UNEP Mission Report:

Risks and opportunities from natural resources and the environment for peacebuilding in the Central African Republic

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Executive summary

1. Background. Within the framework of the partnership between the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the Peacebuilding Commission Support Office (PBSO), UNEP undertook a mission to the Central African Republic (CAR) in January–February 2009. The aim of the mission was to assess the role played by natural resources in the conflict and to identify both risks and opportunities for peacebuilding presented by natural resources and the environment. The mission findings, outlined in this report and complemented by further expert inputs and desk research, informed the Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding in CAR (2009–2011). Recommendations for the implementation of the peacebuilding strategy regarding natural resources management and the environment were drawn from these findings.

The mission was conducted in collaboration with the Ministry of Environment and Ecology with logistical and political support from the United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in the Central African Republic (BONUCA). Stakeholders in the main resources sectors from government, the private sector, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), local communities and the international community were interviewed. This mission report was peer reviewed by in-country experts from the European Commission (EC), World Wildlife Fund (WWF), German Technical Corporation (GTZ) and the Ministry of Environment and Ecology.

2. Country context. Poor governance, insecurity, high inequality and a sense of marginalization of regions and sectors of the population are core conflict factors in CAR, one of the poorest and most neglected countries in the world. The economy, weak as it may be, is already extensively based on the exploitation of natural resources and the prospects for growth in this sector are generally good. This potential needs to be fully harnessed and the sustainable, equitable and transparent management of these resources should be adequately promoted through the implementation of the frameworks governing peacebuilding, development and humanitarian assistance. This is imperative in order to avoid new grievances surrounding natural resources that risk aggravating social tension, undermining stability and, in the worst case, leading to outbreaks of violent conflict. In addition, as the country moves forward, efforts should also be undertaken to ensure armed groups and bandits (the zaraguinas or coupeurs de route) do not capture, tax or illegally exploit high-value resources for income. This report, based on desk study and field research, explores some of these issues in detail and provides recommendations for addressing risks and opportunities related to natural resources in each of the main peacebuilding pillars: security, governance and regional development.

3. Key findings.
   a) Role of natural resources in the conflict: Natural resources, such as timber, diamonds and arable land, play a critically important role in the socio-economic context of the country and, therefore, play an indirect role in the conflict. Although rich in natural resources, decades of poor governance and elite capture have resulted in unequal distribution of the benefits generated by the exploitation of these resources. This, combined with the interlinked lack of growth and development, is a source of tension in part of the country and has contributed to feelings of marginalization and exclusion. However, the role of natural resources in contributing to the conflict can only be regarded as indirect as capturing natural resources does not appear to be a motivating factor for any of the major warring parties. None of the main groups controls areas abundant with resources and no attempts have been made to conquer resource-rich territory in the course of 2008. While
natural resources might indirectly support various groups who survive through looting and minor trade, the systematic capture and trade of high-value resources such as diamonds, gold and timber are not involved. It is not, however, excluded that capturing natural resources could become a motivating factor in the future.

Evidence also suggests that, in the absence of government presence and security, competition for the control over weakly regulated resources (e.g. land), or over increasingly scarce ones (e.g. water in the arid areas of the country), has played a direct role in increasing tension and sparking violence, in particular at the local level. These include: (i) tension over water access and grazing rights, particularly in increasingly dry areas of some northern regions; and (ii) increasing populations and competition over poorly regulated arable land, combined with increasing land degradation.

b) **Impacts from conflict on natural resources:** Natural resources and the environment are indirectly affected by the consequences of the conflict, notably by population displacement and associated coping strategies. The conflict in CAR itself has been costly to the economy: directly through diversion of government revenue to the security sector and through the destruction of investment and infrastructure; and indirectly through interrupting agriculture and resource extraction. It is estimated, for instance, that the considerable investment in cotton production in the conflict zone in the north and northwest of the country has been lost to conflict. Despite recent efforts to comply with national and international standards on natural resources and the environment, the governance and management of these resources have been heavily affected by decades of poor governance and the protracted conflict. This has had an impact on development prospects, people’s access to the benefits generated by resources and the institutional capacities of the various resource sectors, thus potentially aggravating existing conflicts on the regional and local levels.

c) **Risks and opportunities from natural resources in peacebuilding efforts:** Key sectors explored in regard to the risks and opportunities for peacebuilding efforts are: (i) forestry; (ii) diamonds; (iii) agriculture and fisheries; (iv) energy; (v) wildlife; (vi) hunting and tourism; and (vii) water. In each of these sectors, poor governance and management as well as increasing tension over use and access to benefits from their exploitation are potential conflict factors and risks to peace consolidation. Improving the governance and management in these sectors are key issues in order for peacebuilding to succeed. Natural resources will play a critical role in re-establishing peace, kick-starting economic growth and promoting development.

d) **Institutional capacities for natural resource management:** CAR has many framework laws in place for natural resource management and environmental governance. Many of these laws are in the process of being updated (e.g. mining and wildlife laws). However, most of these laws remain at a general level, and lack the elementary norms, rules and regulations required for their proper implementation. The effort to complete the policy and legal framework, to draft all the necessary regulations and to train judges, law enforcement officers and local officials in their application is a high priority. Some work is occurring in this area, but the scale is nowhere near sufficient given the needs. International, regional and transboundary cooperation in this field will also have to be strengthened.

e) **Regional dynamics:** The porous borders of CAR expose the country to armed groups entering its territory and using it as a sanctuary and/or engaging in predatory activities, thereby securing access to natural riches through the use of force. While some of these
groups have clearly adopted opportunistic strategies motivated by greed, others are facing constraints on their livelihoods. For instance, the change of climate in Chad, combined with increased resource scarcity and access issues, pushed herders to explore new areas further south. Tension with sedentary villagers and farmers built up, often leading to violent outcomes. Regional issues like this one, with serious impacts on the security situation, call for improved natural resource management and transboundary dialogue and cooperation.

3. **Recommendations.** Security, governance and need for economic development are the key priorities to stabilize the country and consolidate peace. The way natural resources are managed will have important implications for each of these peacebuilding pillars. In order to minimize the conflict risks presented by natural resources and to harness their peacebuilding potential, UNEP recommends:

a) **Security sector reform (SSR).** Action must be taken to ensure that resource management and environmental rehabilitation interventions offer livelihood and employment opportunities in the context of disarmament, demobilization, reintegration (DDR) projects. In particular, there are significant opportunities to retrain and employ ex-combatants for the delivery and installation of basic water, sanitation and energy infrastructure as well as in the restoration and management of protected areas and related infrastructure and in the development of tourism facilities. Large-scale environmental rehabilitation projects, such as reforestation or soil stabilization programmes, also present opportunities as do the possibility of bio-energy production or carbon capture. At the same time, safeguards are needed to ensure that the new police and security forces and international peacekeepers do not illegally exploit natural resources for supplemental income.

b) **Good governance.** The legal and policy framework as well as the institutional capacities for the management and coordination of natural resource and environmental governance must be clarified and strengthened. This includes addressing land tenure, decentralizing management to the community level, establishing mechanisms for sharing benefits with local communities and for resolving ownership and access disputes. Revenues and taxation must be clearly regulated and illegal trade controlled. Regional dialogue on co-management of transboundary resources, the return of displaced people and conflicts relating to transhumance must also be addressed. Building new management and monitoring capacity in the mining and agricultural sectors should be a priority.

c) **Development poles.** Sustainable management of water and fertile land, which is essential for agriculture, hydroelectric development and bio-energy plantations and important to manage local conflict, must be supported. Community-based natural resource management and testing of the Zones Cynégétiques Villageoises (ZCV, or village hunting zones) system must be promoted as part of this effort. Attention must also be paid to preventing adverse impact of development activities on the environment.
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1 Introduction

1.1 Rationale and objectives

The Central African Republic (CAR) became the fourth agenda country of the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission in June 2008. The strategic framework for peace consolidation in CAR, in line with the priorities of the CAR Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 2008–2010 (PRSP), focuses on the three pillars of security, governance, and regional development. Among the many challenges the country has to face is the need to make the best use of its abundant natural resources and to minimize potential conflicts over wealth sharing, ownership and access. Natural resources are not only an engine for growth and development, but also a means to consolidate the fragile peace and prevent future conflict.

Within this framework, and in partnership with the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO), the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) undertook a mission to CAR from 29 January to 5 February 2009. The aim of the mission was to assess the role of natural resources in the conflict as well as the present risks and opportunities for peacebuilding offered by natural resources and the environment. The specific objectives were to:

- map the natural resource potential in CAR;
- identify the potential risks to peacebuilding related to natural resources and their management;
- provide recommendations on how the Peacebuilding Commission could support the CAR’s efforts in improving natural resource management.

The initial mission findings informed the Peacebuilding Commission and the Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding in CAR of these issues in a summary report that was provided following the mission. Accordingly, responding to the final Peacebuilding Framework and including substantial additional research, this report aims to provide:

- strategic recommendations to the natural resources sector regarding risks to the peace process and opportunities for peacebuilding;
- recommendations for the implementation of the peacebuilding strategy;
- recommendations for the continued implementation of the poverty reduction strategy;
- pilot projects to achieve these ends.

1.2 Methodology and limitations

The UNEP mission was conducted in collaboration with the Ministry of Environment and Ecology of CAR and benefited from the logistical and political support of the United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in the Central African Republic (BONUCA). A local expert from the non-governmental organization (NGO) Gapafot1 joined the mission to facilitate contacts with local stakeholders and communities.

Interviews were conducted with key stakeholders from government, the private sector, NGOs and local communities as well as the international community in each of the main resource sectors (see Annex 3 for mission contact list). A total of 35 interviews were conducted with approximately 50 individuals and 1,800 km were travelled by road, primarily in the resource rich areas of the south.
UNEP’s draft conflict analysis framework guided the content and approach of the interviews. Where possible, interviews were conducted with people from all levels of the resource extraction chain. Information collected from the field was triangulated among multiple sources and cross-checked against other available third party reports. While the mission did not have access to the conflict zone in the north and northeast of the country, interviews were conducted with individuals and organizations working in these regions. The findings were supplemented by desk research conducted prior to and after the field mission. This mission report was peer reviewed by national stakeholders, in-country experts from the European Commission (EC), World Wildlife Fund (WWF), German Technical Corporation (GTZ), BONUCA and the Ministry of Environment and Ecology and by international experts.

1.3 Report structure

This report is organized into six chapters, following the introduction (Chapter 1):

- Chapter 2 provides an overview of the country from a socio-economic and development context, of key natural resources and of the recent conflict and current security situation.
- Chapter 3 explores the policy, legal and institutional framework for natural resource management and environmental governance and identifies capacity-building priorities. It also provides an overview of regional and international cooperation in these sectors.
- Chapter 4 analyses present and future cumulative risks to the peace process from the mismanagement of natural resources.
- Chapter 5 looks at current opportunities for peacebuilding through natural resource management and transboundary dialogue and cooperation.
- Chapter 6 recommends interventions for addressing the risks and opportunities identified. It includes four main subsections: (i) overall policy recommendations; (ii) implementing the Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding; (iii) continued execution of the poverty reduction strategy; and (iv) selected pilot interventions.

1.4 Acknowledgements

The mission depended on the outstanding support provided by a number of individuals working in CAR. In particular, thanks are extended to: Gani Are, OIC, Chief Political Affairs Section, BONUCA; Cherno Mamoudu Jallow, Political Affairs Officer, BONUCA; Honoré K Bobo, Administrative Officer, BONUCA; Gaston Bushayija, Interagency Affairs Officer, UNDP; Kersten Jauer, Programme Officer, UNDP, Rodonne Siribi Clolataire, President, Gapafot; and Philip Helminger, CAR Desk Officer, PBSO. At the desk level, Renard Sexton, Julien Aguzzoli, and Hannoa Guillaume of UNEP’s Post-Conflict and Disaster Management Branch also provided substantive research support while Jeanette Clover and Samba Harouna of UNEP’s Regional Office for Africa provided further peer review and technical inputs. Donata Garassi, technical expert on conflict analysis and peacebuilding, also provided technical inputs to the report and validated the conflict analysis methodology.
2 Country context

2.1 Introduction

This chapter presents background information on the human development, economic and political context within CAR as well as provides an overview of natural resources and the environment in the country. The aim of this segment is to frame the basic characteristics of CAR in a manner that facilitates a clear understanding of the governance framework for natural resources, potential risks to the peace process and opportunities for peacebuilding, which follow in Chapters 3, 4 and 5.

As with any other conflict situation, there are important elements that fall outside a national and contemporary era focus, including political history as well as regional and international dynamics. How these elements are linked to the current conflict situation and connected to access and ownership of natural resources and their derived benefits is an important part of eliminating risks and embracing opportunities going forward.

2.2 Political history

CAR is one of Africa's most neglected countries today, and has been for some time. Since independence from France in 1960, CAR has endured an almost uninterrupted stretch of instability and violent conflict, with consecutive coup d'états, personality-driven and highly centralized regimes on the one hand and various forms of rebellion and violence on the other.

The instability that has defined the current era in CAR is partly linked to colonial legacies, isolation and urban elite capture as well as the struggle to control the benefits of valuable natural resources. These factors have rendered the country susceptible to both external influence, in both the positive and negative sense, and internal conflicts of interest. The timeline in Table 1 provides a summary of this history, and depicts how the current situation reflects decades of self-reinforcing events.

2.3 The social and development context

CAR is a landlocked, impoverished nation of 4.3 million people. At 622,984 km², it is roughly the size of Somalia or Ukraine. It shares a border with Cameroon, Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DR Congo), Republic of the Congo and Sudan, thus sitting within a quite volatile region. It ranks near the bottom of the UNDP Human Development Index 2008, 178 out of 179 countries (ahead only of Sierra Leone), and has regressed over the past 20 years. On the Failed States Index, CAR ranks as the eighth most instable country in the world.

Life expectancy is in the low forties, only half of children go to school and about half of the adult population is illiterate, including two-thirds of women. HIV/AIDS is another major concern, aggravated by the incapacity of the public system to respond. Overall, services are lacking, and those provided are of extremely poor quality, across the entire country. Seven out of ten Central Africans do not have access to clean drinking water. If this trend remains unchanged, estimates are that 60% of the total population still will not have access to clean drinking water in 2015.

On the Gender-related Development Index, CAR ranks 153 out of 177. Important gender gaps exist in many areas: women earn less than men, are less likely to be literate and have less political representation. The population is 62% rural, with a density of seven people per km². Two-thirds of the population lives in absolute poverty, obliged to survive on less than one dollar a day, while 84% lives on less than two dollars daily. Poverty varies significantly from region to region, with rural
populations in the eastern region of the country experiencing more extreme poverty than the more resource-rich and more urban western section. A high proportion of the rural livelihoods depends on land and lies entirely outside the organized economy – indeed, approximately 90% of all farming is at subsistence level. Unfortunately, however, the World Food Programme estimates that 43% of the population of the country is undernourished.

