 9 percent of education funding on infrastructure and other non-recurrent costs. In Darfur, this is likely to be less, and UN agencies should work with state governments to determine and promote the most appropriate balance on this issue.

5. Collaborate to ensure that schools provide a minimum package of child-friendly critical services.

Closely related to the quality issue, schools should embrace a holistic vision of their role in society, particularly in regards to child protection. Progress has been made on this front through humanitarian programmes and other efforts, and UN agencies should work with communities and local officials to strengthen this approach and support the provision of a minimum package of basic services in schools. Key areas include ensuring that schools have access to clean water and sanitation facilities (including soap, latrines and other items) and electricity, as well as links to health services that could promote EPI or other important health initiatives. Nutrition and school-feeding programmes will likewise be crucial, and WFP has already made significant progress in this regard, reaching 308,500 learners through school feeding activities in 2009. All of these activities underpin the quality of the learning experience – itself critical to the benefits of education for the individual and, by extension, for society as a whole.

6. Strengthen the policy and planning capacity of state and locality education officials.

Longer-term education issues in Darfur often come down to questions of policy and planning. Efforts to develop comprehensive state education plans for all northern states – scheduled to begin at the end of 2010 – are a positive step, and UN agencies should support state and federal officials with this process in Darfur. These plans may also offer a possible forum in which to address other issues, including teacher regulations, construction policies and student absorption. Reviewing teacher regulations – particularly training requirements – could significantly improve student-teacher ratios in Darfur. At least 3,000 volunteer teachers received specialized training from UNICEF during the conflict, for example, but many remain ineligible for permanent employment because they lack a formal university degree. Construction policies could also benefit from greater discussion, particularly rules that forbid building permanent primary schools or any secondary schools inside IDP camps. Finally, planning efforts could consider the long-term needs of the public education system – in terms of funding, infrastructure, staffing and other issues – in order to accommodate the many students who currently attend school through humanitarian programmes. These needs will also require attention in light of probable enrolment increases that will follow improvements in infant and child health indicators over the medium and longer term. By supporting the longer-term planning process and building the capacity of local officials, UN agencies can have a significant impact on improving future education for all Darfuri learners.

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**Schools and services**

**Schools and access to water**

Percentage of schools with drinking water tap inside the building

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Drinking Water Tap Inside Building</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Red Sea</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>River Nile</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kordofan</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gezira</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. Kordofan</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Kordofan</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W. Darfur</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. Darfur</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White Nile</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gedarif</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blue Nile</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sinnar</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nyala</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**Schools and sanitation**

Percentage of schools with permanent latrine buildings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Permanent Latrine Buildings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kasala</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kordofan</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>River Nile</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Nile</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White Nile</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gezira</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W. Darfur</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. Darfur</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Darfur</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Kordofan</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. Kordofan</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Kordofan</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


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11 ESR (2010).

Graph: World Bank, Sudan: The Road to Sustainable and Broad-Based Growth (Dec 2009).
Good governance in Darfur has often been in short supply, depriving the region of effective leadership precisely as its people have faced profound environmental, social and economic change. In many ways, the recent conflict demonstrates institutions’ inability to manage these changes or address resulting tensions. Strengthening governance, particularly at the local level, is essential to moving Darfur beyond the current crisis and towards longer-term sustainability. This sustainability should include a wider provision of basic services and a more robust rule of law – particularly regarding the justice sector, protection and gender equality. In short, governance must transform into a positive force in people’s lives – one that can overcome past weaknesses to win the trust and participation of all Darfuris. Achieving this will require careful assistance in order to build local governments’ capacity and support the development of a civil society that can effectively articulate and advocate its priorities.

The decline in governance can mostly be attributed to two factors: marginalization and an internal breakdown. Marginalization, long a feature of politics in Darfur, continued after independence, which saw the abolition of traditional institutions in favour of modern structures. New local governments mostly failed to obtain sufficient resources for local needs, however. Fiscal transfers to Darfur have risen substantially – around 90 percent since 2005, to about $243 million this year. But they remain mostly inadequate and do not always reflect consideration of the level of states’ own revenue. Transfers to Darfur have also lagged other northern states, which saw a roughly 150 percent increase. The resulting gaps in services are one example of this marginalization – only 30 percent of children in Darfur were fully immunized in 2006, for example, well below the 47 percent average for northern Sudan.

Marginalization has also coincided with internal decay. Over time, official institutions became increasingly perceived as privileging certain groups over others. This perception is hardly unique to Darfur, given Sudan’s ranking in the bottom 10 percent for all six worldwide governance indicators in 2008. But in Darfur, it accelerated a loss of trust in government that was already propelled by marginalization. This decay gave rise to an anaemic dual system in which neither the traditional institutions – revived with little real authority in the 1980s – nor official structures were able to confront Darfur’s challenges.

Despite local limitations, decentralization is a legal fact in Sudan, and it could benefit considerably from greater support. States and localities are legally responsible for most services, as well as a substantial share of economic planning and revenue raising. With such broad authority, it is important that UN agencies work with local stakeholders to reverse

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### Budgets and population

**Darfur budgets**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>$m</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>32.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>40.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>26.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>286</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Darfur population**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>m</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>28.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>54.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>17.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Darfur per capita budgets**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>In $ for 2008</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N. Darfur</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Darfur</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W. Darfur</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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1 Traditional “native administrations” were abolished in the 1970s, around the same time that unregistered land was declared state property. These developments had a significant impact on traditional governance in Darfur. The native administrations were later revived with little authority.
2 In fact, recent increases are in many ways more of an “exchange”, given that transfers often replace services that the federal government had previously financed directly.
3 SHHS (2007).
the corrosive effects of marginalization and decay. Moving forward, this implies two basic principles. First, UN agencies should engage local officials and civil society simultaneously, building on the success of similar approaches in other states. Second, all efforts must incorporate a commitment to peace-building that will ensure that governance benefits all Darfuris without perpetuating any existing cleavages.

States, localities and communities all have a critical role to play in building good governance – both legally and according to best practices. Demand for progress and accountability must come from below, meaning that civil society should be fully engaged in identifying, advocating and managing their priorities. UN agencies are already active on this front, notably through the Darfur Community Peace and Stability Fund (DCPSF), which has allocated over $30 million to community-centred projects since 2008. But grassroots engagement must eventually rely on external assistance or official institutions to fund community priorities. Failure to strengthen local governments in step with civil society could therefore entrench the role of external aid in meeting local needs, or dramatically raise expectations of state governments before local authorities have acquired the capacity to meet them.

Fortunately, there is reason to be optimistic about the prospect of working with local governments at the technical level. Published state budgets reveal broad similarities to the priorities of external actors, and states have shown a strong commitment to decentralization. Even in the face of substantial budget shortfalls, for example, all three Darfur states transferred the largest share of their revenue – 40 percent on average – to the localities. Given that localities are frontline providers of health, water and other critical services, UN agencies should assist them in building their capacity.

In fact, some projects have already demonstrated the potential of engaging official and community simultaneously. The UNICEF Child-Friendly Communities Initiative (CFCI), for example, has supported community-initiated projects in Darfur since 2002. In North Darfur alone, this has resulted in 5 State Ministries of Finance (2009).

### Fiscal transfers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Plan $m</th>
<th>Actual $m</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$90%</td>
<td>150%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fiscal transfers since 2005 growth in transfers to Darfur since 2005 Growth in transfers to northern states since 05

Transferred the largest share of their revenue – 40 percent on average – to the localities. Given that localities are frontline providers of health, water and other critical services, UN agencies should assist them in building their capacity.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Top 8 sectors</th>
<th>Plan $m</th>
<th>Actual $m</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North Darfur (2008)</td>
<td>133.1</td>
<td>41.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Darfur (2008)</td>
<td>51.5</td>
<td>40.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Darfur (2008)</td>
<td>428.2</td>
<td>19.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: State Ministries of Finance North, South and West Darfur (2009).
Improving local governance in eastern Sudan: lessons for Darfur

Recognizing that effective governments are critical to the development process, UNDP launched a project to strengthen local governments in eastern Sudan in 2009, offering potentially useful lessons for Darfur. This project cooperates closely with local officials to strengthen local governments’ capacity for public sector management and service delivery, including a focus on decentralization beyond the state level. The project has contributed to significant improvements in official capacity, including the creation of steering committees in all three eastern states that have developed more robust coordination in public planning and management, as well as fostered more effective engagement with communities in the planning process. This project demonstrates the feasibility of working with local governments and communities simultaneously in order to strengthen local governance across the board.

Source: Local Governance and Public Expenditure Management Programme (UNDP)

the construction or rehabilitation of 22 community centres, 556 classrooms, 28 health centres and 31 water yards, among other achievements, all through a process that involved local community and government leaders.

Major priorities

Governance efforts should concentrate on building the capacity of civil society and local governments, particularly at the state and locality levels. This will require a mix of greater support for community engagement, technical assistance for key ministries, capacity development for public management, and support for rule of law institutions that will promote protection, gender equality and human rights. Ideally, these objectives should advance together, given the importance of both governments and communities to building good governance. Capacity building assistance in Sudan currently lags far behind many countries, indicating a potentially high added value of UN agency support. Given security and access concerns in Darfur, UN agencies should target early activities in and around the major cities, expanding to more remote locations as conditions allow.

Aid and capacity development

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1. Strengthen civil society’s role in governance – especially in advocating community priorities.

Greater support to community-based organizations – including women’s groups, youth advocates, tribal councils and others – will engage more Darfuris around critical issues and encourage participation in governance. Recognizing that most of Darfur’s priorities must be defined from the bottom up, UN agencies should work closely with these groups to build their capacity – particularly the ability to lead participatory planning approaches that can eventually engage officials and support outreach on issues like development, gender, human rights or HIV/AIDS. Many DCPSF projects include leadership components, but relatively few take civil society capacity as their main focus. Expanding the DCPSF portfolio to include more projects that concentrate on this issue could substantially boost the ability of Darfuri communities to advocate their priorities. This expansion could be complemented by multi-year initiatives that engage communities around identified priorities, such as resource management, infrastructure or reproductive health. A stronger civil society will be able to guide community-driven progress, ultimately instilling a greater sense of investment in the effectiveness of institutions.