**Table 1.** Chronology of recent political and conflict-related events in CAR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1894</td>
<td>The CAR territory, known at the time as Oubangui-Chari, became a French possession and was later integrated into the French Equatorial Africa federation (AEF).</td>
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<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>After the Second World War, colonial inhabitants were given French citizenship and a right to create assemblies. The first assembly was headed by Barthelemy Boganda, a catholic priest and founder of the political party known as the Movement for the Social Progress in Black Africa (MESAN).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>Dissolution of the AEF and birth of CAR led by Boganda.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>President Boganda died in a plane crash.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>CAR gained independence from France on 13 August. Boganda’s cousin, David Dacko, became president on 14 August.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>The MESAN, Dacko’s party after the death of Boganda, became the Central African unique party.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>On New Year’s Eve, Jean Bedel Bokassa led a military coup deposing President Dacko. He abrogated the 1959 constitution, suppressed the National Assembly and concentrated legislative and executive powers in his own hands.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>Bokassa proclaimed himself president for life.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>After riots in Bangui, Bokassa was deposed by the forces of Dacko, with French secret services assistance (operation “Barracuda”).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>President Dacko created his new party, the Central African Democratic Union (UDC), a single party supposed to succeed MESAN.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>Elections followed with Dacko winning with over 50% of the vote. However, significant social unrest followed, prompting the declaration of a state of emergency. The ensuing coup felled the Dacko government, which was succeeded by the one-party military regime of General Andre-Dieudonne Kolingba.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Democratic multiparty elections were held and won by Ange-Félix Patassé, a former prime minister.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996-1997</td>
<td>Unpaid wages led soldiers to mutiny on three occasions. A multilateral force of African and European soldiers was created and positioned in the capital until the UN mission took over in 1998.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Second democratic elections were held and won by Patassé.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>In October, General François Bozizé launched an attempt to remove President Patassé from power, citing corruption and poor governance. The Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) sponsored a multinational force, who with about 1,000 soldiers of Jean-Pierre Bemba’s Congolese rebel organization Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC), struggled to maintain control over the capital.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>The Patassé government finally fell in March. The former constitution and national assembly were dissolved and a reconciliation process launched, which successfully strengthened the new...</td>
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</table>
regime’s legitimacy at both national and international levels.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>The new constitution was approved by a resounding 90.4% of the voters in a referendum in December, with a participation rate of 77.43%.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Full multiparty presidential and parliamentary elections were held in March, with a second round in May. Bozizé was declared the winner after a run-off vote.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Conflict resumed with the emergence of two new rebel groups, the Popular Army for the Restoration of Democracy (APRD) and the Union of the Democratic Forces of Restoration (UFDR) operating in northern CAR.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>A peace accord was signed in Libya between the government and Abdoulaye Miskine, leader of the Democratic Front of the Central African People (FDPC). In September, the UN Security Council approved the establishment of MINURCAT, a mission designed to help CAR and Chad to build and improve security. In October, the European Union (EU) officially validated the creation of the European Union Force (EUFOR Chad/CAR), a peacekeeping contingent of over 3,000 soldiers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>The Peacebuilding Commission added CAR to its agenda in June. The Libreville Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed soon after with the APRD and UFDR rebel groups. The FDPC, while not at the negotiation table, agreed to comply with the peace agreement. An Inclusive National Dialogue (IND) process was held on 5–20 December. Parties including APRD, UFDR and FDPC agreed to respect and implement the Libreville Comprehensive Peace Agreement and to form a new Unity Government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>In January, the government announced the creation of a new national Unity Government. The UN Security Council extended the mandate of MINURCAT until 15 March 2010.</td>
</tr>
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</table>
CAR’s energy situation is also quite poor. Transport fuel must be brought up from the coast at great expense, causing problems for reliable transport and power generation. The country’s considerable hydropower potential is poorly utilized, with electricity available only in the capital Bangui and in the small town of Boali, where it is generated. The two hydroelectric installations in Boali, 100 km north of Bangui, are in great need of repair and update. Boali I was built during the colonial period and has reached the end of its effective life. Boali II, built in the 1970s, remains far removed from today’s standards of efficiency. A dam was built at one additional site in the 1990s, called Boali III, but while the water retention was completed, turbines were never installed. There appears to be no plans to complete it in the foreseeable future. As a result, the country depends on diesel generators for most of its electricity, a costly and inefficient system that comes at a great cost to the economy.

2.4 The economic and trade situation

The instability of the past 30 years has had a serious impact on the economy of CAR. From 1975 to 2005, the gross domestic product (GDP) of CAR contracted by a nominal 1.5%. During this period, per capita GDP dropped from USD 1,935 to USD 1,224, which, given the high income inequality, signified a major increase in poverty and severe poverty. Since 2005, however, GDP growth has averaged 7% per year, settling in 2008 at a nominal USD 1.9 billion. The primary sector accounts for around 55% of total GDP, made up entirely of natural resources, while the secondary sector represents 15% and the tertiary 31%. The figures vary considerably between sources, however, and the role of informal, including smuggled, natural resources in the GDP is not clear. Table 2 illustrates the important role that natural resources play in CAR’s economy, though the numbers underestimate the full impact, given that the transport and selling of natural resource products make up a significant share of the secondary and tertiary sectors.

Table 2. Natural resources as contributors to the primary sector of CAR’s GDP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Primary GDP contribution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Forestry</td>
<td>6–8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Livestock</td>
<td>12–15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hunting/fishing</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crops</td>
<td>28–30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minerals</td>
<td>4–10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>55–68%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In 2007, timber exports amounted to USD 87.4 million, diamonds exports to USD 62.2 million and coffee exports to US 8.8 million. CAR’s primary trading partners include Belgium, Canada, France, Indonesia, Italy, the Netherlands, the United States and neighbouring Cameroon.

The global financial crisis has had an enormous impact on CAR’s economy. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the sharp decline of the two main exported primary commodities, timber and diamonds, will badly affect government revenues, further deepening the government’s fiscal deficit. Economic growth estimates have shrunk from 5–3% for 2009, while the European Commission estimates that foreign investments will decrease by 20% in 2009.

In addition to the current crisis, three additional factors continue to discourage foreign investment in the country, namely: (i) poor governance, including a weak banking and insurance system; (ii) low government capacity guaranteed security in the resource-rich areas; and (iii) government policies that are characterized by investors as unfriendly to foreigners. As a result, informal economies thrive and business opportunities are frequently pursued by often opaque business networks that operate at the
frontiers of legality, with very little benefit returning in the form of revenue for the State or local communities.

The persistence of conflict in the region has also considerably impacted the development of regional links and cross-border commerce, isolating the country even further and increasing the development challenge.

Income inequality in CAR is among the highest in Africa (61.3 on the GINI index\(^7\)) and the country ranks 162 out of 179 countries in Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index for 2007. The World Bank classifies CAR as a low-income country, eligible for International Development Association (IDA) assistance and Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) relief.

As in most developing countries, particularly those emerging from instability, strong support from international partners is important. However, until recently, the international commitment in CAR has been meager with the share to humanitarian assistance steadily growing since 2004 up to one-third of total aid in 2008, which was USD 295 million.\(^8\) An important event occurred in 2006, however, when the World Bank relieved an outstanding USD 82 million debt with its IDA\(^9\) unit, paving the way for CAR's reclassification as an IMF interim country and decision point candidate under HIPC in 2007. The country is now on track to cancel additional portions of its USD 578 million debt to creditors in the coming years.\(^10\)

In part because of the World Bank re-engagement, between 2005 and 2007 total foreign assistance to CAR more than doubled from USD 117 million to USD 242 million. During this period, humanitarian aid jumped from USD 10 million to USD 78 million. To improve coordination between CAR's aid partners, the Humanitarian and Development Partnership Team\(^21\) was established to carry out regular assessments of humanitarian needs and maintain an updated database mapping all humanitarian and development aid in the country. A Consolidated Appeal for Humanitarian Needs is issued on an annual basis, while a United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) is in place for the period 2007–2011.

At the multilateral level, the European Commission is the major partner. Within the framework of the 10th European Development Fund (covering the period 2008–2013), the EC planned to fund development projects in CAR up to USD 205 million and direct grant support to the government worth USD 49 million.\(^22\) In terms of international development assistance, the EC is followed by the banks (World Bank and African Development Bank [AfDB]) and the agencies of the United Nations (UN), in particular UNICEF, UNDP and FAO.

At the bilateral level, only France maintains a large-scale programme, although the United States has recently shown signs of wanting to re-engage. GTZ is reportedly winding down support to CAR. Most international NGOs present in the country focus on humanitarian aid, and those that invest in development are either operating at a small scale in specific locations in the country, or have only recently begun to engage with the country's development challenges.

In addition to these various factors, conflict in CAR itself has been costly to the economy, directly through diversion of government revenue to the security sector and through the destruction of investment and infrastructure; and indirectly through interrupting agriculture and resource extraction. It is estimated, for instance, that the considerable investment in cotton production in the conflict zone in the north and northwest of the country has been lost to conflict.
2.5 Natural resources and the environment

CAR has abundant natural resources. Furthermore, the country has fairly plentiful water resources. Timber and rough diamonds are the country’s leading export products, while subsistence resources such as land for grazing and agriculture, water, non-timber forest products and wildlife are the basis for most livelihoods across the country.

Timber

In 2005, the total forested area of CAR was 227,550 km², or 36.5% of its territory. Timber is one of the key renewable natural resources and a major potential source of revenue for the State and local communities, given that timber harvesting is currently carried out in southwestern CAR, the area least affected by security problems.

The two principal commercial forest blocs are located in the southwest (largely in Lobaye and Sangha-Mbaéré provinces) and in the south-central area (Basse Kotto and Mbomou). The former is divided into eight concessions that cover the entire area under forest. Most of these have been allocated to forest enterprises (either foreign, mixed foreign–national or national with foreign capital) that are responsible for operating within the terms of the Forest Code and the concession agreements. The latter forest bloc is still not exploited on an industrial scale. The state of the infrastructure and the increased distance to the port of Douala mean that it is not presently economically viable.

CAR is a challenging source for timber production among African producers due to its poor infrastructure, high transportation costs and largely unskilled work force (approximately 4,000 full-time employees). Transportation has been estimated to represent up to 60% of the costs of production. Since CAR is landlocked and has poor infrastructural capacity, timber exports must go through either Cameroon or DR Congo, making exports susceptible to external conflict and unrest.

Mineral sector

The mineral sector, mainly consisting of the extraction and export of rough diamonds, also includes mostly unexploited deposits of iron, copper, zinc, tin, nickel, coltan and cobalt. According to a recent study, the diamond sector provides jobs for 50,000–80,000 people with more than 600,000 people depending on their production for their economic survival. In 2007, estimates indicate that diamond exports amounted to USD 60 million, although smuggling and other informal networks suggest that more may be produced.

Diamond extracting activities, which take place mainly in alluvial deposits using artisanal techniques, are concentrated in central-east and southwestern CAR. By volume, CAR is a mid-sized exporter, similar to Guinea or Sierra Leone. Most diamonds that are exported are of very high “gem” quality, which makes their export an economically viable operation. Similar to the timber sector, the poor transportation infrastructure makes the export of mineral resources a costly and difficult affair, which has thus restricted exports to natural resources with high value to weight ratios, such as diamonds and gold.

Gold is mostly extracted in connection with diamonds. Prospecting for gold alone is not yet a common occurrence, though some very small-scale artisanal mining is done. If there were to be improved infrastructure in the future, this, as well as lower value extractable resources such as tin or zinc, could become viable options for extraction.
Commercial agriculture

At various times in its history, CAR has produced agricultural commodities on a scale that permitted export. Most of that production is either in decline or has collapsed completely. A good deal of this is the result of conflict, with the prime export agriculture zones coinciding with the worst of the conflict zones. Thus, the extensive investment in the cotton industry undertaken in the 1980s and 1990s has been erased, with the infrastructure degraded or destroyed and the foreign partners long gone. Production of coffee (in which there was once an important trade with Sudan), cocoa, sesame and tobacco have either declined considerably, or are well below their potential, even though world prices for cocoa, and to a lesser extent coffee, have held up well.

For the past 30 years, the annual growth rate of the agricultural sector has been approximately 2%. Agricultural development is hindered by widespread insecurity in rural areas adding to the lack of capacity, infrastructure and manpower. Early investment in agriculture exports was lost to the conflict and new investment is hard to come by, not only because of the parlous state of governance, but also due to the near-total absence of even the base levels of infrastructure required to grow and export agricultural commodities. Furthermore, as mentioned above, the investment climate in CAR is unattractive to most legitimate investors. That said, should peace be consolidated in the breadbasket in the north and northwest (where the population density is greatest), and the peace plan improves both governance and provincial infrastructure and services, then the prospects for CAR to develop a source of State revenue from agricultural trade will improve markedly.

Land for pastoralism and subsistence agriculture

Up-to-date figures on the land use patterns of CAR are quite difficult to obtain. It is, however, estimated that just 3-4% of possibly arable land is being used for agricultural activities (around 600,000 hectares). UNDP estimates that about 15 million hectares of CAR’s 62 million hectares could be made arable, while permanent grazing land has been estimated at around 3-4% of CAR’s total land area. Conventional statistics on arable land suggest that presently viable agricultural land is 3.1% of CAR’s land area, or about 1.9 million hectares. Of this, only a fraction is being used for permanent crops, instead relying on shifting agriculture techniques.

Pastoralists in CAR are mostly semi-nomadic herders from the Mbororo ethnic group. They are based mainly in the northwestern savannah area and represent 10% of the total population. Other herders from neighbouring countries, mainly Chad, come during the dry season to find pasture for their cattle in the entire northern area. As these areas were particularly exposed to repeated attacks from rebels, various bandit groups and Chadian army raids, many local herders are now in very precarious situations with often no cattle left. Permanent grazing land was estimated at 5% in 1993, which indicates a possible reduction of grazing land by nearly one million hectares.

Water and fisheries

The water resources of CAR are divided into two large basins, the Chari and the Oubanguian, which receive significant annual rainfall. Overall, the country receives around 1,000 millimeters of rain, annually, with significant geographic variability.

With regard to the fisheries sector, CAR is rich in river courses, enjoys abundant (if often seasonal) water flow and its citizens suffer from a serious deficit of animal protein. This combination of factors should argue for a development of fisheries in CAR. However, despite fish farming being supported over the years by the FAO, that activity has not been continued. Fish yield in the rivers is reportedly down, though it is uncertain whether this stems from overfishing, siltation or a combination of the two.
There would appear to be a good potential for developing fish farming, both to offer a local source of animal protein and to relieve pressure on wild game as a source of meat.

**Non-timber forest products**

The diversity of the wildlife and unique ecosystems in CAR have justified the creation of several parks and reserves. CAR has a total network of 16 protected areas (at least on paper), covering about 12% of the country (76,610 km).\(^{33, 34}\) These protected areas comprise five national parks, seven wildlife reserves, one strict nature reserve, one biosphere reserve, one presidential park and one special forest reserve. In addition to protected areas, the Zones Cynégétiques Villageoises system (ZCV, or Village Hunting Zones) was established in 1992.\(^{35}\) The main objective of the ZCV is to ensure that local communities participate in the management of wildlife and other natural resources and to share profits earned from the sustainable exploitation of these resources. The revenues generated by the ZCV come from the taxes collected from hunting camp rents, infrastructure fees and meat sales from animals killed by tourists. Profits from the ZCV are divided between the State, communes and village communities. While tourism related to hunting was worth millions of dollars in the 1970s and 1980s, it has almost collapsed as a result of the conflict. In 2005, tourism related to hunting generated USD 0.9M, approximately 0.07% of GDP.\(^{36}\)

**Environmental degradation**

Despite recent efforts to comply with national and international standards on natural resources and the environment, the governance and management of these resources have been heavily affected by decades of poor governance and the protracted conflict. This has impacted development prospects, people’s access to the benefits generated by these resources and the institutional capacities of the various resource sectors. This, in turn, has potentially aggravated existing regional and local level conflicts.

CAR seems to be less affected than most African countries by environmental degradation, owing in part to its low population density. Bushfires occur frequently as 90% of the population, especially poor people, rely on coal or wood as a source of energy. Deforestation is a concern, particularly around urban centres, however, across the country forests have decreased by only 0.1% per year, a sixth of the African average.

Desertification in the north, soil degradation, water pollution and a reduction of biodiversity are other environmental problems. Particularly in the drier areas in the north, an irregular rhythm of the dry and wet seasons over the past several years has increased the risk of food insecurity.

2.6 **Conflict overview**

While the causes of the conflict in CAR are multiple, and include national, local as well as regional considerations, research and analysis identify decades of poor governance, widespread insecurity, lack of development and marginalization of regions and sectors of the population, in a context of very limited reach of the central authority, as the fundamental causes.\(^{37}\) Natural resources have played an important underlying role as a causal, exacerbating yet always embedded source of conflict in CAR since it gained independence. While the regime changes, power shake-ups and peace deals have been focused on actors and activities, the underlying problems of inequitable development and poorly managed access to the benefits of natural resources have often been left in the background. The current conflict, which is explicitly linked to alienation and power sharing, is rooted in this same history.
In order to analyse and identify the risks to the peace process and opportunities for peace consolidation in the environment and natural resource sector, a careful understanding of the conflict, including regional and factional dynamics, is vital. Understanding how the environment links with these various spheres of conflict will help to focus the assessment on areas of the most concern.

Synopsis of recent events

Under the Patassé presidency, General François Bozizé was appointed army Chief of Staff in 1996. After a failed coup attempt launched by former CAR President Kolingba in 2001, Patassé dismissed Bozizé, under the belief that he had been involved in the attack. Seeking shelter in Chad, Bozizé prepared and launched several military operations to topple Patassé’s regime, which was widely regarded as corrupt and ineffective. With the National Army split between the two men and thus severely weakened, Bozizé requested help from a group of Chadian mercenaries.

Bozizé came to power in March 2003, with the help of these soldiers. This move was initially poorly received by the international community, however, after taking a strong stand against corruption and greatly improving security in Bangui, Bozizé stood for election in May 2005 and received 64% of the vote.

Unfortunately, the election of President Bozizé did not bring the peace that was promised. Instead, barely a month into Bozizé’s new mandate, armed opposition began to develop – beginning in the northern part of the country: (i) the Popular Army for the Restoration of Democracy (APRD) in the northwest; (ii) the Union of the Democratic Forces of Restoration (UFDR) in the northeast; and (iii) the smaller FDPC in the central-northern area of the country, which are the regions where neither timber nor diamond resources are located. As a result, the benefits of development, such as roads, jobs, schools and the availability of equipment, have been sparser than in the southern region. While clashing regularly with the National Army (Central African Armed Forces/FACA), none of the groups has managed, or has been willing, to gain control beyond their area of operations.

There are three principal armed groups that have been operating in the northern part of the country: (i) the Popular Army for the Restoration of Democracy (APRD) in the northwest; (ii) the Union of the Democratic Forces of Restoration (UFDR) in the northeast; and (iii) the smaller FDPC in the central-northern area of the country, which are the regions where neither timber nor diamond resources are located. As a result, the benefits of development, such as roads, jobs, schools and the availability of equipment, have been sparser than in the southern region. While clashing regularly with the National Army (Central African Armed Forces/FACA), none of the groups has managed, or has been willing, to gain control beyond their area of operations.

There is currently no overarching or guiding principle for the rebel groups. The APRD claims that it fights for the security of the region, yet although it has so far proven strong enough to survive, it seems to seek a political way out of its struggle. The UFDR launched a series of surprisingly efficient attacks against some larger town centres in 2006 and 2007, but in 2008 it was the only rebel group that did not clash with the CAR’s National Army. The UFDR adheres to the agreements concluded with the CAR government and seems ready to continue its struggle politically. The third rebel group with a military presence in CAR is the FDPC, which is also the weakest of the three groups. Besides rebel activity, the population suffers from aggression by a wide array of other armed actors, including their own security services. While some groups such as the UFDR or the APRD are willing to engage in political processes, others, such as bandits and foreign herders, mainly take advantage of the poor security situation to pursue their immediate self-interest. Annex 4 contains a detailed discussion of each of the armed groups in CAR as well as the individuals who lead them.

Regional dynamics
While the main crisis in CAR is a domestic affair, regional dimensions play an important role. The impact of regional conflict is particularly visible in the northeast (CAR-Sudan/Darfur situation) and the northwest (CAR-Chadian situation) regions of the country.

For the first area, CAR and the nearby regions of Chad and Sudan all have in common the fact that they were considered since independence as secondary provinces, neglected by central governments. The Sudanese and Chadian areas share a long history, with some ethnic groups overlapping frontiers and a common burden imposed by Khartoum and N’Djamena, respectively. Among the groups of people living in these areas, the Zaghawa played an important role in the transboundary conflict between the two countries. While the Chadian Zaghawa benefited from the election of President Idriss Déby, a Zaghawa himself, the Sudanese felt all the more how marginalized they were in Sudan. This led to their rebellion, which N’Djamena had to support because of the Zaghawa elites lobby. In addition, the region has always been an open trading and migration path, which allowed the warring parties to access weapons and other vital resources. It also facilitated migrants movement to CAR and Sudan from Chad, increasing pressure on scarce land and providing troops for various armed groups.

Regarding CAR specifically, two main phenomena should be considered. The first phenomenon is the incursion of foreign troops, rebels and armed bands that loot for supplies, with some of them using forced recruitment. Since 2008, Chadian troops have been attacking villages along the border, especially in the northwestern area. Soldiers and herders ally to raid villages of farmers, sometimes leaving nothing behind but ashes. In the eastern area, the DR Congo-based Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) multiplied raids on CAR villages in the southeastern area around Obo. Every year, large groups of heavily armed poachers also enter CAR from Sudan to plunder its wildlife resources. At the same time, as it is throughout the region, CAR has been used as a staging area for attacks in Chad, and DR Congo and Sudan.

A second phenomenon is the increasing number of herders, often heavily equipped, who cross country borders, particularly from Chad, to pasture their herds. Because of the arid climate and diminished access to scarce resources in Chad, CAR is more attractive to pastoralists who do not hesitate to use force against villagers and security forces. During the dry season, clashes are regular between CAR farmers and transhumant Peul herders. While the herders are seeking access to pasture and water, the farmers try to protect their crops and water resources. According to Human Rights Watch, while CAR farmers allied with or joined the APRD to keep the migrant pastoralists on the Chadian side of the border, it seems the Peul herders reached an agreement with the Chadian army to match this alliance.

Overall, it seems that control over natural resources is not a key component of the various strategies adopted by regional players. The only notable exception is land, as the semi-arid northern region where the borders of CAR, Chad and Sudan meet has consistently lost fertile land over the last decades. For CAR, as long as the north and eastern borders are not adequately patrolled, foreign armed elements will continue to easily enter the territory.

Displacement

All of the above led to massive displacement, mainly to Cameroon, Chad and Sudan. In May 2009, 18,000 people from CAR fled to southern Chad for a total number of 70,000 CAR refugees since the conflict started in 2005. Overall, approximately one million people have been affected by clashes in CAR with over 300,000 of them escaping to live in the bush or foreign countries.
Among the affected communities, the Mbororo pastoralists have been exposed to violent attacks from rebels and bandits since 2005 in western CAR. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 60,000 of them had to flee to Cameroon with few or no possessions. The ongoing clashes in 2009 have prevented many displaced people from returning home, and thousands of them still hide in the wild, in great material and psychological distress, or seek shelter in urban areas. For example, thousands in southern CAR have been displaced by incursions of the Lord’s Resistance Army from DR Congo.

2.7 Peace and recovery process

The country’s first PRSP was finalized in 2007 as one important step to the peace process. Through this document, the government formulated a new development strategy with four pillars: (i) security sector reform; (ii) good governance; (iii) economic rehabilitation and diversification; and (iv) investments in human capital. In response to the PRSP in October 2007, donors pledged USD 600 million for development activities through 2010, an amount more than double the annual assistance CAR had so far received. The World Bank, the IMF and the AfDB re-engaged in the country and supported the government’s strategy. The principal donors included the European Commission and the Governments of France, Germany and the United States.

Soon after, CAR became the fourth agenda country of the UN Peacebuilding Commission in June 2008, just days before by all parties signed the Libreville Comprehensive Peace Agreement. The long-awaited Inclusive National Dialogue (IND), involving all three resistance groups, was held in December 2008 with the aim to permit the establishment of a national Unity Government and an electoral commission to set the agenda for the 2010 elections.

To help stabilize the conflict regions of CAR, a UN Peacekeeping Force for Chad and CAR (MINURCAT), totaling 5,200 military personal, was mandated by UN Security Council resolution 1861 to begin operations on 15 March 2009, replacing the European Union Force Chad/CAR (EUFOR CHAD/CAR). As of August 2009, only 46% of the force had been deployed, severely undermining their ability to address the poor security situation in both countries and to provide a safe and secure environment for humanitarian organizations and vulnerable populations.

On 9 June 2009, the government and the UN Peacebuilding Commission adopted the Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding as the roadmap for consolidating peace during the period 2009–2011. The framework focuses on the three pillars of security, governance and regional development, and was largely based on the PRSP.

The security pillar is designed to stabilize the formerly conflictive areas in the north and northeast and to disarm, demobilize and reintegrate former combatants. The governance pillar is aimed at strengthening institutions and human capacity, both improving the performance of government departments and increasing their capacity to address the development needs that represent the best guarantee against a slip-back into violence. The regional development pillar is aimed at expanding both the government’s presence and the services they are able to provide in selected regional centres around the country, on a phased basis and beginning with centres within or near the former pockets of rebellion.

Within the governance pillar, the importance of managing natural resources is well recognized, based in part on the contents of this report, submitted in draft form during the formulation of the framework. However, as natural resources will underpin all three pillars, the remaining chapters assess the role
they have played in contributing to the conflict as well as the associated risks and opportunities for peacebuilding.

Unfortunately, while peace accords have been completed between the government and the three largest rebel groups – UFDR signed in February 2007, while the complementary agreement was signed with APRD (and UFDR again) in June 2008 and with FDPC in July 2008 – two rebel groups, the Convention of Patriots for Justice and Peace (CPJP) and Movement of the Central African Liberators for Justice (MLCJ), are still engaging in skirmishes and clashes with the National Army. Civilians continue to be caught in the crossfire, and there are concerns about whether the ongoing peace processes could be derailed by these events.

Nonetheless, the DDR programme was officially launched on 13 August 2009 to great international fanfare. The first phase will consist of a campaign aimed at raising awareness and informing populations before proper identification of the ex-combatants begins.52
3 Governance of natural resources and the environment

3.1 Introduction

Good governance of natural resources and the environment requires a robust policy and legal framework, combined with institutional capacity at the national and local levels. In many cases, these conditions are absent in many post-conflict governments at both the national and local levels. This vacuum is often supplemented by international and regional cooperation, which plays a key role in capacity-building, sharing knowledge on best practices and through technology transfer. This chapter conducts a preliminary review of each of these aspects. It concludes that there is systematic weakness across all areas and calls for a major investment to strengthen policy and institutions and to build technical, managerial and law enforcement capacity for natural resource management and environmental governance. Failing to make such investments will amplify conflict risks relating to natural resources and could prevent the government from fully exploiting opportunities relating to resource revenues, community participation and local-level development.

This chapter first examines the institutional, legal and policy framework for natural resources and the environment in CAR and then looks at the role of civil society, regional cooperation and international cooperation in the governance and management of the country’s environment and natural resources.

3.2 Institutional framework

Responsibility for natural resources management and environmental governance is divided among five ministries (see Table 3). Within the new Unity Government, the APRD faction was given responsibility for the Ministry of Environment and Ecology, while long-standing ministers of the Bozizé government controlled the other four ministries. Unfortunately, there is a lack of coherence between the institutions because mechanisms to coordinate policy development or implementation do not currently exist. This confusion is compounded by the recent establishment of a Ministry of Environment and Ecology alongside the existing Ministry of Water, Forests, Wildlife and Fishing, with little clarity regarding the mandate of each.

The capacity of government institutions is very weak at the central level and almost entirely absent outside the capital – with the partial exception of the police and the armed forces. Furthermore, the judicial system is reportedly quite arbitrary and open to influence from partisan interests. It is, therefore, urgent to map not only where responsibility lies for environment and natural resources, but also what policy instruments each actor possesses, and which still need to be developed, and the capacity on which each can draw. This must translate into a robust plan for building capacity at both the central and provincial levels.

In terms of human resources, the past history of conflict and lack of opportunity has led to the exodus of a significant proportion of qualified Central Africans. Those who have stayed prefer to work for international agencies or NGOs rather than entering government service. Furthermore, the few experts who work for the government are reluctant to leave the capital. Recruitment of qualified staff for government service is further complicated by periodic arrears in the payment of salaries – currently averaging 29 months! As a result, those who do remain in government have a strong incentive to moonlight or to engage in activities not necessarily in the public interest. The poor state of the national education system means that ever fewer qualified graduates are filling the recruitment pool.
Table 3. Institutional framework for natural resource management and environmental governance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ministry</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Environment and Ecology</td>
<td>This ministry was established in January 2009, during the formulation of the new Unity Government. Formerly, the environmental function was under the Ministry of Water, Forests, Wildlife and Fishing. Given the close history of these two ministries, they continue to be co-located in Bangui. The Minister of Environment and Ecology, François Naoyama, represents the APRD rebel faction. At present, there are no international agencies supporting the functions of the new ministry and the capacity is extremely weak. The division of powers with the Ministry of Water, Forests, Wildlife and Fishing also remains unclear.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Water, Forests, Wildlife and Fishing</td>
<td>This ministry has responsibility for the management of renewable resources and the enforcement of the water, forest and wildlife codes. They are also the focal point for climate change. Minister Emmanuel Bizot is a long-standing minister in the government and has formerly held the position of Minister of Finance. This ministry is the focal point for all GEF interventions and for UNDP cooperation and expects international assistance in developing the fishing sector. In the context of FLEGT implementation, the ministry will hold consultations with civil society on forest issues. No study is available on the non-mining-related natural resources in CAR, although the international cooperation on forest issues has been relatively active.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Mines, Energy and Hydrology</td>
<td>In terms of economic development, this is potentially one of the most important ministries of the government given that it issues all mineral concessions, including uranium. Commandant Sylvain Ndoutingai, President Bozize’s nephew, has been the minister since 2003. His tenure has not been within out controversy. He is the head of Mbomou province where the uranium mine is located and has been intimately involved in the concession allocation. The ministry is expected to show leadership in implementing EITI and to benefit from the experiences of this international regime, however, the main bulk of the work remains. Regarding the role for assuring the judicial frameworks for developing the energy sector, the ministry envisions public–private partnerships in both the priority area of micro/pico-scale hydroelectric power as well as in bio-energy.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development</td>
<td>Fidèle Gouandjika, former Minister for Telecommunications is in charge of the agriculture portfolio.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Planning, Economics and International Cooperation</td>
<td>The ministry plays a key role in the development of the Integrated Peacebuilding Strategy. It has been led by Maliko Sylvain since 2005.</td>
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</table>

3.3 Legal framework

CAR has many framework laws already in place governing natural resources and the environment (see Table 4). Many of these laws are in the process of being updated (e.g. the mining, forest and wildlife laws). However, almost all of the stakeholders interviewed during the UNEP mission remarked that most of these laws remain at a general level and lack the elementary norms, rules and regulations required for their proper implementation.
In addition, a significant portion of the ambiguity regarding institutional mandates is due to uncertainty or divergence in the framework laws themselves. For example, the Forest Code, Mining Code, Environmental Code and lands permitting processes can all apply to one process – e.g. opening a small quarry in a mostly forested area – with no guidance about how to harmonize or sequence.

Table 4. Legal framework for natural resource management and environmental governance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Framework</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Environmental Code</td>
<td>The 2007 code provides for the protection of waters, air, soil, subsoil and biodiversity. It also covers the disposal of wastes, dangerous chemicals, and construction in specific protected areas. An EIA is required for any proposed development project that could potentially affect the environment. The authorization to proceed with the project is granted by the Minister of Environment and Ecology based on the EIA findings. The audience publique (public consultation) is a participatory mechanism triggered for each project having a potential environmental impact and before any decision relating to listing or delisting sites and buildings. Illegal actions call for fines that range from USD 200 to USD 100,000 and for imprisonment terms of one month to eight years.(^{53})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wildlife Code</td>
<td>The protection of wildlife ordinance, passed in 1984, establishes the national territory as comprising two zones of action: zones of hunting and natural history interest, and buffer zones. The former zone is reserved for conservation and for hunting and nature conservation activities by virtue of its low human population density. It includes protected areas and hunting sectors that are conceded to hunting safari operators and represents 40% of the territory. The buffer zones are reserved for agro-pastoral and industrial activities.(^{54}) The code focuses on recreational hunting without addressing bush-meat as a source of food supply for urban and rural areas. For this reason, the code is under revision to better integrate subsistence and commercial hunting.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Forest Code</td>
<td>Adopted in 2001, the code includes among other things detailed taxation to be applied to the industrial exploitation of forestry, defines the various forest areas status and the listing procedure. The commercial extraction of natural forest products is authorized as a customary right if the activity is non-destructive.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Water Code</td>
<td>Drafted in 2006, the code provides for the protection and management of surface and underground water. Specific taxes are set for the domestic use of water obtained through a public distribution system, for the use of waterpower and for commercial or industrial use. Protection perimeters are defined around strategic pools and no depleting or polluting activity can be conducted within these areas. The code also provides for quality and quantity monitoring standards that every distribution service must meet.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mining Code</td>
<td>The 2004 code provides for the establishment of prospection and extraction authorizations. Chapter 5 deals with environmental protection and sets the following obligations for mining permit holders: (i) ensure that soil, water, air and energy are safely managed; (ii) prevent any hazardous substances spill; (iii) protect fauna and flora; (iv) prevent any harm to the population’s health; (v) dispose of wastes; and (vi) treat and prepare non-recyclable wastes with the agreement of relevant administrations. The mining administration is in charge of monitoring the</td>
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supply chain and enforcing the existing laws and regulations.