2. Improve civil society’s ability to resolve disputes and promote justice.

Since August 2009, an estimated 772 people – some 38 percent of total fatalities in Darfur – have died as a result of tribal fighting, in addition to 931 deaths due to armed conflict. As the first line of defense against conflict, civil society must develop effective mechanisms to manage disputes before they turn violent. The DCPSF has made important strides in this area, particularly by supporting a network of peace committees that promote reconciliation and cross-community engagement. Given tribal violence and other ongoing tensions
in Darfur, these efforts deserve considerably more support, as well as increased attention to conflict prevention (versus mediation or reconciliation) and the promotion of human rights in general. Strengthening the management, scope and funding of the DCPSF is one strategy. Initially, this could focus on encouraging longer-term grants through the DCPSF that will deliver more robust support for native administrations and other local groupings that demonstrate a capacity to prevent and manage conflict effectively, as well as raise awareness of justice and human rights issues among the population.

3. Strengthen the capacity of technical line ministries at the state and locality levels.

UN agencies should expand their work in improving the technical and managerial capacity of line ministries at the state and locality levels, particularly in critical sectors such as water, health and infrastructure. These institutions represent the government’s most visible face to local people, and improving their effectiveness will enhance service delivery and help rebuild trust in institutions. Localities typically have line ministry staff on hand, although funding shortfalls often mean that few additional resources exist. Starting where staff are in place, capacity development programmes should include training for ministry staff, as well as the potential secondment of UN agency professionals to work within technical ministries at the state and locality levels. One area where these efforts could begin is in assessments, perhaps by involving more line ministries in the IOM-led Village Assessment Project, which examines needs in rural and semi-rural areas. Cooperative relationships between local officials and UN agencies will maximize the impact of knowledge transfer, thereby boosting the efficacy of line ministries. As security conditions improve, these programmes should expand to new locations.

4. Build stronger capacity for public management and coordination in state governments.

For communities and line ministries to receive support, they must rely on state-led management structures. UN agencies should build the capacity of these structures, targeting state ministries of finance and legislative councils first. State finance ministries in many ways guide the development process at

**Supporting peaceful communities in Darfur**

The Darfur Community Peace and Stability Fund (DCPSF) is a pooled funding mechanism that supports peacebuilding projects throughout Darfur. The Fund aims to facilitate trust at the grassroots level by encouraging greater attention to root causes of violence and the promotion of reconciliation across ethnic, tribal and political lines. Since 2008, the DCPSF has allocated over $30 million to 29 projects, most of which emphasize peacebuilding and reconciliation. While service delivery and capacity improvements also fall within the DCPSF portfolio, these activities do not usually constitute projects’ primary focus. A recent evaluation concluded that with some modifications, the DCPSF could successfully expand its support for these activities, indicating that the Fund could develop into a significant engine for strategic, longer-term progress in Darfur.

**Leveraging assessments for longer-term progress**

IOM’s Village Assessment Project conducts rigorous assessments of rural and semi-rural areas, offering a rich data source for assistance efforts. Already available for two rural councils in North Darfur, these assessments are planned to cover all of North and South Darfur and will fill information gaps – particularly in more remote areas – that will be of enormous benefit to longer-term planning efforts. Assessments are conducted by trained local surveyors, typically recruited from the area in which they are deployed. Once completed, these surveys offer a nearly unrivalled resource for devising programmes in water, livelihoods, education, health and other sectors.

state level, which includes consolidating local economic planning, defending budget requests in Khartoum, and allocating federal transfers. UN agencies should work with these ministries to build their capacity, particularly in planning, policy development and public sector financial management. Initial efforts are already underway, notably through the UNDP Crisis and Recovery Mapping and Analysis project. In addition, UN agencies should consider increasing engagement with Legislative Councils, whose approval is required to send plans and budget requests to Khartoum. Working to build members’ understanding of key governance issues – including community priorities and outreach, management and administration – will enhance the professionalism of the Councils and prepare them to become more effective bodies in the future.

5. Strengthen the official justice sector and the rule of law.

When communities are unable to manage disputes, they rely on an effective, neutral justice sector to enforce the rule of law and promote human rights – including the fair treatment of marginalized groups and women. These structures have been severely degraded in Darfur. In North Darfur, for example, only three criminal courts – all in El Fasher – are continuously operational, out of a total of seven across the state. In addition, out of 72 rural courts in North Darfur, just 39 are functioning, and only five of the state’s estimated 60 lawyers work outside of El Fasher. UN agencies should work with local officials to strengthen the justice sector, focusing on the capacity of justice professionals, as well as popular awareness of and access to justice. Awareness should include outreach that promotes understanding of key human rights and protection issues, such as sexual or gender-based violence and child protection, as well as people’s legal rights as citizens. Initially, these efforts should support legal aid offices around Darfur that will promote access and awareness, as well as training programmes for professionals. The ultimate goal should be the emergence of justice systems in all three Darfur states that act as effective arbiters of disputes and guardians of people’s universal human rights.
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