A new code was adopted in May 2009, whereby all the former provisions were reproduced with one major change for the environment section: Before any activity is undertaken, companies must provide a security deposit in a Central African bank. Extracting companies are also bound to conduct an EIA, accompanied by a public survey and a social and environmental management plan.

### Law on Radioactive Minerals

A specific law for radioactive minerals was passed in 2006, which provides for the extraction, treatment, transport, trade and monitoring of such minerals. The law calls for the creation of a National Radioprotection Agency (ANR) that issues regulations as well as monitors and controls ionizing radiations.

### Oil Code

Hydrocarbons were subjected to a separate code in 1993, which sets the standards for exploitation and transport, with specific regulations for pipelines. Oil extraction must also be conducted in a manner that mitigate impacts on the environment as much as possible.

### Land Tenure Code

CAR does not have a tenure code. The State is in charge of zoning and giving forest and/or conservation concessions. Local and indigenous communities live within and around these concessions. CAR law ignores tenure rights to land, but recognizes subsistence user rights.

#### 3.4 Development and peace policy frameworks

The Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper and Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding will likely be the most influential overall development policy documents over the next three to five years. The PRSP has broad acceptance from most stakeholder groups and formed much of the policy basis for the Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding. The PRSP in CAR rests on the four following pillars, which are also reflected in the peacebuilding strategy: (i) the restoration of security, peace consolidation and conflict prevention; (ii) the promotion of good governance and the rule of law; (iii) economy reconstruction and diversification; and (iv) human capital development. Regarding natural resources management, both the PRSP and Strategic Framework put the emphasis on the mining, forestry and petroleum sectors, although the peacebuilding strategy better integrates concerns about equitable access and benefits sharing. Both documents advocate for the prudent and transparent exploitation of natural resources, systematic environmental impact reviews of all the development projects, better and further taxation of the natural resources and revenue-generating ecotourism. However, the PRSP tends to downplay the need for sustainable resource management, equitable sharing of benefits with local communities and the protection of environmental quality during development. Although the peacebuilding strategy is more inclusive of this concept, there is a tendency for documents governing development assistance to make this type of short-cuts.

#### 3.5 Civil society

A survey of national NGOs undertaken in 2006 found that few of them presented a strong vision and that most suffered from poor programme and financial management and from weak reporting and accountability mechanisms as well as from a near-total absence of results-based management. Furthermore, most national NGOs are Bangui-based and have limited contact with the field. While this appears to be slowly improving, the capacity among CAR NGOs remains considerably more limited than in most African countries.
There is a general perception among donors and the CAR government that NGOs working on natural resources or the environment lack capacity and technical expertise, and that they are trying to cover everything and nothing at the same time. In reality, NGOs indeed play a very limited role in both development of forest legislation and monitoring exploitation. This is probably both a reflection of the need to gain access to funding and to the very small political space for any meaningful participation in the country.

Until the present, almost no international funding seems to have been received by NGOs for capacity-building. Few NGOs have worked with international groups, and the ones that have done so were either in contact with organizations such as IUCN or research groups (CIRAD), but not with campaigning NGOs. In general, most NGOs do not have headquarters, computers or funding to do any field or policy work. Never challenged and supported to do non-political work, the strategic analytical capacity of these groups is also very weak. Any plan to strengthen capacity should work well beyond the public sector to include national NGOs, where possible in partnership with counterparts from the international NGO movement.

### 3.6 Regional cooperation

CAR's position as part of the various Central African economic integration schemes – for example, the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) – as well as its ecological connection to the Congo River Basin also provide many opportunities for regional environmental cooperation and transboundary resource management. These could be important sources of technical and financial assistance as well as sharing best practices on resolving resource-based conflicts. The UNEP mission identified nine programmes based on a rapid scoping exercise, which are summarized in Table 5.

#### Table 5. Regional cooperation programmes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Programme</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD)</td>
<td>NEPAD was adopted by African Heads of State in 2001 in order to infuse new energy, establish solid partnerships and create a strong basis for the alleviation of poverty and sustain economic development on the continent. Environment is one of eight components of NEPAD, and the environment initiative was created to help build Africa’s capacity to implement environmental conventions and related international legal instruments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecosystems of Central African Forests (ECOFAC)</td>
<td>ECOFAC is a regional project that was initiated in 1992 by the European Union to preserve tropical forests, provide alternative sources of food for local populations to reduce poaching rates on endangered species and raise awareness on other related topics. In CAR, a forest conservation zone of 740 km² has been established within the N’gotto forest and is under surveillance by ECOFAC. One of the most successful activities of ECOFAC is the network of Zones Cynégétiques Villageoises (ZCV, or Village Hunting Zones), which represent a model for community-based natural resource management.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Central African Regional Program for the Environment (CARPE)</td>
<td>CARPE is a regional initiative that was created in 1995 by USAID. The project promotes sustainable natural resources management, improved environmental governance and resources monitoring, as well as protection of the Congo Basin genetic resources and the slowing of climate change through forests preservation.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Yaoundé Statement and Conference of Ministers for Forests of Central Africa (COMIFAC) | Recognizing the increasing threats to their forests, the Heads of States of Central Africa officially committed themselves in March 1999 in Yaoundé to working in a concerted way for the conservation and the sustainable management of their forest ecosystems. Strengthened by "the Yaoundé
Statement”, the ministers responsible for forests in the countries concerned met in December 2000 in Yaoundé for the first session of COMIFAC, during which the Convergence Plan was adopted. COMIFAC ensures the follow-up to the Yaoundé Statement and also the application of international conventions and forestry development initiatives in Central Africa.

### Congo Basin Forests Partnership (CBFP)

The CBFP works to implement the Yaoundé Statement in cooperation with COMIFAC. Hosted by ADB, CBFP received an initial contribution of USD 200 million from Norway and the United Kingdom to help local communities develop forest-sustaining livelihoods. The fund is also expected to closely work with other relevant institutions, including member states, COMIFAC and civil society.

### Regional GEF projects:

**Sustainable Management of the Wildlife and Bush-meat Sector in Central Africa**

Enhancing Institutional Capacities on REDD issues for Sustainable Forest Management in the Congo Basin began implementation in January 2009. Led by FAO, the project is worth just over USD 10 million and covers sustainable management of the wildlife and bush-meat in four countries of the Congo Basin: CAR, DR Congo, Gabon and Republic of the Congo. Enhancing Institutional Capacities on REDD issues for Sustainable Forest Management in the Congo Basin began in November 2008 with the World Bank as the lead implementing agency. The aim of this USD 26 million project is to strengthen national capacities to efficiently reduce pressure on forest ecosystems in the Congo Basin and reliably measure carbon stored and emitted.

**Lake Chad Basin Sustainable Development Programme (PRODEBALT)**

PRODEBALT will be implemented in the conventional basin of Lake Chad, which covers a surface area of 966,955 km² in Cameroon, CAR, Chad, Niger and Nigeria. The expected outcomes of the project are the sustainable conservation of Lake Chad to ensure the economic security of the freshwater ecosystem resources, an integrated and judicious management of the basin so as to achieve sustainable development and equitable use of the natural resources for each country, while preserving its ecosystems and biodiversity.

**International Agency for the Development of Environmental Information (AIDE)**

ADIE promotes partnerships between public, private and non-governmental stakeholders in the Central African subregion for environmental data gathering, analysis and assessment to enhance the decision making process and the dissemination of information.

**Tri-state cooperation on protected areas (CAR, Cameroon, Republic of the Congo)**

While transboundary cooperation on many issues has been elusive, CAR is a successful example of such tri-state cooperation in the southwest. Although confined to forest conservation matters, the tri-national mechanisms built to deepen cooperation among the three adjoining protected areas (Lobeke in Cameroon, Nouabélé-Ndoki in the Republic of the Congo, and Sangha-Ndoki in CAR) have largely been successful. The tri-state agreement in the southwest offers a forum for joint planning and provides for the right for eco-guards to pursue poachers across national frontiers if in hot pursuit – possibly setting a model for other such agreements.

### 3.7 International cooperation

Both WWF and WCS are present in CAR for protected areas management programmes. WWF includes CAR in its regional forest conservation programme for the Congo Basin, coordinated from Cameroon and funded by USAID and others. WCS is also involved in the Congo Basin conservation programme, though on a smaller scale.

With regard to international funding for natural resources and environmental governance, for many years the European Commission has funded the Ecosystems of Central African Forests (ECOFAC) programme as well as water supply and sanitation projects in the different “poles de développement”.


Although forests are not among the top EC priorities for the country, informal negotiations with CAR to develop a Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) programme Voluntary Partnership Agreement (VPA) are ongoing with formal negotiations expected to start in 2009.

The ECOFAC programme has funded guards in the rural wildlife and hunting areas of the north, playing an essential role in ensuring at least a minimum level of control over poaching, land encroachment and hunting, given the sparseness of the government capacity in this area. ECOFAC has now run through several successive cycles of funding, however, without any sign that properly trained national staff will be able to take over, threatening to derail the long-term prospects for the wildlife zones.

International cooperation in the minerals sector is led by the two main transparency schemes – the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) and the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). The EITI transparency standard applies to revenues generated by companies and governments in the extractive industries sectors. It seeks to improve economic governance to create wealth and ensure a better redistribution of the benefits stemming from the exploitation of natural resources (oil, gas, and minerals). CAR has been declared an official candidate to the EITI in 2008 and now must fulfil the standard requirements before 20 November 2010. In the diamond industry, CAR has met the minimum requirements of the KPCS, supported by the EC. The KPCS report on CAR underlines, however, that smuggling is difficult, if not impossible, to control or monitor because of the landlocked geography and porous borders that facilitate illegal transboundary traffic.

CAR is a party to ten major multilateral environmental agreements and three protocols (see Table 6). While these agreements do not focus specifically on addressing conflicts linked to natural resources, they can provide financial support for building resource management capacity, including dispute resolution, benefit sharing and access management.

The Global Environment Facility (GEF) has provided funding for enabling activities and small-scale projects to help CAR meet its obligations under specific multilateral environmental agreements, but so far the total amount of GEF funding spent in CAR remains extremely low relative to other countries in the region. The small-scale initiatives include the GEF National Capacity Self-Assessment for global environment management (NCSA), National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan (NBSAP) published in January 2000 and a climate change National Adaptation Programme of Action (NAPA) published in May 2008.

**Table 6. Multilateral environmental agreements**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agreement</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources</strong></td>
<td>CAR signed the convention on 15 September 1968, which was designed to protect natural resources and ensure the conservation and sustainable use of soil, water, flora and fauna. Parties are bound to protect specific areas, notably existing national parks, and to create new ones to make sure endemic species are kept safe.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora</strong></td>
<td>The convention entered into force in CAR on 25 November 1980. The MIKE Program – Monitoring the Illegal Killing of Elephants – is operational in the Dzanga-Sangha Protected Area Complex. The goal of MIKE in CAR is to quantify the status and trends in abundance and the illegal killing of elephants, and determine the factors responsible for the observed trends.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Convention Concerning the Protection of the World’s Cultural and</strong></td>
<td>CAR ratified the convention on 22 December 1980. The Manovo-Gounda St. Floris National Park was listed as a UNESCO World Heritage Site in 1998 due to the diversity of life present, including black rhinoceroses, elephants,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural Heritage</td>
<td>cheetahs, leopards, red-fronted gazelles and buffalo.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs)</strong></td>
<td>CAR ratified the convention on 12 February 2008. It binds the parties to make sure that hazardous substances such as POPs are managed correctly to avoid contamination and long-term pollution. CAR is not currently served by one of the 12 Stockholm Convention Centers for capacity-building and technology transfer to developing countries.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes</strong></td>
<td>CAR joined the convention on 24 February 2006. The Basel Convention aims at reducing, if not suppressing, the transboundary movements of hazardous wastes to avoid their dissemination.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC); Kyoto Protocol</strong></td>
<td>CAR ratified the convention on 10 March 1995 and acceded to the protocol on 18 March 2008. The first national communication was published on 10 June 2003. The NAPA, an assessment of vulnerabilities towards climate change, was published in May 2008.71 Floods and their impact on population and the environment were identified as the main climate change-related danger in CAR.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ramsar Convention on Wetlands of International Importance</strong></td>
<td>The Ramsar Convention was signed by CAR on 5 April 2006. The Mbaéré-Bodingué wetland (101,300 hectares) located in southern CAR has been classified as a Ramsar site.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Convention on Biological Diversity and its Biosafety Protocol72</strong></td>
<td>CAR has been a party to this convention since 15 March 1995. As a follow-up to the requirements of the convention, the National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan (NBSAP) was developed within the framework of a UNDP-funded project with USD 178,300. Assessments have been conducted showing that ecosystems were being deteriorated because of a variety of human actions. While protected areas represent roughly 12% of CAR’s total surface, they lack the appropriate management necessary to achieve the goals set in the NBSAP.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD)</strong></td>
<td>UNCCD entered into force in CAR on 26 December 1996. To mitigate desertification occurring in arid countries, especially in Africa, the UNCCD focuses on enhanced agricultural productivity and on the conservation and rehabilitation of natural resources such as land or water.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer; Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer</strong></td>
<td>CAR’s accession to the Vienna Convention and the Montreal Protocol was on 29 March 1993. Since 1991, consumption of ozone depleting substances (ODS) in CAR has steadily decreased from 43 to two metric tonnes in 2006. CAR received funding from the multilateral fund for a complete phase out of all ODS by 1 January 2010.</td>
</tr>
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</table>
4 Risks to the peace process from natural resources

4.1 Introduction

Natural resources are linked to conflict in complex ways, many of them close to, but beneath the surface. While often not the main storyline that emerges from a conflict zone, the mismanagement of natural resources and the environment often are root causes, contributing causes or causes triggering events that spark a conflict. In the case of CAR, natural resources are one of the root causes of rebellion and conflict, though not the headlining issue. Moving forward, it is clear that natural resources and the environment, in the vulnerable post-conflict context, could be a significant risk for peace consolidation and human development if the issues of benefits sharing, ownership and access to resources and environmental degradation are not well addressed.

In general, the environment and natural resources contribute to conflict in three ways:

1. Contributing to the outbreak or relapse of conflict: Through triggering events, poor sharing of benefits, perceived or real inequalities in access or ownership, or as an incentive for aggressive or violent behaviour, natural resources can be an overt or underlying cause for conflict.

2. Financing or sustaining conflict: Conflict parties often use natural resources and environmental goods as a method for sustenance and political relevance in the country. Resources can be used to purchase arms, or as leverage over government or international actors.

3. Spoiling peace prospects: In some cases, the incentives for peace to small, resource-wealthy individuals or groups are much smaller than those for chaos and instability. As such, "spoilers" can play an unduly influential role on the peace process, or the lack thereof.

This chapter first examines how natural resources have been linked to the current conflict, then looks at three main types of risks to the peace process going forward, specifically: (i) the sharing of natural resource benefits; (ii) ownership of and access to natural resources; and (iii) long-term and cumulative risks.

4.2 Current linkages between conflict and natural resources

While existing research implies that direct competition over natural resources in CAR likely did not play a triggering role in the current conflict, evidence indicates that decades of poor governance, particularly in the environment and natural resources sector, has played an important role in the socio-economic context of the country. Although rich in natural resources, decades of poor governance and elite capture have resulted in unequal distribution of the benefits generated by the exploitation of natural resources. This, combined with the interlinked lack of growth and development, is a source of tension in large parts of the country and has contributed to feelings of marginalization and exclusion. Similarly, the potential of natural resources to contribute to growth and development also remains highly untapped and does not contribute to reducing inequality and poverty, and might contribute to fuel grievances.

Evidence also suggests that, in the absence of government presence and security and given the extreme poverty and deprivation, competition for control over weakly regulated resources (e.g. land), or over increasingly scarce ones (e.g. water in the arid areas of the country), can play a direct role in increasing tension and sparking violence. Issues of access to and scarcity of natural resources themselves have been, and increasingly are, a source of tension at the local and regional levels (e.g.
long-standing conflict between herder versus pastoralists). These include: (i) tension over water access and grazing rights, particularly in increasingly dry areas of several northern regions; and (ii) increasing populations and competition over poorly regulated arable land combined with increasing land degradation.

CAR natural riches attract many poachers and bandits who opportunistically run their illegal business, shaded by the highly publicized conflicts of the region. These groups usually adopt a low profile to get as much as they can from forested areas in northeastern CAR. They loot and sell all kinds of goods, ranging from high-value elephants tusks and bush-meat to honey or even bamboo. Activities of this type will continue to thrive as long as these areas lack proper surveillance and security forces cooperating on both sides of the border.

Regarding financing, it does not appear that controlling areas rich in natural resources was a primary motivation for any of the major warring parties. None of them controls areas abundant with in resources and none has tried to conquer one in the course of 2008. Bearing in mind that there are many resource rich areas in CAR and that none of them is particularly well protected, this is an important observation that counters the belief that African rebels always fight for profit. At the same time, the role of resources in financing rebel activities, while not comparable to other African contexts (DR Congo, Sierra Leone), cannot be completely discounted. Natural resources might indirectly support various rebels and armed groups, who survive through looting.

Given that profit is not a major motivation for rebel groups, none appears to be actively undermining peace processes in order to continue benefiting from natural resource extraction and trade. However, the continued mismanagement of natural resources does threaten the peace process, primarily through grievances caused by the poor distribution of benefits, unclear ownership and land tenure, and competition over scarce resources such as land and water in the north. From the Syrte agreement signed in February 2007 to the Libreville Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed in June 2008, none of the treaties dealt with natural resources or even mentioned access or ownership to resources. Core to the discussions and various agreements were the terms of the amnesty for rebels and government troops.

### 4.3 Benefit-sharing from export-oriented natural resources

Looking forward, the risks to the peace process are largely linked to the previous systemic causes of conflict in CAR. However, because of instability, displacement and the economic and social impacts of conflict, the country remains more vulnerable than before. As such, inequitable sharing of benefits from CAR’s natural resources could be a source of tension when moving forward.

Non-aid income for development, central and municipal government budgets and personal consumption is generated in large part from just two sources in CAR: revenues from natural resources that are extracted for export, namely timber and diamonds. As such, both resources, worth a combined USD 149.6 million annually, feature prominently in the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper and Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding. Unfortunately, as mentioned in Chapter 3, the PRSP in particular tends to pay little attention to the importance of well-focused equitable benefit sharing.

**Timber sector**

In 2007, the timber industry accounted for 46% of the country’s export earnings, although the global financial crisis has since caused a major drop in timber exports. For example, in the southwestern province Sangha-Mbaéré, rich both in timber and alluvial diamonds, tax receipts were down 90% in 2008 when compared with 2007. UNEP found that revenue sharing of these forest taxes is the
largest source of grievance and a potential source of conflict in the sector. The Forest Law for CAR provides for 40% of the tax on concession revenues\textsuperscript{75} from forest exploitation to be returned to the communities in the forest concession areas for productive projects. This has, however, so far proved a failure.

In a first stage, the funds were returned to the mayors of the relevant communities. In the best cases, the funding simply paid the arrears in salaries or went straight into the communal operating budget. In most cases, however, the use of the funds has remained opaque. What is certain is that the communities do not feel that they have benefitted, despite the law. As noted above, this is a source of considerable resentment, and has provided a strong incentive for illegal behaviour on the part of the communities. So, too, has been the failure of forest companies to remit to their workers the severance pay provided for under the law. It is reported that at least some of the pressure on the forest and its wildlife is due to the continued presence of former forest workers who are reluctant to move away in search of new employment opportunities for fear of foregoing their rights. Bayanga in the southwest is an example of a sawmill town where people only stay for fear of losing their severance pay should it ever come through.

More recently, the government changed the approach. All revenues from forest operations are held centrally, and communities are entitled to submit employment-generating projects for funding. Experience has shown, however, that these projects are rarely if ever realized. Even when approved, there are perpetual problems of disbursement. Given that the central government faces periodic unrest over unpaid salaries, it is not surprising that the temptation is to consider these funds simply as part of state revenue and treat them accordingly. In any event, the question is now moot since the near-complete collapse of the forest industry has dried up the flow of forest revenues. Should the industry revive, however, it will be urgent to find a better way to allow the communities to benefit from the exploitation of forest resources in their area. It is one of the few realistic ways to induce law-abiding behaviour, stem poaching and illegal resource capture, and make the joining of armed rebel groups less tempting.

More transparency is also needed in the concession bidding process and participatory management with local communities should be attempted, especially in areas where commercial forestry is not possible or not yet taking place.

Concession holders currently receive assistance from the French-funded PARPAF\textsuperscript{76} project to draw up management plans and to monitor their implementation. CAR has also linked to the Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT)\textsuperscript{77} programme and has initiated a participatory process to reach consensus on Voluntary Partnership Agreement with the European Union (EU) governing standards for the forest industry. Arrangements are already in place with an independent verification agency (BIVAC – part of the Veritas group) to monitor forest income and its legal use. Furthermore, in respect to both timber and minerals, CAR has engaged with the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), a process that involves a commitment to steadily rising governance standards in the extractive sectors. While the process is in its early stages, it does signify a determination on the part of CAR and its international partners not to allow lax standards to destroy its rich forest resources nor dissipate the income from their exploitation.

While the intention is laudable, and while standards of management in at least some of the forest concessions in the southwest appear near satisfactory, there were still considerable problems in the sector even before international demand collapsed. International pressure recently led to the cancellation of two concessions attributed to Chinese companies after it was discovered that they were in league with known lawbreakers. This is not to say, unfortunately, that all forestry now conforms to international standards. There are also reports of military involvement in illegal or illicit
logging and in the firewood business, and areas of dry forest are being “mined” – especially in the area north of Bouar – with little regard for sustainability or the rights and needs of local populations. This is reportedly common in all dry forest blocs and a source of conflict with local populations.

Without a comprehensive approach to reform, the timber sector could be a dangerous mix of the major ills of CAR – poor governance capacity, low transparency and a large quantity of valuable natural resources leaving the country without clear benefits to the public outside Bangui. In terms of the Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding and for overall poverty reduction, this could undermine efforts to consolidate peace, build confidence in the State and diffuse tensions among conflicting groups.

**Minerals sector**

Next to timber, the major export earners for CAR are minerals, especially diamonds and gold. Diamonds are the most exploited mineral in the country, accounting for over 30% of CAR’s export earnings in 2007, with gold earning between USD 0.5 and 25 million, depending on estimates.

There is a huge gulf between theory and practice when it comes to the management of the diamond sector. Reportedly, from 25% to 70% of the diamonds escape the formal circuit and are exported illegally, either smuggled across the border to Cameroon or directly to Europe. Those that do follow the official circuit are often undervalued, so that the tax revenue received by the State is a small fraction of what it should be. Networks of Chadian, Mauritanian and Nigerian interests almost exclusively run the purchasing bureaus by operating across the region and, therefore, are very difficult to monitor and control. They reportedly take good care to ensure that officials, both locally and in Bangui, look upon their activities without reproach.

The Mining Code – like the Forest Code – provides for a portion of the revenue to return to the source communities, but in reality this is not happening. This represents a major lost resource for impoverished communities that receive only a fraction of the funds that, by law, are due to them. And, to make matters worse, the diamond market is in a slump so miners have seen a dwindling of their already meagre income and the State has lost yet another major source of revenue for the public purse.

This has led to growing tensions in diamond-mining areas as miners and workers turn to illegal activity to make ends meet, and show increasing impatience at restrictions on mining activity, for example, on mining in protected areas. Tensions are rife in the southwest as diamond exploitation moves along the rivers close to or inside the Dzanga-Sangha National Park, and it is reportedly a source of tension in the northern protected areas as well. It is believed that the networks of diamond interests fund poaching and trade in game meat (and possibly ivory) and even provide arms for the poachers. Because diamond mining is carried out exclusively by small-scale artisans operating in a scattered fashion over a very large area, it is exceptionally difficult to control.

The other source of local-level conflict relates to the environmental impact of diamond mining. Mining involves removing vegetation cover and digging pits of 5-10 metres deep, usually along the banks of rivers. The pits are exploited for a short time and then abandoned, often filling with stagnant water and offering breeding grounds for disease-bearing mosquitoes. The direct destruction from felling trees in the rich riverine forest, and of siltation that reportedly has a negative effect on river fisheries, must also be borne in mind. As diamond mining extends into ever more river courses, the accumulated damage could be considerable.
As in the timber sector, if these issues are not tackled in a comprehensive way, factors fuelling tensions and the use of violence will be set aside. Improved governance and transparency will be needed to restore public trust and keep workers away from destructive practices.

4.4 Ownership of and access to subsistence natural resources

While export-oriented natural resources often bring more rapid, tangible benefits, in terms of hard currency, access to imported goods and so forth, natural resources for subsistence play a much larger role in real terms. While the export of diamonds, timber and coffee could provide each Central African with about USD 37 per year, primary level pastoralism, non-export farming, fishing, non-timber forest products and other natural resources are valued at about USD 820 million – or USD 190 per person. These natural resources, along with the secondary sector of processing, transporting and selling, makes up the backbone of CAR’s livelihood structure and, as such, is an area where conflict risks are most prone to intensify.

Land for pastoralism and subsistence agriculture

Atop the list of ownership and access risks is the ongoing tension between pastoral and sedentary agricultural livelihoods in northern CAR, along with safari and village hunters in some areas. Reflecting a problem that exists throughout the region, population pressure and a global movement towards settled crop agriculture, itinerant livestock grazers and farmers are experiencing many instances of land and resource disputes.

Shared use of resources among agriculture, livestock and other needs such as hunting is common and has usually been governed by a series of tacit or explicit understandings or tribal-level negotiation processes. Where these situations hold, the mutual benefit can be substantial. Settled communities receive an income by selling goods and services to the passing pastoralists. The cattle can feed on post-harvest stubble and fertilize the fields as they pass through. The hooves of the cattle can also break up the soil prior to the rains, allowing better water retention in the soil.

That said, traditional practices assumed a limited number of pastoralists, with herds limited by disease and wild animal predation, passing through infrequently and remaining for a limited time. As the number of herders grows, and as they accumulate more animals and lose fewer to foot-and-mouth disease or predators, traditional understandings break down and tensions grow. These tensions are aggravated where land use and resource access rights are unclear, notably in the eastern and north-eastern parts of the country.

Reports from north and northeast CAR suggest that increased numbers of livestock are crossing the borders from Chad and Sudan, driven by conflict and prolonged drought in parts of the range. As a result, conflicts over rights of passage, access to water, crop damage and poaching of local game have become more prevalent. Traditional transhumant corridors have simply broken down, as have the wildlife areas and national parks (including the World Heritage site at Manovo-Gounda-St. Floris, now on the List of World Heritage in Danger). Since these protected areas have traditionally stocked adjacent hunting zones, the degradation inside protected areas has set up a sharp conflict with hunting interests operated both by safari hunters and under the successful scheme of Zones Cynégétiques Villageoises (ZCV, or village hunting zones) discussed below.

Based on the breakdown of local governance structures, there are reports of escalating violence in the north. Children of Mbororo pastoralists have been kidnapped and held for ransom, with the result that the pastoralists have acquired ever more sophisticated arms in an effort to defend themselves, instigating the settled agriculturalists to do the same. And where herders are clashing with hunting
interests they encounter not only a well-armed adversary, but also one well versed in using its fire power. Clashes with the pastoralists have, ironically, also led to a rise in the price of beef, making bush-meat even more economically attractive than it already was and further increasing the pressure on wild game. Accusations are also rife of pastoralists setting fires that destroy crops and chattels, and of overusing local wildlife resources. Reports of clashes and flare-ups abound, and most interlocutors agree that this issue is “a bomb waiting to explode”. Unfortunately, this is not an unfamiliar issue in Africa and, thus, there is a good deal of best practice experience from which to draw upon.

In the northeast (bordering on Darfur), the problem is compounded by refugees and armed bands from both Chad and Sudan, a spill-over from the conflict in those countries. It is, however, hard to disentangle the present situation from traditional seasonal movement of people across those porous and poorly marked borders. Border controls have broken down, as have the veterinary controls that once monitored the movement of livestock. However, people from what is now Sudan have been seasonally using pasture land in what is now CAR for a thousand years and the links remain strong between these areas. Nevertheless, there appears to be poaching on an unheard-of scale that threatens to compromise the ability of the area’s wildlife to regenerate, even if peace were to be reached in the zone. This, in turn, is undermining the considerable tourist potential that the area once enjoyed, although it was never properly developed.

Environmental and social changes have each contributed to the growth of this problem. With Sahelian aridity increasing, including southern Chad and Sudan, viable areas for dry season grazing have been diminished, pushing grazers into CAR’s more temperate rangelands. Instability has also led to changes in seasonal migration patterns, with some areas cut off from normal grazing as well as leading to increasing banditry. Overall, instability has reinforced the need for herders to become or remain heavily armed, making the remaining viable routes and grazing areas more volatile than perhaps otherwise. Finally, with non-existent borders in practical terms, foreign herders have been able to move effortlessly into CAR territory and back again into Chad or Sudan. Foreign herds are reportedly larger and their owners better armed, facing little opposition from CAR security forces.  

While CAR lacks a Land Tenure Code, many laws and regulations deal with ownership and use. These are often contradictory, simplistic and lack the ability to help resolve disputes. As a general rule, all unoccupied or unclaimed land belongs to the government. There is a procedure of land registration to apply for ownership based on customary rights. The “right of the axe” (droit de hache) seems to prevail in most cases, meaning the person who cleared the land and uses it productively owns it. To complicate matters further, there is an overlay of customary law, though this too is breaking down as the population moves and integrates. As existing laws and regulations often overlap, the net result is confusion over who is entitled to what and which rights are enforceable. When the traditional administration collapsed in eastern CAR in the early twentieth century, no appropriate institution replaced it to manage the migrant populations needing land. Attempts better to regulate land use in the 1970s and 1980s were heavily centralized and failed to address the issue. Even though policies have shifted to a more decentralized approach, the Land Tenure Code still needs to be entirely redefined in a more pragmatic and realistic way. Inclusive initiatives such as the round table organized by the International Foundation for Wildlife Management (IGF) in May 2008 are gathering stakeholders to discuss land tenure issues that are much needed to design and implement new approaches.

All of the above described dynamics and factors taken together make land issues among the most urgent ones, if not the most urgent one, that need to be addressed to restore security and prevent destructive or violent coping strategies.
While freshwater resources in CAR remain quite abundant, ground water levels continue to diminish and surface water quality is low and deteriorating. Citizens of CAR often face immediate challenges gaining access to clean water. Only 30% of the population has regular access to clean drinking water and only 27% has facilities for improved sanitation. Northeast, east and southeast CAR are the most water-stressed areas. In general, water quality has been worsened by poor infrastructure maintenance, including a lack of adequate storage capacity, poor transportation infrastructure and extremely primitive sanitation facilities and habits.

As a result of urbanization, pollution, population growth and climate change, water stress is expected to increase in more parts of CAR, further stressing the rural population. Interviews indicated that competition of this sort is on the rise. This is an important precursor for instability and a risk to the peace process.

Non-timber forest products

Firewood is an important issue to take into account. Since there is essentially no electricity outside the capital, firewood remains the principal cooking fuel. Demand for firewood is especially high in the vicinity of Bangui, where it remains the principal source of household fuel (90% of household energy use). The effect on local woodlands – including those that are supposedly protected – is devastating. There is a strong need to understand the firewood market and how it works, and to understand the alternatives to it – including a more organized market for charcoal, more efficient cooking stoves and firewood plantations. Similarly, it will be important to understand existing and potential markets for other Non-Timber Forest Products (NTFPs) in CAR.

Special case: Displaced people

There is disturbingly little planning and support available for the internally displaced and for returning refugees regarding access to and management of natural resources. Also, essentially no attention is paid to the impact on natural resources and the environment from return and resettlement programmes, although experience in other countries suggests such impacts can lead to local level tension and conflict. With adequate planning, the negative impacts can be greatly reduced.

There are reports from several parts of the country that internally displaced populations are placing strong pressure on forest and wildlife resources, leading to growing tension with the traditional resource users in the area. Similarly, access to water during the dry season is reportedly a growing source of conflict, especially in the north. Both problems are aggravated by the unclear picture that characterizes land use and land rights.

4.5 Future and cumulative risks

In addition to the issues mentioned above, several natural resource sectors have risks that could materialize over the long term, as CAR continues to work towards human and economic development. While peacebuilding and development efforts should be focused on the benefit sharing and access risks in the immediate term, the concerns discussed below must be considered in long-term planning. In addition, several risks, particularly energy stress, wildlife poaching and some aspects of commercial agriculture, while not serious risks to peace consolidation on their own, could cumulatively add to the instability and insecurity of CAR in the short, medium and long term.

Climate change, demographic change and migration
Along with other changes taking place, the undercurrent of population growth and climate change will have an important impact on CAR in terms of conflict and peace. While difficult to separate from other contributing elements, both can play a cumulative role in encouraging the conditions for violence, migration, scarcity and social strife.

In particular, the changing rain patterns in the sub-Saharan region of CAR and its neighbours will have significant impacts on migration and food security in CAR and the region. Given that this is the area of the country that is most vulnerable to conflict, the medium and long-term impacts of climate change could prove quite influential.

Post-conflict societies usually experience a fairly robust boom in the number of childbirths once violence has subsided, something that can be expected as things calm down in northern CAR. Increasing population densities in degraded areas, combined with climate change, could also increase the risk of conflict or migration.

Fortunately, CAR has a National Adaptation Strategy for climate change, which was authored in 2008 by a joint UNEP-UNFCCC-GEF project, in part connected to the poverty reduction strategy. The strategy identifies six priority areas, including agriculture, food security, forestry, water resources and other natural resources that are threatened by climate change. Unfortunately, the specific climatic impacts are not yet known, though they are expected to be less severe than northern neighbours Chad and Sudan. Therefore, there could be a general intensification of the southern movement of pastoralists, accompanied by the associated tensions and possible conflict risks.

Uranium

The UN estimates that there are approximately 12,000 metric tonnes of “reasonably assured” deposits of uranium in CAR, estimated to be worth USD 1-2 billion, depending on the uranium market. Only one significant project has been proposed so far, by UraMin (owned by the French nuclear group Areva) and consisting of ten uranium deposits in Bakouma, in Mbomou province in the south-central region of the country. In October 2008, Areva announced that it had sold a 49% shareholding in its subsidiary, UraMin, to its Chinese partner, China Guangdong Nuclear Power Company, and to sovereign wealth funds. The Bakouma deposit would likely supply two third-generation nuclear reactors that China has ordered from Areva in a contract signed in September.

If and when uranium ore is extracted, there are three concerns that will need to be addressed. The first involves equitable and transparent revenue sharing with local communities. The second relates to the danger for both workers and the local environment from radiation. The third concerns the added pressure on the natural resources in the area from the work force. Since the mine is close to an area rich in forest (the Bangassou forest) and wildlife, the unplanned arrival of large numbers of people to the area, without adequate planning and controls, could have a devastating impact, sparking conflicts with neighbouring communities.

Commercial agriculture

Although cotton, along with other commercial agriculture products such as coffee, previously played a major role in the economy, national and regional instability has meant a serious reduction in this sector. Many interviewed within CAR expressed a hope that this sector would again be able to bring revenue and jobs to the country in the future. However, it is clear that agriculture at a scale permitting export requires serious investment, which implies capital from foreign investors since little investment capital exists within CAR. Investors are very unlikely to invest unless security conditions are considerably improved and that, in turn, requires a substantial consolidation of the peace. This vicious
circle is very hard to break, particularly since so much earlier investment, such as in cotton, has been lost.

For the commercial agriculture that remains, namely coffee, disruptions to the sector because of global markets or national instability could hurt the sector and damage the peacebuilding process in dependent areas. Similarly, if in future other plantations are started or restarted, benefit sharing and clear environmental guidelines must be included. Oil Palm, Jatropha and other commercial crops have been noted as possible income-generating opportunities that, while positive for foreign income, could prove disastrous to local communities if mismanaged. Access to land, water and the benefits of export in these circumstances must be carefully evaluated before proceeding.

Energy
Throughout CAR, firewood remains the major energy source, even in major urban areas. Indeed, the lack of electrification even in provincial capitals is a potent symbol of the State’s failure to provide even the most minimal of services, fuelling the cycle of resentment and rebellion from which the country has suffered for far too long, not to mention the other consequences of a lack of electricity – on food storage, on shelf-life of vaccines and medicines, etc.

Regarding hydrocarbon resources, as of 2007, CAR does not have any officially acknowledged or proven reserves of oil or natural gas. However, exclusive concessions to two “large sedimentary basins, the Doseo and the Salamat” were negotiated between the CAR government and the RSM Production Corporation in 2000. United Reef Ltd. and the RSM Production Corporation suspended oil exploration in CAR in 2003 as a result of the coup and the associated unrest. RSM Production Corporation requested arbitration of the resulting dispute with CAR through the World Bank’s International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). With the case currently ongoing, no further exploration or extraction has occurred, and the future of oil production in CAR is considered “promising” but uncertain. Further exploration has been hampered both by logistical difficulties and by the fact that the reserves – if they exist – lie directly under land that has seen the worst of the conflict. If oil is found in CAR, safeguards will need to be established for the equitable sharing of revenues and to prevent environmental damage from extraction and transport.

Wildlife poaching
The fauna in CAR is under severe pressure. The density of almost all wild animals in the northeast has greatly decreased over the past 20 years. Hunting of all types, including bush-meat and safari hunting along with poaching of elephants for ivory and the traffic of other wildlife resources from protected areas, are creating tensions between user groups. If linked with other elements of violence, wildlife poaching and hunting, with well-armed individuals participating, could add to instability.
5 Opportunities for peacebuilding

5.1 Introduction

While the environment and natural resources can be a source of conflict, they can also play an important role in the peace process. Indeed, the environment has historically been a topic over which even the most bitter rivals can speak, given its importance across any dividing lines, whether political, ethnic, economic or ideological. In CAR, natural resources have in some cases been used for cooperation, but many more opportunities exist. In order to support the peace process, which has proven to be universally fragile, these opportunities must be embraced fully. In addition to assisting peace consolidation more generally, these opportunities can help to reduce the risks from poor management of the environment and natural resources that were discussed in Chapter 4.

In general, the environment and natural resources contribute to peacebuilding in three ways:

1. **Supporting economic recovery**: In a post-conflict context, kick-starting the regeneration of the national economy is a key item for poverty reduction and peacebuilding. In many cases, high-value natural resources are the fuel for the initial period of recovery. If well managed, they can start to return income and stability to the economy.

2. **Developing sustainable livelihoods**: Beyond simply stimulating the growth or recuperation of GDP figures, natural resources can contribute to a peace consolidation through sustainable livelihoods. The sustainable livelihoods approach helps to reduce vulnerability to stresses, whether environmental, economic or political, while maintaining the sustainability of natural resources for present and future generations.

3. **Contributing to dialogue, confidence-building and cooperation**: As part of the reconciliation and recovery process, the environment and natural resources can provide opportunities for divided communities to make joint decisions for a common future. In addition, improved natural resource management, when linked to people’s livelihoods, can increase public confidence in the State’s ability to administer and provide, something that is usually quite lacking in post-conflict settings.

This chapter first analyses how the environment and natural resources have been utilized for peacebuilding so far in the peace process. Second, three types of peacebuilding opportunities - sustainable livelihoods, inclusivity in the high value resource sector and taking advantage of peace platforms - are discussed.

5.2 Current natural resource links in the peace process

*Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding in CAR, 2009–2011*

The Strategic Framework contains three pillars: security sector reform (including disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration), governance and the rule of law, and development poles. Under the third identified challenge in the governance priority, natural resources management is linked to the fight against corruption that has started with CAR joining the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative. In this perspective, the Peacebuilding Commission pledged to “advocate for increased international assistance to the country, and for better management of the country’s natural resources with a view to implementing priority peacebuilding activities.”

It will take the form of support for the “strengthening of the main national institutions responsible for promoting transparency, efficiency and accountability in the management of public funds and natural resources”. The Peacebuilding Commission also acknowledged the role that civil society can play in the development of responsible natural resources management to defuse tensions and conflicts under priority four (delivery of basic public services) of the governance section. This priority also links sound
natural resources management to improved living conditions. To promote these sound practices, the Peacebuilding Commission will make sure that technical assistance is provided to local communities. And, most important, priority action seven focuses on “sound management of natural resources within a protected environment, and the guarantee of equitable redistribution of their revenues”. Wealth sharing should indeed be a top priority as economic and social marginalization was identified as one of the main sources of grievance, constituting a powerful incentive to engage in destructive and unlawful activities.

*Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 2008–2010*

Of the four strategic pillars identified in the PRSP, the third one deals with economic recovery notably through “macroeconomic stabilization, rural development, transparent and efficient exploitation of natural resources, promotion of tourism and cottage industries and development of infrastructure to support production”. In the PRSP, natural resources are presented as key to the fight against corruption as well as to support economic recovery and development. The latter should be promoted through sustainable management as noted under the priority “exploit natural resources”. This third pillar includes projects on forestry, mines, fisheries, water and sanitation, energy and tourism, among other sectors. All of these would enable real economic and social development, while at the same time protect the environment and promote sustainable management and growing practices.

*Natural resources and economic recovery*

Natural resources constitute the base of the Central African economy. While they provide most of the wealth that the country is producing, they also represent the main potential for economic development and job creation in CAR. Conflict kept investors away for many years, cutting the country from the funds that would allow natural resources-related industries to really start off. Large protected areas also lack proper teams of managers and enforcers, especially in the northeast. Protection activities could provide employment and, coupled with correctly managed ecotourism, generate alternative incomes that would divert people from resorting to illegal or violent businesses to make a living.

5.3 Sustainable livelihoods and community-based resource management

For the peace process to move forward, a key element will be how key scarce resources are managed in a collaborative and sustainable fashion. In particular, forest, water and wildlife resources are of great importance to the economy, resettlement and reform processes.

*Forests*

As laudable and well planned as the forest concessions may be in southwest CAR, it will be important to develop and experiment with participatory management of forest resources throughout the country, especially in areas where commercial forestry is not viable or not yet taking place. Indeed, the national Forest Code provides for such forms of collaborative or participatory management. Priority might be given to the Bangassou forest area, where successful experiments with village-managed hunting offer an excellent base, and in the former conflict zones in the north. Bangassou has also served as a pilot zone for resource-based development with microfinance (with the Canadian NGO CECI).

The full potential for improving forest management using financial vehicles under the UNFCCC should also be examined, including the potential for reforestation using the Clean Development Mechanism and newly-allocated funds under the UNFCCC’s REDD. A substantial REDD pilot project is currently being established by WWF and the United States company EcoSecurity, with support from the Congo
Basin Forest Fund (United Kingdom). The first phase is to develop a methodology in time for UNFCCC Committee of the Parties 15 in Copenhagen in December 2009.

**Water resources**

Given that water is an abundant resource in CAR in absolute terms, better management and collaborative planning between communities should be a confidence-building opportunity with fewer hurdles than other resources to overcome. In addition, similar to the tri-country forest basin agreements that CAR has made with Cameroon and the Republic of the Congo, water is a resource for co-management internationally.

**Sustainable wildlife tourism and hunting**

The Zones Cynégétiques Villageoise programme was established in 1992. The main objective of the ZCV is to ensure that local communities participate in the management of wildlife and other natural resources and share profits earned from the sustainable exploitation of these resources. The revenues generated by the ZCV come from the taxes collected from hunting camp rents, infrastructure fees and meat sales from animals killed by tourists. Profits from the ZCV are divided among the State, communes and village communities. While tourism related to hunting was worth millions of dollars in the 1970s and 1980s, it has substantially collapsed as a result of the conflict. In 2005, tourism related to hunting generated USD 0.9 million, approximately 0.07% of GDP.

The southeast also borders on present or former conflict zones in the DR Congo and Sudan. Unlike the northeast, however, the region is essentially empty of permanent human settlement with the exception of the area along the southern border with the DR Congo. However, it reportedly still carries a robust stock of wildlife, and poaching is not as well organized or as devastating as in the northeast. This affords it a solid potential for nature-based tourism, whether conservation or hunting-based. While arms are drifting into the area from rebel groups in the DR Congo, armed bands cross the borders from both the DR Congo and Sudan; and while clashes with pastoralists are on the increase, the sheer isolation and emptiness of this area (roughly equivalent to the provinces of Mbomou, Haut-Mbomou and Haute Kotto) has allowed it to maintain much of its potential. It is, indeed, one of the last unexplored frontiers of Africa; few places represent such a combination of watersheds: it divides the Nile and Congo basins, the zone of Anglophone influence from that of Francophone influence, the Islamic world from the Christian and animist, and forest from savannah ecosystems.

If properly stabilized, there is potential for wildlife ranching and wildlife-based tourism. And the ZCV in the Bangassou areas has been among the most successful. It will be important to build on these to experiment and extend co-management and participatory management approaches (perhaps based on the model of Zimbabwe’s CAMPFIRE programme) to give communities a real stake in natural resources management, and to ensure that revenue from hunting and tourism genuinely stays in the area and contributes to development priorities. There is also scope for transfrontier cooperation between CAR, DR Congo and Sudan (discussed below).

There is a good base on which to build. Experience from the years of ECOFAC activity has generated a solid set of best practices that are constantly updated (a review of ZCV took place at the same time as the UNEP mission). WWF are at an advanced stage of planning a major project in the east, the first phase of which is to understand and map human-natural resource issues, but with plans for natural resource management on a large scale, if possible extending to tri-state cooperation.

It is too often forgotten that one of the principal sources of insecurity is the inadequate presence of basic government services, including law enforcement personnel. Management of natural resources also requires trained staff to enforce the agreed rules and to ensure that access rights are respected.
The very presence of such staff (e.g. the eco-guards of the ECOFAC project) can be a contributing factor to security and assist in monitoring and controlling traffic across frontiers.

While the southwest also represents a focus for national and international efforts to conserve biodiversity, conservation action has become an increasing source of local conflict. Poachers clash with “eco-guards” in the reserves. Organized and well-armed poachers clash with local populations who collect wild game with artisanal weapons and snares. Slash-and-burn cultivators impinge on the protected areas, failing to respect the rule that restricts this activity to a narrow band on either side of the roadways. And diamond miners move into the forests along the stream beds, creating considerable environmental damage in their wake and often setting up villages that depend on forest resources for their livelihoods.

5.4 Inclusivity, transparency and equity in high-value sectors

Minerals

Diamonds represent a considerable income potential for CAR. The formal circuit for diamonds set out in the mining law has clearly broken down, and the trough currently being experienced in the world diamond market has provided further incentive to bypass the formal circuit in favour of illegal markets. The artisanal miners and work teams are suffering considerable hardship, and the tension in their communities is palpable. They are the source of considerable environmental damage, but have few alternative livelihoods to turn to – at least few legal ones. Unless the situation is dealt with soon and in a concerted fashion, conflict could begin to break out in the diamond areas. In particular, if DDR processes in the north fail and armed groups move south to capture diamond areas.

CAR’s move to align itself with the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) will require greater control over the movement of diamonds and the use of income derived from them. CAR is also taking steps to conform to the Kimberley Initiative, which aims to track the income from diamond sales and to eliminate the illegal trade in diamonds. This will also help ensure that diamonds from conflict zones in Angola or the DR Congo will have greater difficulty using CAR as a transit port, a phenomenon that has been reported to occur.

Timber

The main challenge involves wealth and benefit sharing with local communities from taxes and concession fees paid to the central government. More transparency is also needed in the concession bidding process and participatory management with local communities should be attempted, especially in areas where commercial forestry is not possible or not yet taking place. Management systems are needed, combined with clarified ownership, use and access rights for local communities.

Emerging high-value resources

Energy commodities, including uranium, have been in the forecast for CAR for several years. Beginning with large hydropower plants and hydrocarbon exploration, the promises of additional export income has been numerous, although they are not yet economically viable.

Interest in hydropower has recently given way to a wave of interest in biofuels. Mirroring the frenetic growth of attention to biofuels in Europe and North America, there has been a sharp increase in interest in CAR’s potential for producing plant-based fuels, both for the domestic market and for export. The EU – which has a legal mandate to reach the 10% target of biofuels as a proportion of all transport fuel – sees CAR as the next opportune investment, with its sparse population, extensive arable land, abundant water and favourable climate and would like to launch a study on CAR’s
potential as a biofuel producer. Commercial interests in South Africa, the United States and Europe are looking into large-scale (50,000 hectares) plantations of oil palm (remaining conscious of the need not to compete with food production), and a German consultancy is looking into the potential for Jatropha (a tree that grows in arid areas and produces seeds rich in oil) production on a large scale in the conflict-scarred northwest.

While CAR should by all means examine the potential for biofuel production on a large scale, it should not leave this to commercial interests only. Indeed, because Jatropha grows in areas often unsuitable for intensive cultivation but eminently suitable for livestock, hunting or wildlife-based tourism, there is a need to investigate the potential for community-based Jatropha, perhaps in the ZCV or wildlife areas in the east and northeast.

5.5 Taking advantage of platforms for peacebuilding

Protected areas and wildlife

Created in 1990, the Dzanga-Sangha Complex in extreme southwest CAR comprises a dense forest block of 4,589 km², divided into three management units: Dzanga National Park (495 km²), Ndoki National Park (727 km²) and the Dzanga-Sangha Special Reserve (3,359 km²). Dzanga-Sangha is adjacent to the Nouabalé-Ndoki National Park, DR Congo, and the Lobéké National Park, Cameroon, which together form a tri-national conservation zone. The forest contains very high concentrations of elephants, gorillas, chimpanzees, bongos and buffalos. The national parks are strictly protected from all forms of exploitation except tourism and scientific research, however, subsistence hunting is allowed in the special reserve. Commercial forest exploitation occurs in the special reserve, and some exploitation occurred in the 1970s and 1980s in Dzanga National Park. Timber and diamond exploitation has stimulated immigration to the region, and the principal village, Bayanga, only 12 km from Dzanga National Park, has more than 2,000 inhabitants. The complex is managed by the CAR government with support from WWF and represents an excellent model of how protected areas can also support transboundary cooperation and confidence building.

In the past, the richest wildlife areas lay in the north and northeast, in the zone that has for the past decade or more known some of the most intractable conflict. This has led to the degradation of the protected areas – once seen as the foundation for an active safari tourism industry – and the devastation of the wildlife they contain. The rehabilitation of these protected areas and their restocking with wildlife could, if security can be provided, offer an optimal chance for development of these regions that lie far from the capital and receive little investment. The ZCVs in the area, once seen as positioned to benefit from the spill-over of wildlife from the protected areas, now ironically offer the best chance for repopulating the protected areas themselves. Securing what is left of the wildlife in the area must be regarded as a high priority.

Land

To address the growing land problem, particularly with regard to grazing land, efforts are under way to map conflicts and expectations – for example, the work done by the International Foundation for the Conservation of Wildlife (IGF) with EU funding. There is a clear need to clarify formal and customary land and resource access rights and to identify the policy tools available for clearer zoning, delimitation and marking of transhumance corridors. Land-use zoning is a priority, particularly in north and northeast CAR, and is one of the objectives of a project on conflict resolution planned by the EU in the context of the European Development Fund 10 (EDF 10). An increased presence of the State at the frontiers and restored veterinary services might also assist this effort. However, there must also be thought given to how the State can exact a return on investments that benefit transhumant pastoralists; at present, they receive no benefit whatsoever and their inability to provide adequate security is undermining their authority and respect for the rule of law. In this respect, the national
federation of livestock owners (Fédération Nationale des Elevleurs de RCA) has reportedly been part of the problem, dealing directly with pastoralists and securing lucrative arrangements that are not translated into income for the public purse. There is also the need for transboundary dialogue between CAR, Chad and Sudan to agree on management and monitoring mechanisms for transhumance corridors.

6 Recommendations

6.1 Introduction

The above analysis of risks for conflict and opportunities for peace consolidation, contextualized by country characteristics, conflict history and governance structures, have highlighted important linkages between natural resources and stability in CAR. Informed by these findings and in line with the ongoing peace process, the peacebuilding framework and the national development strategy (PRSP 2008–2010), key priorities for national and international actors involved in this sector can be identified.

Three general types of interventions should be designed:

1. **Mitigate any impacts** on the environment that have emerged as a result of the conflict. This includes direct, indirect and institutional consequences.

2. **Address and mitigate the risks** for conflict relapse and peace process erosion that are linked to the environment and natural resources.

3. **Support and facilitate the opportunities** for peacebuilding that emerge from the environment and natural resources sector.

Each initiative must be targeted towards the pillars of the peacebuilding framework and the PRSP to ensure that natural resources contribute positively. By organizing them in this fashion, natural resources can be mainstreamed through recovery activities in a seamless fashion, providing tangible benefits to the stability and sustainability of CAR, without duplication or overlap (see Figure 1) \(^{99}\).

![Figure 1. Natural Resources can play a key role in peacebuilding activities (see note 97)](image)
As part of CAR’s peacebuilding and poverty reduction strategies, security, improving governance and supporting growth and development, particularly in the regions that have been the most marginalized, are areas where natural resources can likely play the most productive role.

This chapter has four sections, first discussing overall policy recommendations, then matching the ideas and initiatives with the priorities of the peacebuilding strategy and then the poverty reduction strategy. Finally, several suggested pilot projects that begin to implement the recommendations are described.

The goal is to ensure that both strategies are implemented in a manner that clearly integrates the concerns discussed in this report, and make certain that the environment and natural resources contribute to peace consolidation rather than renewed conflict.

6.2 Overall policy recommendations

The following five main recommendations synthesize the needs identified in the analysis contained in the previous chapters.

1. Use improved governance and management of natural resources to strengthen confidence in the State, including stronger rule of law: The areas in CAR where conflict has originated from have largely been marginalized from many parts of State function, including power, benefits of natural resources, security and good governance by national authorities. Improvements in governance of subsistence resources, such as water, forests and wildlife and of high-value resources such as timber and minerals, can build confidence of rural, alienated populations in the legitimacy of government. The supplementary income for the State generated through these activities would allow the delivery of basic services that could further consolidate trust in public administration. In particular, governance capacity must be built outside of Bangui, with community-based resource management as a guiding principle.

2. Use the peace process and economic re-launch to reform the high-value resource sector: In addition to overall governance improvements, the recovery period can be used as a reason – and justification – for significant changes in the way natural resources for export are handled. Using inclusive measures, the urban and rural sections of society should be able to use this period to begin to address and resolve the issues of allocation of benefits, as well as ensuring that the benefits remain within CAR and contribute to development in the country.

3. Tackle ownership and access issues to scarce subsistence resources in a comprehensive fashion: Particularly in the case of pastoral and agricultural clashes, forward-looking strategies to land reform, water allocation and other resources must be designed in the near term, before additional pressures further exacerbate the problem. Developing a national security strategy that includes regional impacts of transboundary movement of domestic and foreign pastoralists and water courses that border CAR’s southern neighbours are key parts of this process.

4. Manage long-term risks in the short and medium term: With numerous natural resource and environment-linked conflict risks on the horizon, including climate change, possible uranium or hydrocarbon extraction and restarted commercial agriculture, issues beyond the recovery period must be considered before they escalate.

5. Use scarce resources in rural areas as a platform for peace: Whether focusing on building ties between rival groups or ensuring coherence between government and local leaders (or rural integration in general), scarce livelihood natural resources and the local environment is an
important subject for cooperation. Accordingly, it is important to introduce mediation and dispute resolution mechanisms and establish transboundary dialogue between CAR, Chad and Sudan.

6.3 Implementing the Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding

While included in the Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding as part of the good governance and rule of law pillar, the environment and natural resources can also play an important role in the implementation of the other pillars of the strategy, specifically, additional elements of good governance, security sector reform and development poles. Natural resources are currently anchored in the good governance and rule of law section of the Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding, specifically in priority area seven:

“Sound management of natural resources within a protected environment, and the guarantee of equitable redistribution of their revenues”.

The following three points summarize how the environment can be best mainstreamed through the peacebuilding strategy: good governance and rule of law, security sector reform, and development poles.

**Good governance and rule of law**

Improving the governance – particularly for the most valuable resources (timber, mineral) and those where the risk of conflict is higher (transhumance) – is critical. This will demand such actions as enhancing compliance with international standards, specific legal and policy provisions, and building the capacities of institutions and other stakeholders to enact provisions, manage resources and to monitor the process and the environment sustainably. Interventions in this area will be critical to re-establish State legitimacy at the community level.

This is a key contribution to improving overall governance in CAR, and a precondition for the proper use and exploitation of natural resources, and to ensure that the benefits are shared and benefit all citizens and contribute to growth, which will subsequently contribute to strengthening State legitimacy.

1. Reform of the legal, policy and institutional framework for the environment and natural resource management: Many elements of Central African environmental governance need significant improvement, update and harmonization, beginning with the high-value sectors of forest and mining, and continuing to other environmental safeguards. Specifically, the Forest Code needs updating, and environmental safeguards for current and future concessions in the mining sector need strengthening. As a general rule, transparency standards, including EITI and FLEGT, should be fully embraced. Finally, there is a need for clarification and rationalization of the land tenure and access regulations, including land-use zoning. Throughout all, reliable data, including baselines, are badly needed.

2. Benefit sharing and redistribution: Benefit sharing and redistribution mechanisms for the natural resource sector were an important element of the Peacebuilding Framework, encouraged by UNEP’s contribution to the drafting process. In order to best put this into practice, first a review of existing mechanisms for redistribution, including variability by sector, needs to be completed. After this, measures can be designed that ensure that natural resources contribute to the development of the areas and communities where they originate. Moving forward, the important role of forest conservation in medium- and long-term climate change mitigation efforts could provide benefits to local communities through REDD and other programmes.

3. Advocacy in the sector: Throughout the natural resource sector, it is essential for sustainability to become a legal requirement as well as standard practice For example, sustainable local
development should be a standard practice of extractives operators and companies, and robust environmental impact assessments a standard voluntary procedure even when enforcement capacity is light.

4. **Capacity-building at multiple levels:** The environment and natural resource sector needs a higher level of capacity throughout the government, rather than being restricted to the capital. As such, capacity-building programmes for national and local level government staff to implement legal provisions and policies regulating governance and management of resource must be a high priority.

**Security sector reform**

As outlined in the conflict analysis and the mission findings, the lack of security has had a significant direct and indirect impact on the mismanagement of natural resources and violence linked to their control and access. The commitment to reform in the security sector, including DDR, suggests that there is a role for natural resources, in particular, the development of sustainable livelihoods for former combatants. It is also important to ensure that stakeholders within the security sector reform process are sensitive to the equitable sharing of benefits from natural resources, along with access to scarce resources.

5. **Training and environmental education in the security sector:** As security sector reform moves forward, the training and employment of combatants will continue to be a key element. Sector-specific training and employment could include the rehabilitation of infrastructure for water and energy infrastructure, and the restoration and protection of protected areas. As part of this effort, environment education focused on ex-combatants, peacekeepers and national security forces will be important – for example, a code of conduct for peacekeepers and national forces with regard to natural resources.

**Development poles**

Lack of development and services (water, sanitation, energy, among others), extreme poverty and marginalization were identified as several core causes of conflict. Insecurity in specific regions has had an important impact on the economy and on the capacity of the government and local stakeholders to use them. As peace consolidates, and other factors that have contributed to conflict are progressively addressed and economic and development activities are revitalised, it is critical to ensure that the management of natural resources also contribute to this process. Increasing economic and development interventions on natural resources and the environment must integrate mechanisms to ensure their environmental sustainability. This is a key contribution to addressing the grievances of sectors of the population and rebel groups generated by neglect and marginalization, and to creating the conditions that would prevent a relapse into conflict.

6. **Mainstreaming the environment through development and recovery projects:** As infrastructure development projects, revitalization of commercial agriculture, biofuels and other energy production and other development efforts are undertaken as apart of the recovery period, sustainability must be incorporated throughout. For example, land-use changes must be carefully harmonized with overall land reform efforts, and EIAs used to ensure that commercial food and energy crop exploitation does not cause more harm than good. Similarly, a balance between land for subsistence and export agriculture must be achieved. Throughout, projects that provide sustainable livelihoods in the conflict-affected areas of CAR must be prioritized, with medium- and long-term needs close in mind.
7. **Community-based natural resource management:** As the transition from recovery to development occurs over the coming years, local level capacity-building for community-based natural resource management is important for the long term. Similar to decentralization in conception, community-based natural resource management helps to make local, rural living sustainable and works to retain the value of resources in their local regions and communities.

6.4 **Continued execution of the poverty reduction strategy**

Although the PRSP has been under implementation since 2008, it remains quite important to continue to integrate natural resources in a positive, peacebuilding fashion. Of the four pillars of the PRSP, two are covered almost identically in the peacebuilding strategy, showing the close coordination between the two documents. Two areas of the PRSP are not explicitly covered in the peacebuilding strategy, however, where the environment and natural resources can play a positive role, and should be explicitly mainstreamed.

1. **Rebuild and diversify the economy:** In three main areas, sustainable natural resource-based economic growth can contribute to recovery and peace such as sustainable and equitable timber extraction, cooperative planning by local and central authorities, and restart of sustainable, intercropped commercial agriculture.

2. **Develop human capital:** Similar to the good governance efforts, human capital outside the government is also quite important. As such, there is a need for capacity-building for natural resources management and planning in rural areas in the NGO and private sector – particularly those with scarcity problems or inefficient or inequitably shared high-value resources. Moreover, given that all too many training programmes do not lead to sustainable employment, education efforts could be focused towards "on the job" training and support, as well as including informal trade and subsistence economies.

6.5 **Selected pilot interventions**

In order to put these recommendations into action, projects must be developed that could aid the peace process in a pragmatic way. The following four pilot interventions reflect key priorities in the near term, and reflect the way that the suggested responses in sections 6.3 and 6.4 can be further explained.

1. **Law and policy reform:** A key priority for both conflict prevention and private sector development is to include a major programme to complete the legal framework for environmental governance and natural resource management, to draft all the necessary regulations and to train judges, law enforcement officers and local officials in their application. While some work is already happening towards this goal (the Rainforest Alliance is reportedly active in updating the Forest Law), the scale is nowhere near sufficient given the needs.

2. **Further develop sustainable tourism and protected areas management:** Given the fact that wildlife-based tourism and both safari and village-managed hunting represent a strong and immediate potential for foreign currency revenue, it would appear a high priority to work with the European Commission both on the continuation of ECOFAC during the design and implementation of the natural resource-related elements of the Peacebuilding Plan and to ensure that their experience, ideas and resources are fully integrated into this plan.
3. Transboundary dialogue regarding land access: In many of the conflict areas of CAR, internal problems are compounded by what is happening across the border in neighbouring countries. The situation in the northeast (and to a lesser extent in the east and southeast) is complicated by violence in neighbouring Sudan, including incursions of armed bands, large-scale movements of refugees and of those who thrive where law and order are weak. The northeast also suffers from instability in neighbouring Chad and from the massive presence of arms in both Chad and Sudan. It is clear that CAR alone cannot solve the problems that result without those same problems being successfully addressed across its northern and eastern borders. To a lesser extent, there is a need for CAR to open a dialogue with its neighbours to the north, east and south – namely Chad, DR Congo and Sudan.

4. Regional dialogue regarding transient rebels and the environment: The same model should be initiated in the area of CAR, Chad, DR Congo and Sudan, initially to deal with common problems relating to resource use and access, but with the potential to serve a wider purpose in identifying sources of tension and potential conflict. In the southwest, the environment provides a platform around which regular tri-state (Cameroon, CAR, Republic of the Congo) dialogue and cooperation might be built in a zone that has many environmentally-based sources of conflict (including the movement of Congolese rebels into CAR). Building on the contacts made through forest discussions, additional cooperation could be developed.
### Annex 1: Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADIE</td>
<td><em>Agence internationale pour le Développement de l’Information Environnementale</em> / International Agency for the Development of Environmental Information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AEF</td>
<td><em>Afrique Equatoriale Française</em> / French Equatorial Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>AfDB</td>
<td>African Development Bank</td>
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<tr>
<td>AIDS</td>
<td>acquired immunodeficiency syndrome</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANR</td>
<td><em>Agence Nationale de Radioprotection</em> / National Radioprotection Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APRD</td>
<td><em>Armée Populaire pour la restauration de la République et la Démocratie</em> / Popular Army for the Restoration of Democracy</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAR</td>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARPE</td>
<td>Central African Regional Program for the Environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBFF</td>
<td>Congo Basin Forest Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBFP</td>
<td>Congo Basin Forests Partnership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CECI</td>
<td><em>Centre d’Études et de Coopération Internationale</em> / Center for International Studies and Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIRAD</td>
<td><em>Centre de Coopération Internationale en Recherche Agronomique pour le Développement</em> / International Cooperation Centre of Development-Oriented Agricultural Research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMRN</td>
<td>Comité Militaire de Redressement National / Military Committee for National Recovery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMIFAC</td>
<td>Conference of Ministers for Forests of Central Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPJP</td>
<td><em>Conventien des Patriotes pour la Justice et la Paix</em> / Convention of the Patriots for Justice and Peace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>disarmament, demobilization, reintegration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DR Congo</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECCAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of Central African States</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOFAC</td>
<td><em>Ecosystèmes des Forêts d’Afrique Centrale</em> / Ecosystems of Central African Forests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDF 10</td>
<td>10th European Development Fund, 2008-2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EIA</td>
<td>Environmental Impact Assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EITI</td>
<td>Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUFOR</td>
<td>European Union Force Chad/CAR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FACA</td>
<td>Central African Armed Forces / <em>Forces Armées Centrafricaines</em> (known as the National Army)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agriculture Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDPC</td>
<td><em>Front Démocratique du Peuple Centrafricain</em> / Democratic Front of the Central African People</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLEGT</td>
<td>Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOMUC</td>
<td>Force Multinationale en Centrafrique / Multinational Force in Central African Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FUC</td>
<td><em>Front Uni pour le Changement</em> / United Front for Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>gross domestic product</td>
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<tr>
<td>GEF</td>
<td>Global Environment Facility</td>
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<tr>
<td>GTZ</td>
<td>German Technical Corporation</td>
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<tr>
<td>HIPC</td>
<td>Heavily Indebted Poor Countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIV</td>
<td>human immunodeficiency virus</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICSID</td>
<td>International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDA</td>
<td>International Development Association</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex 2: Glossary

Concession: A title granted by the government to companies to use a designated portion of land under terms and conditions specified by relevant codes and legal agreements.

Conflict: Conflict is a dispute or incompatibility caused by the actual or perceived opposition of needs, values and interests. In political terms, conflict refers to wars or other struggles that involve the use of force. In this report, the term “conflict” is understood to mean violent conflict.

Conflict resources: Conflict resources are natural resources whose systematic exploitation and trade in a context of conflict contribute to, benefit from, or result in the commission of serious violations of human rights, violations of international humanitarian law or violations amounting to crimes under International Law.

Ecosystem services: An ecosystem is a dynamic complex of plant, animal and micro-organism communities and the non-living environment interacting as a functional unit. Ecosystem services are the conditions and processes through which natural ecosystems, and the species that compose them, sustain and fulfill human life. These include “provisioning services” such as food, water, timber and fibre; “regulating services” that affect climate, floods, disease, wastes and water quality; “cultural services” that provide recreational, aesthetic and spiritual benefits; and “supporting services” such as soil formation, photosynthesis and nutrient cycling.

Environment: The environment is the sum of all external conditions affecting the life, development and survival of an organism. In the context of this report, the environment refers to the physical conditions that affect natural resources (climate, geology, hazards) and the ecosystem services that sustain them (e.g. carbon, nutrient and hydrological cycles).

Livelihood: A livelihood comprises the capabilities, assets (including both material and social resources) and activities required for a means of living. It is considered sustainable when it can cope with and recover from stresses and shocks, and maintain or enhance its capabilities and assets both now and in the future, while not undermining the natural resource base.

Natural resources: Natural resources are actual or potential sources of wealth that occur in a natural state, such as timber, water, fertile land, wildlife, minerals, metals, stones and hydrocarbons. A natural resource qualifies as a renewable resource if it is replenished by natural processes at a rate comparable to its rate of consumption by humans or other users. A natural resource is considered non-renewable when it exists in a fixed amount, or when it cannot be regenerated on a scale comparative to its consumption.

Non-forest timber products (NFTPs): These are all biological materials, excluding timber, which are produced by forests and extracted for subsistence or commercial purposes. They include fruits and nuts, vegetables, medicinal plants and herbs, fish and wild game, etc.

Pastoralism: The agricultural practice consisting of the breeding of livestock. It can be nomadic or sedentary.

Peacebuilding: Peacebuilding comprises the identification and support of measures needed for transformation towards more sustainable, peaceful relationships and structures of governance, in order to avoid a relapse into conflict. The four dimensions of peacebuilding are: socio-economic development; good governance; reform of justice and security institutions; and the culture of justice, truth and reconciliation.

Peacekeeping: Peacekeeping is both a political and a military activity involving a presence in the field, with the consent of the parties, to implement or monitor arrangements relating to the control of conflicts (cease fires, separation of forces) and their resolution (partial or comprehensive settlements) as well as to protect the delivery of humanitarian aid.
**Peacemaking:** Peacemaking is the diplomatic process of brokering an end to conflict, principally through mediation and negotiation, as foreseen under Chapter VI of the UN Charter.

**Security:** “State or national security” refers to the requirement to maintain the survival of the nation-state through the use of economic, military and political power and the exercise of diplomacy. “Human security” is a paradigm for understanding global vulnerabilities, which argues that the proper referent for security should be the individual rather than the State. Human security holds that a people-centred view of security is necessary for national, regional and global stability. “Environmental security” refers to the area of research and practice that addresses the linkages among the environment, natural resources, conflict and peacebuilding.

**Transhumance:** Transhumance is the seasonal movement of people with their livestock.
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Annex 4: Armed groups operating in CAR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Area and timeframe</th>
<th>Background</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Army: Forces Armées Centrafricaines (FACA) Presidential Guard</td>
<td>Based in Bangui</td>
<td>FACA lacks adequate capacities and resources to enforce security, especially in north and northeastern CAR. It needs more training and more soldiers as it can rely on only half of its total forces at any time (total of 5,000 men). The army has been reportedly involved in multiple crimes and human rights violations. According to the UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary executions, “killings by the security forces have been common, and impunity for abuses has prevailed. The security forces have been unable to protect human rights or to respect human rights, and the government has been, in turn, unwilling and unable to punish violations”. These practices led to massive civilian displacement, as did the crimes perpetrated by the Presidential Guard.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armée Populaire pour la restauration de la République et de la Démocratie (APRD)</td>
<td>Northwest Since June 2005</td>
<td>Created right after the elections that were held in 2005, with Patasse being excluded from it. Led by Jean-Jacques Demafouth (former Defence Minister under Ange-Félix Patassé), the APRD is primarily composed of former Patassé’s Presidential Guard members. Various self-defence groups also joined the APRD, as villages had been exposed to unchecked violence from various armed criminals in the area and since the government could not provide for the security of these people. Members of the APRD are from Sara and Kaba ethnic groups. Although it claims its main goal is to protect civilians, the APRD has been reportedly engaged in human rights violation on multiple occasions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union des Forces Démocratiques pour le Rassemblement (UFDR)</td>
<td>Northeast (Vakaga, Haute-Kotto) Since September 2006</td>
<td>UFDR appeared in 2006 and managed to gain control over large towns in northwestern CAR. Formation of the group can be explained by the total absence of State capacity in this marginalized area. Members of the UFDR are primarily from the Gula ethnic group (mainly muslim) who were claiming to fight against discrimination and in reaction to government fraud over compensations from Sudan for attacks in 2002. Some of the soldiers that supported General François Bozizé during his coup attempts are also part of the UFDR, claiming they did not receive proper rewards for their efforts. Assessed as being the best trained and equipped opposition armed group in CAR.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forces Démocratiques pour le Peuple Centrafricain (FDPC)</td>
<td>Central-north (near Kabo) Since 2005</td>
<td>Significantly smaller than the two other main rebel groups, FDPC is led by Abdoulaye Miskine, who was hired in 2001 by President Patassé to head security operations near Kabo. At first a very small group, it expanded in 2008 during the national dialogue. It then launched attacks against FACA and allied with the MLCJ in February 2008 for more armed operations. The FDPC claimed that the government was not complying with the peace process commitments. Miskine now lives in Libya. The FDPC has just reached an agreement with the CAR government granting amnesty for its members; 20 officers returned, but Miskine remains in Libya at the time of writing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Convention des Patriotes pour la Justice et la Paix (CPJP)</td>
<td>Since late 2008 North (N’delta)</td>
<td>The CPJP has stayed outside of the peace process, which remains the case at the time of writing. The group has clashed on several occasions with the National Army since January 2009. Led by Charles Massi, former minister under Patassé and Bozizé, the CPJP consistently disrupted the peace process in 2009. After Massi was arrested in May in Chad and released in July, it is possible the dynamic will change as he stated that he was willing to reach an agreement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mouvement des Libérateurs Centrafricains pour la Justice (MLCJ)</td>
<td>August 2008</td>
<td>A splinter group that separated from the UFDR in 2008, the MLCJ is led by Abakar Sabone, a former UFDR spokesman. After signing the 2008 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, the MLCJ took up arms again in February. It attacked national forces jointly with the FDPC, denouncing the government’s lack of political will to follow the provisions of the agreement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Front Uni pour</td>
<td>Northeast</td>
<td>FUC appeared in late 2005. It was a Chadian rebel group allegedly supported by</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**le Changement (FUC)**

| 2005–2006 | Sudan that used CAR as a safe haven, allowing its members to prepare attacks on the Chadian territory. Composed of members of the Tama ethnic group but also of the Zaghawa group (same as President Déby). It was integrated into the Union des Forces pour la Démocratie et le Développement (UFDD) in 2006, which became a part of the Union des Forces de la Résistance in January 2009. |

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**Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA)**

| Southeast Early 2008 (created 20 years ago) | The LRA is a Ugandan rebel group that found shelter in the DR Congo near the Garamba National Park. Because of their repeated attacks in southeast CAR, a thousand villagers had to abandon their home to go near the city of Obo. The latest attack was directed against the city of Mboki and occurred on 24 July 2009. The multilateral operation “lightning thunder” conducted in December 2008 and meant to hit the long-lasting rebellion hard did not have the expected impact on the LRA, but it had the effect of chasing the group from the DR Congo to CAR and Sudan. |

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**Bandits and zaraguinas**

| Northern CAR | The lack of proper security forces in the country allowed the wake of these heterogeneous groups. They have been engaging in various criminal activities including killings, rapes, abductions and looting. Because of them, thousands had to leave their homes to seek refuge in neighbouring countries such as Cameroon or Chad. Their presence along trade routes also greatly affects the circulation of goods in the country. They were not included nor mentioned in the various peace agreements although they still represent a major security issue in CAR. |

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**Poachers**

| | Well-equipped poachers from Sudan cross the border to hunt elephants and loot other natural resources such as bush-meat or bamboo. |
Annex 5: References

1 GAPAFOT is a local NGO in CAR working with poor, vulnerable people in urban and rural areas.
2 UNEP Conflict Analysis Framework
3 UNDP Human Development Report 2008
5 UNDP Annual Report 2007: Central African Republic
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   http://www.minplan-rca.org/documents-cles/doc_download/1-document-de-strategie-de-reduction-de-la-pauvrete-2008-2010-anglais
8 Bemba became the DR Congo vice-president in 2003. He was arrested on 24 May 2008 to face charges of
crimes against humanity and war crimes before the International Criminal Court.
12 Banque de France website, Presentation des Pays de la Zone Franc.
14 Economist Intelligence Unit, CAR country report, December 2008.
   http://www.worlbank.org/1HDJC8NXNO
15 The World Bank ranks CAR as 180 out of 181 on the list of “Worst Places to Do Business”.
   http://www.worlbank.org/1HDJC8NXNO
16 In May 2009, a new Mining Code was adopted. It requires mining companies to offer 15% of their capital to
the state and also give away 18% of their revenues. In a similar perspective, diamond-trading companies will
have to establish their headquarters in CAR in a building worth at least USD 320,000 (the law reads XAF 150
million) and construct an administrative building for the state anywhere in the country within three years after
their activities start worth at least USD 760,000 (XAF 350 million).
17 This index measures the degree of inequality in the distribution of family income in a country. The more nearly
equal a country's income distribution, the lower its Gini index, e.g. a Scandinavian country with an index of 25.
The more unequal a country's income distribution, the higher its Gini index, e.g. a sub-Saharan country with an
index of 50.
18 HDPT DAD Aid Management System. Presentation on aid flows in 2008 and perspectives for 2009 (recovery
gap, global economic crisis, public financial management, PRSP, DevInfo), June 2009.
http://dad.minplan-rca.org/rapports/RCA_DAD_Aide_2008_ENG_090530.pdf?attredirects=0
19 worth USD 82 million of USD 578 million total CAR debt to creditors.
http://go.worldbank.org/1HDJC8NXNO
http://www.imf.org/external/publish/PR/Pages/09245.htm
21 € 142,8 million in projects and € 34 million in direct grants.
24 Eight different companies are currently authorized to extract timber, namely: the French IFB, THANRY
Centrafrique, SESAM – reserve de Bayanga, the Lebanese SEFCA, the Syrian SCAD, plus SITI, RIO –
RIVUMA, and SYLVICOLE – reserve de Bayanga.
http://www.car-conference.net/documents
For further details see Government of CAR, briefing paper on transport, 2007.


For details, refer to Crisis States Research Centre, op. cit.


For further details see Government of CAR, briefing paper on governance, 2007.
http://www.car-conference.net/CAR_Consultation_Governance_ENG.pdf


55 The initiative is present in CAR, Gabon, Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, and Sao Tome and Principe.


57 CARPE works in Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, and Sao Tome and Principe, and is intended to continue until 2016.

58 At the end of this summit, a joint statement containing 12 resolutions ("the Yaoundé Statement") was signed and a mandate was given to the ministers in charge of forests of the respective countries to ensure its implementation. The international community, through resolution 54/214 of the United Nations General Assembly, gave its support to this initiative of the Heads of State, by way of material and financial support for the forestry development efforts of the countries of the subregion.

59 During the second extraordinary Ministerial session of September 2004 in Libreville, Gabon, the organization became the "Central Africa Forests Commission “, keeping the initials of the COMIFAC. The commission is composed of the forestry ministers of several Central African countries (CAR, Gabon, Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, and Sao Tome and Principe, Chad and DR Congo).

60 The CBFP includes Burundi, Cameroon, CAR, DR Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, the Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, and Chad; and also Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Spain, Japan, South Africa, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, the United States of America and the European Commission. Many international organizations are part of CBFP, including FAO, UNCCD, UNESCO, UNDP, UNEP and the World Bank.


63 The programme will cover six years from 2009, and its total cost is estimated at about UA 60.07 million (USD 89.6 million). It is jointly financed by an ADF grant for an amount of UA 30 million (USD 44.76 million) and other donors (GTZ, BGR, European Union, World Bank, and the Islamic Development Bank.


66 To date, enabling activities have totalled USD 1.6 million while only a single project, testing participatory approaches for sustainable management of the Bangassou Dense Forest region of southern CAR, worth USD 2.5 million on local level forest management and biodiversity conservation has been implemented. In neighbouring Cameroon and DR Congo, USD 25 million and USD 23 million of GEF medium- and large-scale projects have been implemented or approved, respectively.

67 The NCSA process has reached completion and produced two reports on climate change and desertification in October 2007.

68 The NBSAP allowed the crafting of strategies and guidelines for future key projects. It paved the way for a USD 3.5million UNDP participatory project in the densely forested area of Bangassou.

69 In the NAPA, one of the findings points to the wide vulnerability to climate-related disasters in every part of the country. Prioritization of the risks undertaken in the action plan was used to design and select key projects to support climate change adaptation.


73 IPIS, ibid.


75 See the Central African Forest Code, Title 5, Chapter III.

76 Projet d’Appui à la Réalisation des Plans d’Aménagement Forestier.
The EU’s Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade programme.


IPIS estimates that up to two tonnes of gold is exported each year in informal and formal markets. Using a conservative figure of USD 850 per ounce, it would amount to USD 25 million. See IPIS, *ibid.*, p.28.


IPIS, *ibid.*

This was the average of several estimates made by the mission’s interlocutors, most of which hovered around that number. Given that 40% of government revenue comes from the trade in diamonds, this is a serious drain on the national economy.

IPIS, *ibid.*


UraMin was taken over by the French company AREVA in 2007.


http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/country/country_energy_data.cfm?fips=CT


http://www.unitedreef.com/Projects/OilGasCentralAfrica.aspx

ICSID Case No. ARB/07/2, RSM Production Corporation v. Central African Republic.

Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding in Central African Republic, 2009-2011, p.11


REDD – Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation


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http://www.minplan-rca.org/documents-cles/doc_download/1-document-de-strategie-de-reduction-de-la-pauvrete-2008-2010-anglais


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